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PREFACE 
This idea for this dissertation emerged from two different sources: a broad interest in British 
politics and a fascination for the role of parties during times of political reform. The latter 
point perhaps needs some elaboration. Parties may design reforms of the political system 
but in doing so they will often set in train processes with unforeseen effects on themselves. 
Of particular interest is the fact that parties are not only masters but also servants of the 
political institutions where they operate, often finding that elected representatives import 
cultures and interests which deviate from the parties’ own. Moreover, parties themselves 
are carriers of historical compromises, ideological and organisational legacies which will 
often constrain and complicate attempts to change them. Following the creation of 
subnational legislatures, for example, the casual observer would expect parties to change, 
primarily by re-balancing the organisation towards the subnational level. Yet there is also 
reason to expect barriers between changes in the parties’ environment and similar reforms 
within the parties themselves. One would imagine vested interests and historically 
embedded identities (as well as conflicting strategic calculations) to be mobilised against 
party change, especially when reallocation of power is on the table. 
That speculation was the starting point of my doctoral research, which was directed 
towards political reforms underway in Britain. Here, subnational legislatures had been 
introduced in Scotland and Wales in 1999 through the process of devolution, whereas 
England, the larger constituent nation in the UK, had been granted no such autonomy. As 
part of the broader backdrop, the European Parliament had acquired a greater policy-
making influence since the mid-1990s. What were the consequences for the territorial 
organisation of British parties? To what extent was a drift now evident towards more multi-
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levelled parties, with a special role granted to Scottish and Welsh branches vis-à-vis the 
central party offices in London and with direct relations to the European level? Where 
internal barriers to such a development could be observed, how should they be 
conceptualised? 
There are a number of people whom I am indebted to for being allowed to address 
these queries through to a dissertation. I would like to express my gratitude, first, to my 
supervisor, Professor Knut Heidar, for providing precisely the comments that were needed, 
when they were needed, despite a range of formal duties to perform. Without his 
encouragement and effective supervision the research project would not have taken off nor 
managed to fly properly. I would also like to thank Professor Øyvind Østerud, my co-
supervisor, for stern leadership and steady support throughout the process. Finally, I would 
like to thank Professor Morten Egeberg, whom I had the pleasure to assist for years before 
the present project started. Without his kind encouragement and initial supervision I would 
never have dared venture into doctoral research, or an academic career, at all. 
The Department of Political Science provided an excellent working environment 
throughout the period of research. I have been lucky to be part of an exceptionally warm-
hearted cohort of PhD fellows. Among all these, I would like to thank Amund Lie for his 
highly valued friendship and for commenting on all works with academic expertise and an 
excellent sense of humour. Dag Einar Thorsen, Kristian Helland-Hansen, Stina Solhøy, Anders 
Jupskås, Aase Marthe Horrigmo, Tor Otterholt and Gudrun Østby should also be thanked in 
particular for a very pleasant community. Additionally, my gratitude goes to Knut-Andreas 
Christophersen for the opportunity to take part in the teaching of research methods over 
these four years, and to Professor Bernt Hagtvet for his unrivalled scholarly inspiration. 
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Outside the Department there are others who have been of great significance. I am 
particularly grateful to Juan Christian Pellicer, who has been a guide to the academic world, 
a great inspiration and a most formidable friend. I would also like to thank (and 
congratulate!) Pieter de Wilde, a dear fellow wanderer on the path to this degree, and to 
thank Trond Christian Anvik and Jon Hatlen for providing encouragement from earlier times 
onwards. Finally, I am grateful to Kristin M. Haugevik and Atle L. Wold for the communal 
efforts to establish British Politics Society, Norway and to Kristin in particular for all shared 
and inspiring projects underway. Within the circle of Norwegian scholars dealing with British 
politics, I would also like to thank Jan Erik Mustad, the big fella, for welcoming the young and 
aspiring in the field with such warmth. 
 The main share of the empirical work for the project was conducted through a series 
of interviews in Britain in 2008 and 2009, with parliamentarians and party staff in London, 
Edinburgh/Glasgow and Cardiff. I would like to express my gratitude to all interviewees. The 
combination of efficiency and hospitality that is genuinely British was prevalent in all these 
exchanges, which involved Members of Parliament, Welsh Assembly Members, regional 
party secretaries, election coordinators, liaison officers et cetera. At no point did anyone 
question the usefulness of a Norwegian novice studying the intricacies of British party 
organisation, nor did anyone shy away from providing information about the parties’ inner 
life. Devolution has become a much researched topic during the past decade, and research 
on internal relations in parties can be sensitive. On this backdrop, some exhaustion on the 
part of interviewees would have been justified. However, a spirit of generosity was what 
prevailed. 
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 As part of my research, I was also very lucky to be granted two rewarding research 
stays at the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield. I am very grateful to Professor Ian 
Bache for hosting the stays, for ensuring that I was introduced to the Department’s scholarly 
activities (as well as to the moors of Derbyshire) and for providing marvellous help with the 
empirical analysis throughout 2009. I would also like to thank the evaluating committee – 
Professor Hanne Marthe Narud, Professor Kris Deschouwer and Dr. Jonathan Hopkin – for 
thoroughly assessing my dissertation. 
  Finally, I would like to express my warmest gratitude to my mother and father, Anna 
Marie and Bjørn, for providing the safest harbour and for teaching us the enjoyment of 
gardening and cooking, the significance of Hamlets eplekake and the distinction between 
Astrakhan and Transparente Blanche. In the end, nothing could matter more. 
 
Lillestrøm, 28 November 2010 
Øivind Bratberg 
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Multi-level politics and party 
change – a historical 
institutionalist perspective 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Multi-level politics – the empowerment of, and interaction between, political actors at 
multiple territorial levels – has in later years been subject to increased attention in political 
science. Multi-levelness has been extensively scrutinised in the public administration 
literature. Meanwhile, research on political parties has only belatedly recognised that there 
are parallels in the processes of change traversed by party organisations. Parties operate in 
an environment where institutions at the regional and the European level rise in salience. 
How they respond in terms of internal (re)organisation is the topic of the present 
dissertation, which analyses three statewide British parties since the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in 1999. This introductory chapter gives a 
thematic backdrop, by reviewing established findings in the literature and by offering a 
historical institutionalist framework for the analysis of party change in a multi-level 
environment. Finally, a reflection on methodology and research design is offered alongside a 
brief review of the empirical articles included in the dissertation. 
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Amund Lie, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Aron Halfen, Johan Christensen and Ketil Bråthen for helpful 
comments on the draft. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Political parties in Europe have over the last decades been faced with significant changes in 
their environment – in the dominant cleavages, the role of the state and the competition 
with other forms of political activism (Katz and Mair 2009). One significant driver of change 
is the development towards increasingly multi-levelled politics. In a wider sense, there is 
nothing new in politics cutting across territorial levels. Local government is an integral part 
of all polities beyond the city state, and federal systems draw upon a constitutionally defined 
division of power between the federal state and its constituent territories.1 However, 
developments in Europe since the late 1970s have served to highlight the territorial 
dimension in a number of European states. The transition involves two parallel processes – 
domestic regionalisation and European integration – both of which challenge the pre-
eminence of the national level. As a consequence, parties which have grown and matured 
with the nation state must adapt to a context where decision-making authority is 
increasingly located outside its remit. The topic addressed in this dissertation is whether 
parties respond by reallocating power internally to align with a changing territorial structure. 
My empirical focus is the creation of subnational legislatures2 in Britain and the stepwise 
enhancement of the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The research question could 
be formulated as follows: 
 
To what extent, and through what processes, does territorial reform of the state 
lead to similar reorganisation of political parties? 
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Parties are faced with contradictory demands in responding to territorial reform. The 
dilemma is most obvious when it comes to regionalisation. The creation of subnational 
legislatures implies an acknowledgement that statewide actors are incapable of fully 
representing regional interests, and a party leadership which rejects this could be seen as 
negligent of the new democratic settlement (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006:16-18). On the 
other hand, there is a limit to how far decentralisation can run if parties are to remain 
credible statewide actors. Internal divergence is not a virtue if resulting in inconsistency and 
contradiction. Moreover, party elites will under normal circumstances be concerned not to 
support a process leading to state fragmentation. The need to acknowledge regional 
autonomy thus walks hand in hand with the need to maintain a cohesive party across the 
territory (cf. Roller and van Houten 2003). With regard to European integration, the 
challenge is somewhat different. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected 
from statewide parties but their parliamentary affiliation and the sticks and carrots available 
are cross-national (Hix 2002). Here, the challenge for statewide parties is as much about 
effectiveness as about legitimacy, as MEPs cannot be fully controlled by statewide party 
elites. However, as with regionalisation, there may be normative barriers against delegating 
power if statewide representation and national unity are seen to be more legitimate than 
legislatures below or above the national level. 
Evidently, parties are not passive victims of state reform. Regionalisation is a process 
voted through by a political majority and subject to parliamentary approval, and the EP has 
been strengthened only as a consequence of inter-governmental agreements. Yet, once 
legislatures are created, they introduce a dynamic of invested resources and claims to 
legitimacy outside the statewide political arena. Parties which are ideologically committed to 
Introduction 
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a unitary state may continue taking cues from the statewide party leadership, but one would 
expect autonomy to be yielded to party branches at regional elections (van Houten 2009). 
Overall, a basic expectation would be that parties respond to territorial reform by 
(re)aligning organisational structures with the structure of the state, understood here as the 
formal allocation of power and requirements for interaction between the national and the 
regional level of government. The realities of party change however suggest that the process 
is more complex: parties respond to decentralisation by different forms and degrees of 
organisational change, often (but not exclusively) in line with party policy concerning the 
state structure. There are various theoretical schools which could account for these 
differences. This dissertation draws upon historical institutionalism (HI), where explanation 
is sought in the historical trajectory of the individual party. In particular, what will be 
highlighted are the organisational and ideational legacies providing the point of departure 
for party change. There have been few attempts in the literature on political parties to draw 
lines to institutionalist theory. However, parties like other organisations in the public sphere 
can be conceptualised as institutions: indeed, to a larger extent than most organisations, 
parties supply their members with a clear set of inherited norms (Peters 1999:112-14). To 
paraphrase a classical tenet, party reformers make their own history, but not under 
circumstances of their own choosing; dead generations weigh as heavily on political parties 
as on other actors in political life.3  
While the research topic extends to party politics in multi-level polities across 
Europe, the empirical analysis is limited to the study of three statewide parties in Britain4 
since devolution, that is, the creation in 1999 of the Scottish Parliament (with primary 
legislative and limited tax-varying powers) and the National Assembly for Wales (with 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
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secondary legislative and no tax-varying powers). In part two of this introductory chapter I 
discuss how the dependent variable, parties’ internal allocation of power across territorial 
levels, can be operationalised. Part three gives a brief summary of existing literature on 
multi-level parties (MLPs), taking as starting point how they have been analysed in federal 
systems and then evaluating the literatures on party response to regionalisation and 
European integration. In part four, I elaborate a historical institutionalist perspective on 
party change and formulate two rival hypotheses. The fifth part of the chapter discusses 
methodological choices; I then summarise the empirical articles included in the dissertation 
in part six before the chapter is concluded with a brief assessment of the hypotheses in part 
seven. 
 
2. MEASURING ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE MLP: 
CENTRALISATION VS. STRATARCHY  
A general definition of the MLP could be a party organisation with multiple lines of 
accountability and a division of authority between relatively autonomous party sections 
below and/or above the national level.5 This definition focuses on the organisational 
dimension of parties. The operationalisation of power is conventional: in a party, power 
concerns control over output in the form of candidate and leadership selection, campaigning 
and policy formulation. According to Carter et al. (2007:10), “those who have power within a 
party can decisively influence what a party stands for, how it competes in different electoral 
arenas, and who will be elected to party and public offices”. Indicators such as the selection 
of candidates, formulation of manifestos, control over finances and organisation of 
Introduction 
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campaigns provide comparative information about where power resides in a party. 
Measuring the dependent variable thus implies investigating where in the party control over 
these activities is located and to what extent that control changes hands over time. 
There is little consensus in the literature with regard to which, if any, of the indicators 
above is primordial to the territorial allocation of power in a party. While some contributions 
focus on one indicator only – such as candidate selection (Lundell 2004) or manifestos 
(Mazzoleni 2009) – others combine the indicators pragmatically (Hopkin 2003, Laffin et al. 
2007). Regional control over candidate and leadership selection is sometimes seen as 
decisive to party decentralisation; however, regional candidate selection could be merely 
symbolic without sufficient autonomy on policy formulation and manifestos.6 In the 
dissertation, the indicators of power allocation I apply are considered to be additive. The 
basic dimension to which they contribute runs from centralisation to stratarchy (Laffin et al. 
2007). Where regional party branches are granted enhanced power over candidates, 
manifestos, finances and/or campaigns, we may infer that change towards a more 
stratarchical party has occurred. Stratarchy is the opposite of hierarchy, referring to a 
federal division of responsibility between commanding military generals (OED 2010). The 
idea of multiple lines of accountability and a federal relationship between levels of 
command give stratarchy analytical leverage vis-à-vis decentralisation, which is a general 
term referring to increased dispersal of authority or responsibility. At the opposite end of 
the axis centralisation is preferred to hierarchy; the latter has particular connotations to 
ecclesiastical or inter-personal rather than intra-organisational relationships (ibid.). Thus, we 
arrive at the dichotomy of centralisation vs. stratarchy. This is the basic dimension along 
which I assess the territorial allocation of power in a party organisation. 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
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A caveat may be added to this conventional understanding of power allocation in parties. 
Power can be indirect and relational rather than direct and observable (Poguntke and Webb 
2005). For example, the endorsement of specific regional leaders and candidates by the 
statewide party leadership may be highly significant to subnational politics, as witnessed by 
candidate selection for the devolved legislatures in Britain (Bradbury et al. 2000). In prosaic 
terms, the opportunity for regional branches to chart a separate course – be it in terms of 
policy or personnel – must be acted upon in order to yield substantial results. More 
philosophically, an exhaustive analysis of the MLP requires a scope which includes the 
interpretative side of party politics – the issue of how and why a regional party branch 
differentiates itself from the statewide party and what implications this may have for 
policies and for the actors involved (Moon and Bratberg 2010). Article two and four in the 
dissertation follow this lead to some extent, the former in examining the relationship 
between Welsh Assembly Members (AMs) and Members of Parliament (MPs), the latter in 
analysing how policy divergence between England and Scotland is reflected in party rhetoric. 
These two articles take a tentative step towards investigating how the meaning attached to 
the political process mediate the changing opportunity structures created by devolution.7 
 
2.1. Autonomy and influence 
In line with the conception of stratarchy, an organisation could be seen as decentralised “to 
the extent that discretion and authority to make important decisions are delegated by top 
management to lower levels of executive authority” (Simon et al. 1954:1). Moreover, the 
degree of decentralisation is greater the more decisions are made lower down the hierarchy 
Introduction 
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and the more important those decisions are (Dale 1952:149-50).8 This is useful as a point of 
departure, but it emphasises merely the autonomy of lower levels to make decisions within 
their remit. What should also be included in our understanding of stratarchy is the degree to 
which regional party branches are acknowledged as constituent units in the party and 
thereby permitted influence over decisions made at the centre. Regional party branches will, 
in order to strengthen their position in the overall party, have an interest both in maximising 
their autonomy from and their influence over the statewide party, particularly where the 
structure of the state requires close interaction for example through regional representation 
in the upper house of the statewide legislature (Swenden and Maddens 2009c:268). Hence 
the strength of regional branches could thus be measured both by their autonomy from the 
centre and their influence over joint affairs (Moon and Bratberg 2010). An instructive 
example of enhanced influence would be where party change secures regional branches 
representation at the governing board of the statewide party. A similar logic applies to the 
relationship between the statewide party and its party group in the EP: autonomy denotes 
the leeway to decide upon candidate selection, manifestos, campaigns and finances in 
relation to the EP; influence means the capacity to impact upon the European policy 
development, manifesto and campaigns of the statewide party and to be granted positions 
in the governing structures of the organisation. Integrating the intra-party relationships 
below and above the national level in a joint conception of the MLP is thus a way of 
analysing parties as they emerge from the processes of regionalisation and European 
integration. 
Separate spheres of authority and multiple lines of accountability are characteristic of 
the MLP (figure 1.1). The issue of authority implies that regional party branches and the EP 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
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party group will enjoy a certain organisational autonomy (and thus control various indicators 
of power), a certain influence over the statewide party. The issue of accountability implies 
that regional party branches are responsible partly towards their own members and voters 
and partly towards the statewide party organisation. In organisational terms, the EP party 
group is partly accountable to the statewide party, partly to the Europarty in which it is 
integrated and partly to the regional branches from which MEPs are recruited. Europarties 
are the party federations at the European Union (EU) level to which statewide parties are 
affiliated and which thus constitute the political platform for legislative work in the EP (Bardi 
1994, Delwit et al. 2001). 
 
Figure 1.1: The party as a multi-level organisation (arrows signifying lines of 
accountability)9 
    Europarty 
 
 
Statewide party 
 
 
Regional party branch   Regional party branch 
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3. PARTIES AND TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE: A BRIEF 
LITERARY REVIEW 
The rise of alternative sources of power below and above the national level has generated 
research from several theoretical traditions. A great number of these contributions are 
grounded in the public administration literature and guided by the concept of multi-level 
governance (MLG). MLG combines a focus on multiple territorial levels with the perceived 
transition from government to governance, where regulatory policies are increasingly 
delegated to agencies, the market and the voluntary sector (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Bache 
and Flinders 2005). Grounded in the practice of public sector institutions, governance is not 
a concept to be readily adapted to political parties. However, the multi-levelness highlighted 
by MLG has a broader relevance, and it is therefore surprising to see that consciousness of 
territorialisation was long amiss in the party literature (Hopkin 2003, Deschouwer 2006). 
Other debates have occupied more scholarly attention by addressing a number of perceived 
challenges to political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, Gunther et al. 2002). 
Membership decline and falling activism have been seen as tokens of falling legitimacy. 
Debates have multiplied over the traditional forms of representative democracy and the role 
of parties in it, an issue of relevance across Europe but particularly prevalent in Britain 
(Poguntke 2002, Crick 2005, Stoker 2006, Hay 2007). 
In later years, however, an empirical literature on MLPs has emerged. Decentralising 
reform of the state – exemplified by Belgium, Spain, Italy, France and Britain – has taken 
these polities closer to federal systems by creating legislatures below the national level. Thus 
the scope for territorial cleavages has expanded – both as potential friction within the 
statewide parties and as a battle between parties committed to the integrity of the state and 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
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ethno-regionalist parties advocating further regionalisation. Running in parallel with this 
development, European integration has affected the way parties operate domestically and 
tied them closer to Europarties (Kreppel 2001, Ovey 2001). EU membership creates a new 
set of opportunity structures and commitments. The rising prominence of the EP could lead 
to a pressure towards detachment of party groups from national capitals, as policies are 
increasingly developed and agreed in the EP. In sum, multi-level politics conveys a dilution of 
political authority formerly vested in the nation state. In order to understand these 
processes, given their relatively short history, a brief consideration of how parties organise 
in federal systems is appropriate. Below I will provide this, and then review established 
findings with regard to party organisation under regionalisation and European integration. 
 
3.1. Parties in federal systems 
The basic political fact of federalism is that it creates separate, self-sustaining centers 
of power, privilege, and profit which may be sought and defended as desirable in 
themselves, as means of leverage upon elements in the political structure above and 
below, and as bases from which individuals may move to places of greater influence 
and prestige in and out of government.10 
 
The literature on parties in federal systems is extensive (Truman 1955; Chandler and 
Chandler 1987; Hrbek 2004), even if there is little theoretical reflection on the dynamic of 
party reform, that is, whether and how territorial reform of the state engenders party 
change (Heidar 2007). The legal definition of a federal system is that federal and regional 
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jurisdictions are constitutionally defined, that constituent territories (regions/states) are 
ensured representation at the federal level, that there are specified thresholds for 
constitutional reform and a neutral arbiter to resolve conflict over competencies (Swenden 
2006:9-10). The origin could be a set of geographical entities which unite – as was the case 
with the United States – or the federation could emerge through decentralisation, whereby 
 
the powers of the central government [will be] devolved upon the subordinate bodies 
in such a way that both central and regional units are thenceforth endowed with 
certain powers and functions of which neither can be deprived by the other.11 
 
Federal systems are characterised by constitutional differentiation between a regional and a 
federal level, each with separate accountability to the electorate through distinct electoral 
arrangements. Some powers are reserved to the regions, but the federal level retains the 
ultimate authority over a set of key policy areas such as foreign policy, defence and 
monetary policy (Watts 1998). Beyond the core of definitional characteristics there are 
important differences between federal systems with regard to division of tasks and the 
formal relationship between the federal and the regional level. Within the literature, a 
distinction is usually drawn between cooperative (or functional) federalism on the one hand 
and dual (jurisdictional) federalism on the other. Cooperative federalism follows the German 
model, supported by a functional division of labour: primary legislation is created at the 
centre, while implementation is mainly the responsibility of the regional level. Within this 
system, regional executives are represented in the federal upper house, which makes 
internal consensus evermore important for the parties involved. Cooperative federalism is 
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characterised by bargaining and territorial interdependence within and across parties. 
Parties operating under cooperative federalism learn to integrate tightly to defend their 
interests effectively at the federal level: this is confirmed by the German case (Renzsch 
2004:27). Dual federalism, by contrast, encourages institutional separation rather than 
fusion. Instead of a functional division of labour between legislation and implementation, 
competencies are divided by policy domain. Both territorial levels legislate and implement 
within domains of their jurisdiction: competencies are thus defined mainly by sector, and 
government institutions are duplicated on a smaller scale in each of the constituent regions 
(Chandler and Chandler 1987:93). This prepares the ground for a political system with clear 
borders between the federal and regional level. Separate rather than joint powers are a key 
principle of dual federalism. Within the parties, this typically results in a high degree of 
autonomy and loose structures for coordination (Thorlakson 2009:159). Canada and the 
United States are ideal-typical examples of systems based upon dual federalism. 
As a constitutional framework, federalism clearly enhances the scope for internal 
diversity. A common claim in the literature is furthermore that the form of federal 
arrangements structure the way in which parties organise (Chandler and Chandler 1987:89). 
Germany is perhaps the best example: since the process of legislation cuts across the 
distinction between federal and regional, political parties adapt by similarly close 
organisational integration between the two levels (Heidar 2007). Electoral politics also 
reflects this, in terms of political recruitment as well as coordinated coalition alignments at 
the regional level (although the latter has started to diversify in later years – cf. Detterbeck 
and Jeffery 2009:67). Federal parties are thus cooperative ventures in Germany, whereas 
federalism in Canada favours a dual approach to party organisation, with more limited 
Introduction 
14 
 
interaction, clearer internal demarcation of competencies and less extensive recruitment 
between the levels. In this general sense, then, party organisation reflects the distinctive 
ways in which federal systems are structured. The validity of this assumption has also been 
proven when it comes to centralism vs. stratarchy. Thorlakson (2009), for example, examines 
the relationship between state structure and party organisation across seven federations 
and finds that centralised states (with a greater share of public revenues and expenses 
controlled by the federal level) display more centralised political parties; that is, parties 
granting less autonomy to regional branches (Thorlakson 2009:170).12 
William Riker (1964:137) gave a particular twist to this argument: as party structures 
typically reflect federal structures, the former should count as an indicator of the degree of 
federal centralisation. As empirical research has shown, however, reality is more complex. 
Party structures are not a simple consequence of the way the state is organised, but over 
time, development supports the hypothesis that specific federal systems encourage special 
organisational forms. The German parties are paradigmatic examples, starting afresh under 
the federal system after the Second World War yet with ideological baggage from previous 
eras in German politics. The social democratic SPD carried a past as a heavily centralised 
party with direct hierarchical links to the local level, while the Christian democratic CDU 
originated in the postwar era at the Land level, before establishing the federal party in 1950 
(Detterbeck and Jeffery 2009:69). Both legacies have continued to permeate the parties. SPD 
developed formal party branches at the Land level as late as the 1960s, and the tension over 
competencies has continued between Land and district branches. CDU, while strengthening 
the federal level’s coordinating capacity, over the last four decades, is still characterised by 
multiple regional voices on policy and organisation (ibid.). The postwar development of the 
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two dominant German parties is one of convergence – from centralism to federalism in SDP, 
from confederalism to federalism proper in CDU (although the latter has maintained a 
confederal relationship with CSU which represents the movement in Bavaria) (Gabriel 
1989:67). In later years, the argument has been made that the preconditions of the closely 
integrated German party system are weakening. Regional disparities, separate interests and 
federal-regional detachment are features which are reflected also in the operation of 
parties. Renszch (2004:199) adds the significance of European integration and globalisation 
to this perspective: regional interests are increasingly viewed as stretching beyond rather 
than within the frame of the federal state. In a context of multiple territorial levels, politics is 
becoming denationalised. 
 
3.2. Parties and regionalisation 
With regard to party organisation, how does federalism compare with the regionalised 
political systems which have emerged in a number of European states since the 1980s? 
Traditionally, parties in unitary states have been analysed in a separate literature from party 
organisation in federal systems. Party politics in regionalised states has fallen between the 
categories, as the conventional view of parties as unitary, hierarchically structured 
organisations was rarely questioned in party research within Europe. The lacuna was 
addressed by Hopkin (2003) and Deschouwer (2003, 2006), who proposed clearer 
conceptualisation and enhanced attention to parties’ territorial dimension. A cascade of 
empirical studies has followed since. Research has looked at electoral politics as well as party 
organisation, increasingly from a comparative perspective (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 
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Swenden and Maddens 2009a). Moreover, a string of individual case studies have added to 
the stock of knowledge on parties and territorial reform, with Britain, Belgium and Spain 
providing much of the data (Brzinski 1999, Swenden 2002, Hopkin and Bradbury 2006, Fabre 
2008, Hopkin 2009). This territorial turn in the literature also implies that the analytical 
distinction between federalised and regionalised is no longer clear-cut: this has, 
interestingly, been a conventional argument in the MLG literature (Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
The empirical research on parties in regionalised states can be summarised in a few 
key observations. First, the delegation of power from the national level is generally followed 
by decentralisation within the parties. Secondly, in line with findings from the federalism 
literature, where subnational legislatures are created it often takes time for parties to 
reform and decentralise their organisations along similar lines. Thirdly, there is considerable 
scope for idiosyncrasies underway, depending on ideology, party leadership and 
entrepreneurship (Swenden and Maddens 2009b:14-15, Thorlakson 2009). In terms of how 
parties adapt their organisational structures, there are clear parallels between the 
federalism and regionalism literatures. The trajectory of the parties in Spain gives an 
interesting parallel to the development in federal Germany. As in the German case, there 
has been organisational convergence between the two dominant parties, one of which, the 
conservative Partido Popular (PP), carries a strongly centralist legacy, whereas the other, the 
social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), has drawn heavily on regional 
strongholds and a party structure closer to stratarchy. The historical backdrop is particular to 
Spain. PSOE emerged from the Franco era to rebuild the party from regional strongholds and 
chieftains and with an ideology of regional autonomy. PP is radically different in carrying the 
torch of centralism inherited from the conservative right (Fabre and Méndez-Lago 
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2009:116). There is a strong parallel within each of the parties between territorial structure 
preferred for the state and the principles upon which the parties themselves are structured 
(ibid.). This confirms the argument that debates on the balance of power between central 
and regional government is reproduced within the parties, as a struggle over how 
competencies and tasks should be allocated (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). 
 
3.3. Parties and European integration 
While parties are essential vehicles of representation at the national level they are only 
marginal actors in the EU, where policy is made by the triumvirate of the Commission, the EP 
and the Council. Governing parties may influence national positions in the Council, and in 
the EP they are present through their MEPs: however, influence even over the MEPs is not 
exclusive, as they are also accountable to Europarties. The input that national parties 
contribute to the EU system is therefore limited. Meanwhile, at the other end of the cycle, 
the output from EU policy processes is of obvious significance to them. Statewide parties see 
their own scope for action constrained by EU policies which commit member states to 
specific courses of action. Thus, parties are deeply affected by the EU yet incapable of 
directly affecting its decisions. 
Much of the recent literature on EU and its member states is structured by the 
concept of Europeanisation – that is, “change and adaptation which is understood to be a 
consequence of the development of the European Union” (Ladrech 2002:389–90). 
Europeanisation highlights the response of actors and institutions to the changes in their 
environment that the EU has incurred through expansion and deepening from the mid-1980s 
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onwards (ibid.:393).13 A recent, comparative study by Poguntke et al. (2007) finds limited 
change in parties as a result of European integration. The little change there is supports the 
hypothesis that European integration has led to a weakening of party activists and 
empowerment of elites. This is accelerated when the party is in government (Raunio 2002). 
According to Ladrech (2007:948-49), “parties have essentially isolated the EU within the 
broad range of their activities and in effect have ‘outsourced’ EU-related policy and decision-
making to unelected advisers and experts, whose actions are legitimated only by party elites 
in government”. European integration, it seems, adds a final element to the “iron law of 
oligarchy”, ensuring that a small elite shares the spoils of power.14 
In the EP, an arena where parties could exert some influence, there are only rare 
attempts by statewide parties at reining in their MEPs. The work within the EP is largely 
detached from domestic politics and generates other commitments and loyalties. MEPs 
enact their parliamentary role on a double mandate, representing the home parties that 
select them as well as the Europarties that control committee assignments, speaking time 
and policy initiatives in the EP (Hix 2002:688-89). Rather than monitoring the ongoing 
activities of their MEPs, parties concentrate on ensuring that suitable candidates are 
selected (Raunio 2000). Labour, interestingly, represents one of the most conspicuous 
efforts at tying the MEPs closer to the party at home. In return for enhanced control by the 
statewide party over MEPs, the latter are granted influence over policy development in 
London. This “link system” is however dependent on the party being in government, as the 
key property of the system is the exchange between policy spokespersons in the EP and 
ministerial teams in London (Messmer 2003). 
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A final side of Europeanisation, particularly apt given the analytical focus of the dissertation, 
is the potential empowerment of regional party branches. There are multiple examples in 
the literature today of how the regional level seeks to promote its interests at the European 
scene (Jeffery 1997, 2000, Marks et al. 2002, Tatham 2008). This literature has 
predominantly been occupied with the executive arm of regional government, although 
liaison and representation of subnational legislatures have also been examined (Kiiver 2006, 
Raunio and Wright 2006).15 The parallel which this literature invites is whether regional party 
branches parties follow a similar path to that of regional executives. Tatham (2008:504) 
suggests that the EP could be “an effective channel to promote sub-state interests within the 
EU arena, especially when MEPs are elected on the basis of regional constituencies”. Going a 
step further, we should also investigate whether the parallel to the bypass thesis of MLG has 
any relevance to political parties (figure 1.1, p. 9). Could Scottish and Welsh party branches 
go as far as establishing their own relationship with European party groups, autonomous 
from the statewide party elites? Each of the processes of regionalisation and European 
integration sketched above merits further research attention. Hitherto, attempts at 
combining domestic regionalisation and European integration in research have been few and 
far between (Brinzski 1999, Magone 2003, McGarry and Keating 2006, article 3 in this 
dissertation). This is an area which should be subject to further study in the fledgling 
empirical research on MLPs. 
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4. EXPLAINING (THE FORM AND EXTENT OF) PARTY 
CHANGE 
Research on territorial reform and party change in Europe has found limited scope for 
generalisation. According to a recent, authoritative study of territorial politics in Europe, 
“there is no grand theory to explain the organizational or campaign strategies of statewide 
parties which operate in a multilevel electoral context” (Swenden and Maddens 2009c:268). 
Various mediating variables have been proposed to account for party organisational change. 
Government incumbency has some explanatory leverage, but is a context-specific feature 
relevant only to a minority of parties at a given time.16 More pertinently, party family is 
often raised as the most significant intervening variable. Detterbeck and Hepburn (2010:124) 
contend that parties on the left are more disposed to decentralise power internally, whereas 
Swenden and Maddens (2009b:23) argue that the difference runs between liberal and 
Christian democratic parties (which are stratarchically disposed) and social democratic and 
conservative parties (which have a preference for centralisation). The same authors later 
concede that party family merely provides a tentative idea of party position on the 
centralisation vs. stratarchy axis (2009c:260-63). In later years, moreover, too many parties 
have changed their approach for party family to be a stable predictor. Conservative parties 
have, in several cases, changed from unitary organisations towards enhanced recognition of 
regional branches; social democrats have, on their part, moved from positions as essentially 
centralised parties in the era of welfare state development towards a regionalist (as well as 
Europeanist) agenda.17  
Party policy about the appropriate structure of the state has been mentioned 
repeatedly as an explanatory variable of party organisation. However, policies could emerge 
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alongside party organisational change rather than being analytically prior to it. More 
convincingly, I will argue below, explanations of the degree and form of party change should 
look back to the organisational and ideational legacies of each party with regard to 
territorial allocation of power. In order to establish this perspective we need a baseline 
reference. The rationalist perspective discussed below elaborates how party change should 
proceed if parties respond instrumentally to changes in their environment. 
 
4.1. The rationalist perspective18: adaptive reform 
In a survey article of the empirical literature on party change, Harmel (2002) uses the 
relative emphasis upon external and internal causes as a criterion for a threefold typology. 
Harmel distinguishes between:  
- explanations referring to system-level trends to which all parties in a given system at 
a given time are exposed; 
- explanations grounded in the life cycle shared by all parties of a similar origin 
- explanations of discrete change, which draw upon a combination of external and 
internal causes to account for change in individual parties.  
 
The first of these categories, the system-level trends approach, draws upon the premise that 
parties in a system are subject to a set of shared challenges to which they respond through 
organisational reform. Hence, when requirements change, convergence around new 
organisational models is to be expected to ensure survival and facilitate success. This 
approach comprises several of the classics in political party research. The mass party of 
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Duverger (1951), Kirchheimer’s catch-all party (1966), Panebianco’s electoral-professional 
party (1988) and Katz and Mair’s cartel party (1995) broadly subscribe to explanations by 
way of system-level trends. Parties respond to social, economic and technological change by 
adapting their organisation accordingly: change is often gradual but it is rational in form and 
result. An instructive example is Duverger (1951), who observed how conservative and 
liberal parties adopted the organisational model cultivated by socialist mass organisations to 
secure the necessary manpower and organisational base for electioneering. The result was 
convergence around the mass party template, seen as most efficient for the postwar epoch 
of mass mobilisation. Similarly, the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995) sums up a set of shared 
qualities characterising parties in a post-ideological, post-mass mobilisation era where 
parties have become professionalised and embedded in the state apparatus.  
System-level trends denote long-term processes as the usual source of change, 
assuming that the costs of non-adaptation will be steadily growing till a threshold is reached 
(Harmel 2002:133).19 The belief in adaptation to changing environmental demands is a 
hallmark of rationalism (Pierson 2000b).  In the context of political parties, the relationship 
between state and party structure in federal systems chimes well with a rationalist 
approach. If we accept the assumption that parties seek to maximise electoral support, the 
intuitive optimising strategy with regard to territorial strategy is to shadow the structure of 
the state. Furthermore, if parties are perceived as unitary and rational actors, alignment of 
state and party structures should be expected to occur swiftly in response to state reform. 
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) see the allocation of power in parties as responsive to where 
power is located in the state. If authority is increasingly concentrated in the capital, parties 
follow suit in their internal allocation of power. Should the development be reversed, one 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
23 
 
would expect that parties adapt accordingly, in line with the predominance under federalism 
of “loose, non-programmatic catch-all formations that can accommodate divergent regional 
interests” (Chandler and Chandler 1987:89). Decentralisation of the parties should thus be 
seen as a logical consequence of the changing territorial structure of the federation. 
According to Eldersveld, in his classic account of MLPs: 
 
[T]he party must cope with widely varying local milieus of opinion, tradition, and 
social structure, and this encourages the recognition and acceptance of local 
leadership, local strategy, local power… Thus, a kind of ‘balkanization’ of power 
relations occurs, with variations in the extent of autonomy in middle and lower 
hierarchical strata from one habitat to the next.20 
 
From this vantage point, the hierarchical party structure is unworkable within the framework 
of federalism. In its place, Eldersveld (1954:9) postulates an egalitarian division of labour 
between territorial levels: such delegation of organisational command is seen as enabling 
proximity and adaptability to different electoral circumstances.  An interesting application to 
the contemporary, multi-level environment is given by Carty (2004). Here, organisational 
authority is geographically dispersed and responsibilities between the central party and 
subnational units resemble a franchise: the former provides “the basic product line” 
whereas the latter are responsible for “delivering the product” on the ground (Carty 
2004:9,11). In line with the franchise metaphor, parties can display different faces, policies 
and coalition partners while maintaining an overarching unity with the federal party. The 
party as a whole enjoys the benefits of an acknowledged brand which is fine-tuned to 
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different territorial contexts. In terms of a territorialisation of politics, the franchise or 
stratarchical party as conceptualised by Eldersveld (1964) and Carty (2004) comes close to 
the ideal-type party organisation as seen from the rationalist perspective. Such adaptation is 
not constrained to developments within the state: Brzinski’s (1999) study of party strategy in 
Belgium provides an instructive example of how the creation of formal opportunity 
structures below and above the national level – through federalisation and the 
strengthening of the European Parliament – has spurred party organisational change and 
empowered the subnational and European level of the parties. 
I should conclude this brief review by returning to the argument that rational parties 
do not have to reorganise in response to decentralising reform of the state. In parties which 
are strongly committed to statewide unity (and where this is reflected in a hierarchical 
allocation of power), there will often be strong resistance against organisational reform. This 
could be the case not only among party elites, but also among activists, members and 
voters. If so, could not the maintenance of a centralised organisation be a rational response? 
Although this argument is defensible in theory, it is difficult to see how it could be 
sustainable in practice. The claim that regional branches in the party are not trusted by the 
centre will be an easy accusation to make: likewise, where subnational legislatures are 
endowed with a separate electoral mandate it is difficult to see how a party can mount a 
defence for sustained command from the centre. Hence, in a regionalised state, it is a 
reasonable claim that rationalism suggests a stratarchical party organisation. Rationalism in 
the form sketched above leaves aside many complicating factors, but for heuristic purposes, 
it serves the theoretical discussion well. HI, as we will see, has less to offer in terms of 
parsimony but much to reflect upon in terms of supplementing the rationalist perspective. 
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4.2. The historical institutionalist perspective 
According to HI, parties – as other organisations – do respond to environmental demands. 
The question is what mediates between environmental stimuli and organisational change, 
based on the credo that rationalist explanation is incomplete (Pierson 2004:131). Vis-à-vis 
theories on party change, a linkage could be drawn to what Harmel refers to as the discrete 
change approach. Here, organisational change is seen to arise from the interaction of 
external and internal causes, with a leadership grasping the opportunity for reform created 
by external stimuli (Harmel 2002:127-28). This approach to party change is less disposed to 
generalisation as it is typically concerned with explaining processes of change in individual 
parties rather than across a party system or among all parties of a certain origin. 
Harmel and Janda (1994:265) differentiate between external causes of varying 
importance, claiming that the most important stimuli are those that leads a party to evaluate 
is effectiveness in meeting its primary goal, whether that is electoral success or other 
ambitions. Environmental stimuli of this radical kind can engender organisational change 
that cuts deeper and is more extensive than what could have been created by internal 
factors alone. Their analysis leans upon the perception of parties as following different 
primary goals, typically distinguished as vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking 
(Strom 1990). Appleton and Ward (1997) on their part argue that environmental stimuli are 
not always related to party goals. Periodic stimuli (longer-term, systemic causes with 
threshold effects) and accidental stimuli (sudden incidents disrupting the balance of power 
in the party) can each in their own way be causes of change. Moreover, between 
environmental stimuli and party change there are important mediating variables: party 
factionalism (cohesive leadership increases probability of reform), institutionalisation (low 
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institutionalisation increases probability of reform) and system fragmentation (high system 
fragmentation increases probability of reform) (Appleton and Ward 1997:344-47). 
Both these contributions are consistent with Swenden and Maddens’ (2009c:268) 
observation that parties respond differently to decentralising reform of the state. My own 
analysis is close to Appleton and Ward’s approach, but I will argue that with regard to 
territorial reform, the set of mediating variables must be revised. First, party factionalism is 
ambiguous when it comes to territorial allocation of power. Should factionalism also take 
into account elite alliances across territorial levels? Does cohesive leadership imply cross-
level consensus on the direction and extent of reform? In this thesis I substitute 
leadership/entrepreneurship for the party factionalism variable. Secondly, with regard to 
party system fragmentation, it is not clear what the significance of different subnational 
systems might be. It is conceivable that pressure to decentralise will increase in territories 
where the party enjoys particularly strong support, but not necessarily so. I therefore choose 
to omit party system fragmentation from my model. In the view I will put forward, it is 
institutionalisation in the form of organisational and ideational legacies that provides the 
most fruitful variable mediating between territorial reform and party organisational change 
(cf. Hopkin and Bradbury 2006, Fabre 2008, Hopkin 2009). 
According to HI, similar stimuli can lead to very different outcomes depending on 
features that are endogenous to the individual organisation (cf. March and Olsen 2006a:8). A 
party that is institutionalised becomes, in the eyes of its members and supporters, 
increasingly detached from instrumental utility, less oriented towards performance goals 
and more towards maintenance of the identities attached to the organisation (Selznick 
1957:17, Jaffee 2001:227). The party’s purpose is redefined towards consolidation; 
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evaluation of performance becomes less transparent and interests invested in the status quo 
stronger (Panebianco 1988:53, Appleton and Ward 1997:348). March and Olsen (2006b:691) 
define an institution as a “relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in 
structures of resources that make action possible […] and structures of meaning that explain 
and justify behavior” (italics in the original). The context of a party organisation is a fitting 
one: control over candidate selection, formulation of manifestos, finances etc. provide 
resources while ideational legacies constitute structures of meaning which pin down and 
justify the allocation of power in the party. Unlike other types or organisations, the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of parties are put to the test through the ballot paper 
rather than through customer loyalty, public acknowledgement or other tokens of approval. 
However, in each of its functions, such as recruiting members, developing policy, seeking 
voters’ support, attaining office and implementing policies, parties display similar qualities to 
those of civil society organisations or business corporations (although the combination of 
qualities that parties represent may be unique) (Schlesinger 1984, Jaffee 2001:208-10).  
 
4.2.1. Historical institutionalism and party change 
In the relatively small literature on party change, parties are typically conceived as 
fundamentally conservative when it comes to reforming ideological position as well as 
organisational structures (Harmel and Janda 1994:261-62). Parties are, in the words of 
Wilson (1980:532) “shielded from the impact of a changing environment by the force of 
tradition”. The few deviations from this pattern typically occur in relation to performance 
crises or other types of external shocks and windows of opportunity for reform, concepts 
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which lean heavily on institutionalist perspectives (Egeberg 2003). Panebianco (1988:18-19) 
draws a distinction between the party organisation as a rational model vs. a natural system: 
moving from the former to the latter is precisely what occurs when a party is 
institutionalised. An institutionalised party is dominated by consolidation and interests 
invested in the status quo. However, the tension remains between offensive strategies 
towards fulfilment of party goals (characteristic of younger parties) and defensive strategies 
to protect the acquired status of elites and professionals in the party. 
HI emerged as part of the turn to institutions in the political science literature from 
the 1980s. Summarised under the heading of new institutionalism, these contributions 
aimed at refocusing attention towards the structural and normative context in which 
decision making occurs (March and Olsen 1984, 1989). Different typologies have been 
proposed to distinguish between the multiple directions within the institutionalist literature 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, Lowndes 1996, Peters 1999). HI has been defined against rational 
choice institutionalism (where institutions appear as the rules of the game structuring 
interaction) and sociological institutionalism (where institutions define norms and identities 
which determine individual behaviour). HI, it is argued, charts a middle way between these 
approaches, seeing preference formation as constrained but not determined by collective 
institutions whose form and legitimacy are derived from past practices (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2000:16; cf. Simon 1957).21 With regard to institutional change, HI refutes the 
belief that institutions change in response to changes in their environment. Typically, 
adaptation and change of inherited wisdom is late, inefficient and characterised by path-
dependence and myopia rather than rational reform (March and Olsen 2006a:7,11). The 
concept of path dependence holds particular importance. The analysis of the QWERTY 
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keyboard is a paradigmatic example of how certain technological solutions are “locked in” 
and halt further innovation, illustrating how rationality at the individual level may lead to a 
suboptimal collective outcome (Arthur 1989). In organisational life, the path dependence 
argument contends that predominant features – ideational and structural – are locked in 
from an organisation’s initial phase. Development is typically conceptualised as a branching 
model: once specific choices are made, it is increasingly difficult to return to a previously 
rejected path (Krasner 1984:225). 
A similar view is recognisable in the party literature, where the genetic approach 
contends that party organisation is constrained by its period of creation, which leaves a 
lasting imprint on the party (Panebianco 1988:20). Institutional reformers are constrained by 
“the dead weight of previous institutional choices” (Thelen 2003:493). Pierson accounts for a 
number of feedback mechanisms which ensure that organisations remain biased against 
change: learning, coordination and mutual adaptation are three such mechanisms (Pierson 
2000a:253-56).22 Radical reform may not only be difficult but unattractive, particularly 
where powerful vested interests are involved (Pierson 2000b:492). Research focus from this 
perspective is often directed towards short spells of innovation which work as punctuations 
or critical junctures between long periods of stability. Change is thus seen to occur during 
abrupt periods where the organisation (for external or internal reasons) is particularly 
receptive to reform (Hall and Taylor 1996:942, Mahoney 2000:515). 
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4.2.2. The causal impact of ideas 
HI has been portrayed as better suited to explain stability than change, as path dependence 
suggests an inescapable stability, highlighting short flashes of innovation followed by long 
periods of reproduction and consolidation (Peters 1999:68). However, as political 
institutions are under continuous debate, it is not only in brief moments that their structures 
are challenged (Gains et al. 2005:29). Often, the key processes of change occur as gradual 
transformation: incremental process with transformational results. Analysing change thus 
implies the attempt to establish what aspects of an institution are (re)negotiable under 
which circumstances (Thelen 2003:233). In the case of political parties, the empirical focus 
would thus be what parts of their organisational and ideational structures are open for 
change as a consequence of state reform. Change is continuous, and agency is not 
constrained to particular windows of opportunity (Streeck and Thelen 2005:19). 
Furthermore, organisational change implies shifting the balance of power not only 
with regard to actors and strategies but also ideas (Hay and Wincott 1998:955-56). HI has 
indeed seen a turn towards ideas in later years (Blyth 1997, Lieberman 2002, Hay 2004).23 
Berman (1998) exemplifies how ideas could be given a separate role in the analysis of 
political parties. Analysing the contrasting paths of social democracy in inter-war Germany 
and Sweden, Berman shows that similar changes in the political environment provoked 
different responses from each of the two parties, exemplifying how policies that have been 
locked in at an earlier stage may constrain the scope for later reform. It is broadly agreed 
that parties carry ideas which are manifest in policy programmes and manifestos and can 
thereby be analysed. The fact that ideas may devise the organisational structure of the party 
is an observation that is less often analysed. Fruitful examples are found in analyses of the 
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renewal of Labour in Britain in the long decade from the mid-1980s, which entailed both 
organisational, programmatic and policy reform (Shaw 2003, Russell 2005). Ideas about 
appropriate allocation of power may be seen to have path-dependent characteristics in the 
form of ideational legacies; these legacies constrain political choice. Institutional change 
therefore requires a challenge towards the ideas that institutions rest upon. Organisational 
structures not only define the allocation of power, they also act as temporary lock-in 
mechanisms for political ideas. This does not imply that ideational legacies are static and 
inescapable; rather, their dominance rests upon organisational structures and sustained 
support from the leadership (Blyth 2002:306-09). Ideas that are embedded in organisational 
statutes are the most tangible; useful examples are the allocation of seats in the national 
executive of a party as well as control over indicators such as party finances, candidate 
selection and electoral manifestos.24 In sum, what is proposed by the revised historical 
institutionalist perspective that I put forward is an enhanced focus on agency, a more 
dynamic perception of institutional change and a clearer acknowledgement of ideas as 
causal factors.25  
 
4.3. Independent and mediating variables 
In part two of this chapter I proposed how the territorial allocation of power in a party could 
be operationalised. This is also a prerequisite for analysing change: we need to know what 
precisely must differ in order for us to say that a party has changed its territorial allocation 
of power. In addition, there is the need to define the independent variables of 
regionalisation and European integration and the mediating variables of ideational and 
organisational legacies. Below I seek to clarify those issues. 
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Figure 1.2: Dynamic of reform in the multi-level party 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the two independent variables in this analysis, regionalisation is operationalised as 
decentralising reform of the state through the creation of subnational legislatures. 
Distinction between more or less profound decentralisation could be drawn on the basis of 
various criteria. The extent of legislative powers is one such criterion: alternatively, 
decentralisation could be measured as degree of fiscal autonomy (share of public revenue 
and expenses that is subsequently controlled by the regional level) (Swenden 2006). In the 
present dissertation this issue is resolved pragmatically: the British case displays distinctly 
different degrees of decentralisation to Scotland (with primary legislative powers and limited 
tax-varying powers) and Wales (secondary legislative and no tax-varying powers). If we 
perceive the scale of subnational legislative powers as indicator of decentralisation, there is 
a clear-cut asymmetry between powers granted to Scotland and to Wales. 
While the creation and consolidation of subnational legislatures is a defining 
characteristic of regionalisation, there is no such clear-cut basis for European integration. In 
the Europeanisation literature, European integration conventionally works as an 
independent variable expressing the expansion of EU policy competencies (Knill 2001, 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). What aspects of the EU are the most relevant will vary with 
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Ideational 
legacies 
Revised territorial 
allocation of power
Leadership 
constellation, 
entrepreneurship 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
33 
 
the field of investigation. With regard to political parties, it is particularly the strengthening 
of party politics in the EP which should be relevant to explaining organisational change. As a 
consequence of the increasing salience of policy making in the EP, one could expect the 
organised relationship between the EP party group and the statewide party to change over 
time, e.g. by MEPs being formally acknowledged in the party executive or being granted 
enhanced impact on electoral manifestos. Hence, the organisational effects could be easily 
measurable, but European integration as an independent variable refers to a process rather 
than explicit institutional creation or reform.  
It is perfectly conceivable that there are forces in the party working against territorial 
reorganisation. An obvious example would be a heavily centralised party ideologically 
opposed to subnational autonomy and/or European integration. Where such opposition is 
carried primarily by the current leadership, it is captured by the mediating variable of 
leadership constellation. Where, by contrast, opposition is historically grounded, this is 
reflected in the mediating variables of organisational and ideational legacies. Organisational 
legacies represent the formal allocation of power between territorial levels in the party, 
involving indicators such as candidate selection, finances and the formulation of electoral 
manifestos. Ideational legacies in the present context refer to dominant views inherited in 
the party with regard to territorial issues. In its basic form, it implies party policy towards 
regionalisation. As a corollary, ideational legacies capture prevailing views within the party 
with regard to issues such as territorial vs. functional representation, the perceived 
significance of a territorial centre of government etc. 
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4.4. Party change: rival hypotheses 
In the previous paragraphs, I have drawn up a revised historical institutionalist perspective 
on organisational change in political parties. The resulting theoretical model (figure 1.2) 
summarises the theoretical discussion, and it is also the basic model on which the 
succeeding empirical studies are based. The rationalist perspective would suggest that 
parties respond to a changing environment by organisational reform. Swenden and 
Maddens (2009b:13) certainly argue along these lines when they contend that a statewide 
party in a multilevel party system will be pressed to reform towards a federal structure in 
order to protect its electoral position, nationally and in each of the constituent territories. 
Parties which oppose this development may need even more the kind of subnational 
political entrepreneurs who can attract support for a party identified with opposition to 
decentralising reforms. The British case may have some interest in this regard related to how 
the Conservative Party has aimed to reinvent itself in Scotland and Wales. Where parties are 
subject to territorial reforms, the rationalist hypothesis would be: 
 
H1: In response to decentralising reform of the state, parties will gravitate towards 
the stratarchical party model to adapt to a set of different electoral contexts. 
 
While this rationalist prediction is fairly clear-cut, the historical institutionalist hypothesis 
must be more circumstantial. The view of parties as late and incremental reformers has two 
key implications: first, environmental stimuli will not necessarily lead to organisational 
change; secondly, the change that does occur will depend heavily on factors internal to the 
party (Carter et al. 2007:9). Change will be constrained by ideational and organisational 
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legacies and “filtered by the established procedures, structures and traditions of the parties 
themselves” (Hopkin 2009:182). In the British context of little more than a decade of 
subnational legislatures, alongside a slowly evolving process of European integration, 
incremental and path dependent party change would be the empirical prediction. However, 
as a basis for investigation this suggests little more than the belief that history matters and 
that development is defined by dominant structural forces (Peters 1999:75). A revised 
historical institutionalist perspective should investigate the nuances of party change, 
including its scope conditions, driving forces and the barriers against implementation. 
Specifically, the scope for agency should be clarified. The basis of the hypothesis concerns 
the speed and form of organisational change: 
 
H2: In response to decentralising reform of the state, parties will change their 
territorial allocation of power only incrementally. Moreover, the change that occurs 
will be heavily dependent on organisational and ideational legacies. 
 
We could elaborate further two conditions that from the historical institutionalist 
perspective could be necessary and sufficient to alter the dynamic hypothesised in H2. More 
wide-reaching change may occur where 
 there are deep contradictions between these legacies and the party’s environment...  
 ...coupled with a leadership willing and able to generate radical reform.  
 
In the seventh and final part of this chapter I return to these hypotheses on the basis of the 
analysis of three British parties. 
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis in this dissertation is structured as a comparative analysis of the three 
dominant statewide parties in Britain – Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democrats. The political system approximates a natural experiment with regard to the 
relationship between decentralising reform and party change: with subnational autonomy 
for Scotland and Wales established in 1999, it is possible to compare before and after to 
analyse the effects on statewide party organisations.26 In terms of geographical variance, 
moreover, Britain offers interesting empirical data since primary legislative powers are 
conferred on the Scottish Parliament, while the Welsh Assembly enjoys only secondary 
legislative powers and England (or English regions) has no legislature and thus no devolved 
powers at all. Finally, Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats represent 
differences in organisational form and ideational legacies towards subnational autonomy, 
thus providing variation on relevant independent variables from the historical institutionalist 
perspective.  
There is also an additional element to the British case which merits particular 
attention. The UK is one of only five EU member states electing MEPs by region rather than 
statewide lists, following electoral reform in 1999. Under the present system, Scotland and 
Wales are constituencies alongside Northern Ireland and nine English regions. Here, 
regionalisation meets European integration in a manner which is both analytically intriguing 
and politically contentious. Has subnational autonomy enabled regional party branches to 
obtain more autonomy from statewide parties in European policy making, e.g. with regard to 
selection of EP candidates and programmes? Moreover, has European integration had any 
impact on the assertiveness of regional party branches at home, i.e. within the confines of 
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the nation state? This invites a consideration of the territorial dynamic between two 
territorial processes and the challenges to statewide parties that they present.  
 
5.1. Case studies: balancing particular and general 
As reflected by the scholarly literature, empirical studies of political parties generally and 
MLPs in particular are predominantly oriented towards small-N research (Hough and Jeffery 
2006, Poguntke et al. 2007, Hopkin 2009, Swenden and Maddens 2009a). The argument for 
in-depth analysis is valid whether the emphasis is organisational, ideological or electoral. 
Parties are complex entities, and theoretical concepts should be grounded and 
contextualised: in this regard the case study has obvious strengths (Gerring 2007a:48-50). 
When it comes to MLPs, there have been fruitful comparative analyses of parties across 
different nation states (Fabre 2008, Thorlakson 2009, Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010), while 
larger statistical studies are few (Mazzoleni 2009). If there is little scope for grand theory on 
how parties respond to denationalisation, statistical analyses run the risk of tracing simple 
correlations while leaving the empirical substance untouched. 
The scope for testing and improving theory by case studies is a contested topic in 
political science. Lijphart (1971) and, more recently, Geddes (2003) have emphasised the 
inherent problem in studying single cases to test or develop theory covering a large 
population. Eckstein’s (1975) call for crucial case studies points out how maximum analytical 
leverage could be obtained by selecting cases on the basis of location in the relevant 
population. Thus, a least likely approach could provide robust support to a theory as the case 
is selected from the margins of where the theory should be valid, while a most likely 
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approach could provide a strong argument for rejecting a hypothesis as the case is selected 
from the centre of the theoretically defined population. However, crucial case studies in the 
strict sense are difficult to establish. In the analysis of three British parties, no such strategic 
case selection applies. Instead, the historical institutionalist approach encourages a search 
for variation in the assumed independent variables – especially ideational and organisational 
legacies – to examine whether they contribute to different outcomes in the allocation of 
power. The analysis is conducted in recognition that the key strength of case studies lies in 
theory development and revision rather than testing, in the context of discovery rather than 
the context of justification (Gerring 2007a:39-40). 
Recent methodological debates have stressed the case study’s potential for analysing 
causality by studying variation both within and across cases (George and Bennett 2004, 
Gerring 2007a). An implicit argument is that the preference for statistical studies, large 
samples and causal effects should be replaced by a notion of causality based on a focus on 
mechanisms and process (cf. Gerring 2007b). Hall (2003:387) contends that “parsimony is no 
longer seen as a key feature of explanation in the political science, and views about what 
constitutes an acceptable mode of explanation have shifted towards the historical”. While 
this argument may be overstated, there is little doubt that if the aim is to understand 
temporal processes where causation is expected to be laced with contextual elements (such 
as in parties with a few general characteristics and a range of idiosyncratic details), in-depth 
study has much to offer. Complexity furthermore means that attempts at generalisation 
should distinguish clearly the specific and the general features of a given causal account. 
George and Bennett’s (2004) concept of contingent generalisation signals modesty and 
precision: results derived from a case study should be subject to theoretical and empirical 
Multi-level politics and party change – a historical institutionalist perspective 
39 
 
specification as to the circumstances under which the results are expected to be valid. This 
captures the essence of small-N research producing cumulative knowledge through close 
and nuanced study of individual cases (Rueschemeyer 2003). 
 
5.2. The use of interview data 
According to Gerring (2007a:33), “there is an elective affinity between the case study format 
and qualitative, small-N work, even though the latter is not definitionally entailed”. The 
study of three British parties has mainly been conducted by way of semi-structured 
interviews, with the last article drawing on textual analysis. Rationalism and HI are broad, 
overarching frameworks that encourage the development of numerous empirical predictions 
to be tested against a pattern of qualitative data. However, relying upon interview data 
poses a set of challenges to the way we do empirical research. If – as argued by Burnham et 
al. (2004:1) – “critical reflection on method [is what] separate[s] the academic study of 
politics from political journalism”, such reflection must be particularly prevalent in relation 
to interviews.  
 Three empirical articles based on interview data are included in the dissertation. 
Interviewees for the project were approached in part as informants, in part as respondents. 
Much of the information acquired related to concrete arrangements for communication, 
interaction and accountability within the party. In addition to the relatively straightforward 
indicators on the allocation of power and responsibility, there was a normative element 
which turned the attention to how subnational autonomy was perceived within the party. 
Were the present structures for interaction considered effective by the different branches of 
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the party? Were there grievances that had been noted? To what extent had processes 
towards the present arrangements been inclusive, what type of concerns had been raised, to 
what extent had there been a learning process underway? In the article covering 
relationships between AMs and MPs the approach was slightly different. Here, in addition to 
the basis of formal information, it was a significant ambition to tap into party culture as a 
dimension affecting these relationships. Evidently, a larger number of representatives would 
have given a more valid scope for generalisation. However, to study relationships on the 
ground also entails limitations in time and capacity, and individual findings add significant 
flesh to the bone of the more extensive data covering the parliamentary groups.  
Qualitative interviewing as a method has often been seen as incapable of testing and 
refining hypotheses. In reality, however, informants are carriers of knowledge and 
information which can be measured against pre-conceived theoretical expectations: 
structure is provided by the researcher (Weick 1989, Pawson 1996, Andersen 2006). 
Evidently, there are difficulties in establishing patterns from interviews, and in handling 
contradictory information. To name an example, where a party official in London presents a 
hierarchical relationship to the regional branches as harmonious and broadly recognised, a 
regional official may give a quite different account. In such cases, triangulation of sources – 
as far as possible – can help provide a safer platform for inference. Meanwhile, contrasting 
accounts on issues which concern the normative, expressive dimension of the interviews 
also provided very useful insights in viewpoints and modes of thinking in different sections 
of the party. By taking an activist approach to the interviews, testing theoretical 
expectations while maintaining a comparative approach, qualitative interviews could help 
generate results that are more reliable and valid. This is not a refutation of the explorative 
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interview as a method to gauge subjective experience and interpretation. However, in this 
dissertation it is the semi-structured, broadly hypothesis-testing approach to interviews that 
is pursued.  
The dissertation is in the main constrained to analysing formal, observable features 
of multi-levelness. However, the fourth article introduces an ideational analysis of 
devolution in practice, examining how the autonomy of Scottish party branches is reflected 
in parliamentary debates on higher education policy. Formal indicators of power allocation 
must be supplemented by a clear account of how these features are interpreted and 
enacted by the actors involved. As was the case with the interaction between AMs and MPs, 
a formal analysis of power allocation in the party cannot give an exhaustive analysis. In the 
Welsh study, the non-formal aspect of the MLP involves (shared or conflicting) 
understandings of the appropriate division of labour between the two levels in the party. In 
the analysis of parliamentary debates, the issue under study was a divisive policy field of 
great symbolic importance for the relationship between the national and the regional level. 
Here, ideas are brought to bear with particular clarity. How is Scottish distinctiveness argued 
for and substantiated? How is an alternative direction of policy justified among the 
parliamentarians, and how should the path towards diverging policy decisions be 
understood? The fourth article addresses these questions in as accountable a manner as 
possible. 
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6. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL ARTICLES 
The four empirical articles included in this dissertation cover different aspects of the way 
three British parties have responded to territorial reform of the state.  
The first article is published in 2010 in Publius: the Journal of Federalism 40, 1: 59-81. 
It analyses the three statewide parties through a set of indicators concerning the allocation 
of power between London and the devolved parties: the selection of parliamentary 
candidates, the formulation of electoral manifestos and the financing of electoral campaigns. 
Data for the empirical analysis were obtained from interviews with key party officials and 
consultation of party rules and procedures. Evaluating how the three statewide parties have 
developed since 1999, the article concludes that Labour has moved incrementally away from 
centralism towards stratarchy; the Conservative Party has seen more extensive 
decentralisation since devolution, while the Liberal Democrats have been the least affected 
of the parties, given their pre-existing federal structure. From a theoretical perspective, the 
historical institutionalist hypothesis is lent considerable support: parties change 
incrementally and special preconditions are required for change to be more abrupt and 
more wide-ranging. However, the study emphasises the need for more nuanced conclusions: 
in the Conservative Party, for example, low electoral support and a generational shift in key 
personnel has created propitious conditions for organisational change – in Scotland but also 
in Wales, where party officials have taken the role as entrepreneurs to generate new 
organisational arrangements and to enhance both autonomy and influence vis-à-vis the 
statewide party. In Labour, meanwhile, control over the levers of power has only cautiously 
been decentralised to the Scottish and Welsh party branches. The Liberal Democrats, finally, 
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exemplify the relative ease by which regionalisation can be handled when party structures as 
well as ideational legacies devise stratarchy in the form of federalisation. 
The second article is forthcoming in The Journal of Legislative Studies 17, 4 (2011). It 
considers the relationship between AMs and MPs in Wales. The intention is to integrate two 
different strands of research, concerning party response to devolution and the (legislative 
and representative) role of elected representatives. Devolution has established identical 
electoral constituencies for the two legislatures, and in the majority of constituencies the 
AM and MP share party affiliation. How does the relationship between the two 
parliamentarians evolve? To what extent is there a shared infrastructure, and how is 
communication and campaigning resolved? Moreover, at the level of political parties, what 
arrangements have been created for communication between the parliamentary groups? 
The article develops two hypotheses from the institutionalist literature – first, that the 
creation of subnational legislatures challenges party cohesiveness and, secondly, that how 
this challenge is met by the parties is guided by their distinct ideational and organisational 
legacies with regard to devolution. Empirical data are drawn mainly from 18 semi-structured 
interviews with AMs and MPs from Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democrats, mainly covering constituencies where the same party holds both the AM and 
MP. The analysis lends qualified support to the thesis that the Assembly inspires loyalties 
rivalling statewide party identification. On the second hypothesis, the findings confirm that 
not only does the infrastructure for collective communication differ between the parties: 
there are also contrasts with regard to how relations between individual representatives are 
resolved. The article makes a call for more refined analysis of how ideas about appropriate 
behaviour are applied to the new arenas created by devolution. 
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The third article is published in 2010 in West European Politics 33, 4: 851–69. It looks more 
closely at the dynamic between devolution on the one hand and European integration on 
the other. Regional autonomy and European integration represent a double challenge to 
institutions at the national level, potentially diluting authority both from below and above. 
The interaction between them further complicates the situation, as when regions forge 
direct links to EU institutions. While this multi-level dynamic has been widely debated in the 
literature on regional executives, much less has been said about how statewide parties have 
adapted to the emerging dynamic between regionalisation and European integration. Britain 
represents a fruitful case to study, applying regional constituencies (among them Scotland 
and Wales) which were introduced alongside devolution in 1999. Scottish and Welsh 
assertiveness may also be encouraged by the presence of regional representations in 
Brussels and by the co-participation in Council meetings of direct relevance to Scottish or 
Welsh affairs. Given the context of enhanced autonomy at home, to what extent have 
regional party branches obtained more autonomy from the statewide parties in European 
policy making? To a very limited extent, is the conclusion of the empirical analysis, which 
draws upon a number of interviews with party officials. Devolution has enhanced the 
potential for autonomy in the relationship with MEPs: however, this has had little practical 
effect on policy making, where national unity prevails both in the formulation of manifestos 
and in the running policy development. Divergence along geographical lines is rare in the EP 
party groups, and Scottish or Welsh issues are raised as part of the shared policies of the 
statewide party. An instructive parallel can be drawn to the way subnational authorities 
relate to EU institutions. Here, several comparative studies have concluded that subnational 
authorities have largely settled in a working mode where interests are pursued through 
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member-state agendas, rather than pursuing the vision of a Europe of the regions with 
insufficient political clout. 
Finally, the fourth article is forthcoming in Higher Education Policy 24 (2011). It 
focuses upon how the parties have made use of the emerging scope for policy divergence 
within the borders of the nation state. The case selected for study is policy area of tuition 
fees for higher education. Here, the debate over student tuition fees has, subsequent to 
intense political debate, yielded sharply different results in England, Scotland and Wales. The 
issue of tuition fees represents a strong and symbolic defiance of the policy choices in 
London. The Scottish abolition of fees has been seen as reflecting the distinctive tradition of 
higher education in Scotland as well as the relatively left-leaning politics compared to 
Westminster. Accounting for the policy process leading up to the present arrangements in 
England and Scotland, the article presents a comparative analysis of debates in the two 
legislatures. While all the three statewide parties have differed internally between 
arguments promoted in London and Edinburgh, Labour stands out as the party with the 
highest thematic consistency. The Liberal Democrats, not surprisingly, show the strongest 
tendency to highlight Scottish distinctiveness as a reason to chart a separate course from 
London. Finally, and paradoxically, while policies have diverged, the debates in the two 
legislatures tend towards convergence over the decade of devolution, driven by the shared 
challenges of the higher education sector. The article finishes by reflecting upon some of the 
problems raised by policy divergence, to party cohesiveness as well as to users and providers 
of public services. 
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7. CONCLUSION: THE TERRITORIALISATION OF PARTIES? 
The territorial organisation of parties has become an increasingly prominent feature of 
politics in Europe. Britain provides an instructive case for studying the dynamic within party 
organisations responding to the regionalisation and European integration. The backdrop of 
the present dissertation is that the challenge of multi-level politics is set to increase in 
urgency and complexity in the years to come. 
 In part four of this introductory chapter I formulated two rival hypotheses concerning 
the speed and form of party organisational change. According to the rationalist hypothesis, 
in response to decentralising reform of the state, parties will gravitate towards the 
stratarchical party model to adapt to a set of different electoral contexts. To what extent 
does this hypothesis stand up to empirical scrutiny of three British parties? If the prediction 
of stratarchy is interpreted strictly, the findings do not fully satisfy the criteria. Admittedly, in 
response to devolution – and on the backdrop of enhanced European integration – the 
British parties have changed their internal allocation of power. A movement along the axis 
from centralisation to stratarchy is discernible, lending credence to the expectation of party 
realignment with the structure of the state. However, the movement has generally been 
uneven and cautious, and convergence is far less prevalent than the hypothesis suggests. 
There are many hurdles along the way to party organisational change, ensuring that 
convergence among the parties on territorial organisation has remained unfulfilled during 
the first decade of devolution. 
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The historical institutionalist hypothesis predicted that in response to decentralising reform 
of the state, parties will change their territorial allocation of power only incrementally and 
that the change that occurs will be heavily dependent on organisational and ideational 
legacies.  
Two conditions deemed to be necessary and sufficient for more extensive reform were 
added: 
 there are deep contradictions between these legacies and the party’s environment...  
 ...coupled with a leadership willing and able to generate radical reform. 
 
On the expectation that organisational change would be slow and incremental, the empirical 
analysis supports the notion that change is less straightforward and responsive than what 
the rationalist hypothesis suggests. The second prediction of the institutionalist hypothesis – 
that organisational and ideational legacies provide the keys to how the individual party 
responds – is also lent considerable support. The overarching observation, however, is that 
the constraints defined by party legacies provide only the basic framework for reform. 
Within this framework, agency and situational features matter considerably. The analysis of 
three British parties shows that legacies do matter, but always in tandem with powerful 
actors in the party ensuring that they do. Party elites at the national and regional level 
define how legacies are translated to organisational practice. Where party change is 
observed, this is in the form of entrepreneurship by actors (such as regional leaders) seeing 
the need for reform. Deep contradictions between legacy and environment may help open a 
window of opportunity for change, but then again, if contradictions are not deep there will 
rarely be an obvious need for reform. 
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Hence, rather than stating the two conditions as necessary and sufficient they could be seen 
as facilitating or supportive conditions, increasing the possibility but not determining that 
comprehensive organisational change towards stratarchy will occur. The institutionalist 
hypothesis comes out as broadly supported, but in need for further specification – and, 
when faced with given empirical cases, specification. The following empirical articles aspire 
to do precisely that. Beyond the search for nuances looms the criticism commonly launched 
against institutionalists that they are incapable of deriving testable propositions from their 
theoretical perspective (Lindner and Rittberger 2003). Indeed, institutionalism sometimes 
appears more in the form of conceptual lenses structuring empirical studies than theory 
being tested (cf. Allison 1969). The often limited stringency of institutionalist studies is a 
comments in response to which nuances should be elaborated and more precise hypotheses 
developed. It is important that this is pursued, as institutionalism has a vital dimension to 
offer party analysis – a field which has too often neglected Panebianco’s (1988:xiii-iv) dictum 
that “[f]ew aspects of an organization’s functioning and current tensions appear 
comprehensible if not traced to its formative phase”.  
Britain is a particular object of study with regard to territorial politics. Devolution is 
asymmetric and only applies to Scottish and Welsh party branches. However, asymmetry is 
far from unique in the context of territorial politics, where Spain is another prominent 
example. Moreover, regionalisation does not have to be all-embracing to be of analytical 
value. A more important concern to raise at the end of this introductory chapter is that there 
are underlying normative issues in the analyses which could have been subjected to more in-
depth debate. Examples of such issues are the following:  
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- How does internal reallocation of power affect party democracy, with regard to 
legitimacy as well as membership mobilisation (article 1)? 
- To what extent are citizens in Scotland and Wales better served by having an extra 
layer of parliamentary representatives (article 2)? 
- How could regional constituencies and a strengthening of Scottish and Welsh party 
branches improve the democratic quality of the EP – and, more broadly, the 
legitimacy of European integration (article 3)? 
- What are the consequences of devolution for the regional responsiveness of public 
policy, and how should diverging preferences in each part of Britain be 
accommodated by the statewide parties (article 4)? 
 
The scope and ambitions of the empirical articles only permits brief attention to be paid to 
these issues. If regionalisation and European integration are to meet demands both for 
effectiveness and democracy, there will be more to debate in political terms – but also from 
the academic vantage point, along conceptual, causal and normative dimensions of the 
“territorialised” parties emerging in Europe. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 The federal principle also lends itself to non-territorial division of authority: examples could be federal 
systems where ethnicity, organisational affiliation or any other distinguishing criterion is applied (Watts 1998). 
2 Subnational and regional are used interchangeably in the dissertation to denote the territorial level of 
government between the national and the local. The existence of subnational legislatures with some legislative 
authority is seen as a key definitional criterion of regionalisation. This also enables comparison between 
regionalisation and European integration, where the European Parliament provides parties with the essential 
opportunity structures for representation. 
3 Paraphrased from Karl Marx (1897), p. 1.  The original phrase reads, in the English translation: “Man makes his 
own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by 
himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs like an alp upon 
the brain of the living.” 
4 Britain is used throughout the dissertation to denote Great Britain, i.e. England, Scotland and Wales. Northern 
Ireland, which has separate legislative arrangements and a separate party system, is not analysed. References 
to regions or regional in the British case refer to Scotland and Wales unless otherwise stated: this is for the 
purpose of consistency and comparability and does not negate their existence as nations. 
5 See ‘Multi-level parties in process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their home parties’, article 3 in the present 
dissertation. 
6 As for which of the indicators which would be the first to change in the wake of decentralising reform of the 
state, again the literature provides no clear answer. Candidate selection and manifesto formulation would 
need to be decided upon immediately, and would therefore offer a useful assessment of the immediate 
capacity for change in a party. This is a field which merits more empirical investigation, including in the British 
case on which this dissertation is focused. 
7 A pragmatic way of resolving the issue of how devolution unfolds would be to focus upon the extent to which 
there is an observable change in output as regional party branches gain control over more of the essential tasks 
in the party. Pursuing the meaning attached to selected strategies however requires a more interpretive, in-
depth approach to assess how regional party branches conceive of their increased autonomy. 
8 Both definitions given by Jennergren (1981), p.39. 
9 Reproduced from ‘Multi-level parties in process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their home parties’, article 3 in 
the present dissertation. 
10 David B. Truman (1955), p. 123. 
11 William S. Livingston (1952), p. 81. 
12 With regard to the influence regional branches exert on the central party, no such correlation with state 
structure is found (ibid.). 
13 Note also Bache and Jordan’s (2006:30) useful definition of Europeanisation as “the reorientation or 
reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect policies, practices and preferences advanced 
through the EU system of governance”.  
14 This form of elite consolidation and membership detachment is also an essential feature of the cartel party 
as theorised by Katz and Mair (1995). 
15 Interestingly, the European dimension represents a double obstacle to subnational legislatures, which have 
no direct channel to any of the decision-making institutions. According to Kiiver (2006: 4-5), “[t]he centre-
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region and government-parliament gap, when combined, lead to a situation where the involvement of the 
Scottish parliament in EU matters is mediated, and mitigated, by the Scottish executive, the Westminster 
parliament, and the UK government”. 
16 Moreover, although incumbency could hamper party change towards stratarchy, as has arguably been the 
case with Labour (cf. Laffin et al. 2007), the consequences of being in government will often be most relevant 
to the non-formal aspect of internal power allocation, through elite agreements on the scope for policy 
divergence and the extent to which alternative political identities can be nurtured by regional party branches. 
17 Decentralisation was, for example, a touchstone of reform in the French socialist party during François 
Mitterrand´s presidency; in Britain, the devolution scheme promoted by Labour and introduced in 1997 was a 
key element in the party´s renewal (Keating 2004). 
18 What is referred to as the rationalist perspective in this chapter could also be denoted by other labels. In 
chapter two, which is the first empirical article of this dissertation, the concept of actor-centred functionalism 
(Pierson 2004) is applied. The basic assumptions are shared, including the view of parties as collective actors 
choosing strategy to maximize benefit and therefore responding rationally to changes in their environment. 
19 It might be appropriate here to recapture the phrase by the previous Secretary of State for Wales Ron Davies 
that devolution is a process, not an event (Davies 1999). Harmel (2002:133) also makes the important 
qualification that a process may of course be triggered or initiated by an event. Regionalisation in the form of 
devolution, as well as the progressive European integration, fits appropriately with the reference to trends or 
processes on which functionalism (and the system-level trends approach) rests. 
20 Samuel L. Eldersveld (1964), p. 9. 
21 HI moreover has its own distinguishing features in a strong emphasis on the historical trajectory of 
institutions, a distinctive role for ideas as causes and a sustained focus on substantially important collective 
institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1997:8, Judge 2005:9-10). 
22 Elsewhere, Pierson comments the importance that path dependence is used with analytical care to ensure 
that the concept is explanatory and not merely descriptive (Pierson 2004:49). Similar concerns are raised by 
Mahoney (2000:507). 
23 According to Blyth (1997:230), this development has largely reflected a desire for more complete accounts of 
institutional change rather than introducing ideas ad hoc to explain change that could otherwise not be 
accounted for. 
24 Less immediately available are the ideas about appropriate allocation of power which underpin these formal 
arrangements in the party. Focus in the dissertation is directed towards formal arrangements; however, non-
formalised ideas about power allocation do constitute a backdrop, particularly in chapter three (analysing inter-
parliamentarian arrangements in Wales). 
25 A focus on ideas is furthermore a fruitful approach to the friction between ideas and formal structure which 
may generate political change (Lieberman 2002). An institutional order based on statewide political parties 
may see its legitimacy challenged by a different logic in which regional party branches operate autonomously, 
supported by separate legislatures and new political identities. Reform towards Eldersveld’s (1964) 
stratarchical party is a possible outcome of this friction, but as we have seen it is certainly not the only possible 
outcome.  
26 Formally, a natural experiment requires that other variables driving party change be held constant. This is not 
claimed in the present analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How do national parties respond to federalisation or, in a less extensive form, devolution? 
British politics provides an interesting case since parties here have been faced with a new 
strategic environment since the establishment in 1999 of legislatures in Scotland and 
Wales.1
The question raised in this article is thus to what extent devolution has been 
accompanied by similar decentralisation of power in the dominant UK-level parties. Previous 
research on British parties under devolution has focused predominantly on Labour (Morgan 
and Mungham 2000, Hassan 2002, Laffin and Shaw 2007, Laffin et al. 2007a), while 
comparative analyses have been rare (Bradbury 2006, Hopkin and Bradbury 2006). 
Moreover, while few analyses of parties under devolution apply distinct theoretical 
frameworks, even fewer draw on contributions from the federalist literature which could 
add relevant insights (Deschouwer 2003, Hopkin 2003). The present article tries to amend 
these shortcomings through an analysis of (territorial) allocation of power in Labour, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. The ambition is twofold: first, to establish a 
clear picture of where power is allocated in the three parties near a decade after devolution; 
second, to test the validity of two competing theoretical perspectives concerning party 
change. While a functionalist perspective would see internal decentralisation of power to 
 Devolution has brought a sub-national level of legislative government to the fore, 
introducing a dynamic which differs from the centralised structure of the traditional 
Westminster model (Bache and Flinders 2004:38). Analysing how parties respond to 
devolution should deepen our knowledge on party organisation in a multi-level polity. With 
the emergence of a sub-national level of political power, do the parties follow by internal 
reform? 
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Scotland and Wales as an expected effect of devolution, an institutionalist perspective would 
expect change to be incremental and path dependent, with organisational variables 
mediating (and possibly obstructing) moves towards decentralisation. Parties draw on 
distinct organisational structures and inherited ideas about appropriate allocation of power, 
and internal reform will thus be late and incremental in response to environmental change. 
The present article evaluates these two perspectives in light of how Labour, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats have responded to devolution. I choose to 
focus on three indicators of power: the selection of parliamentary candidates, the 
formulation of electoral manifestos and the financing of electoral campaigns. The rest of the 
article proceeds as follows: first, a review is given of dominant themes in the literature on 
parties and devolution, and two theoretical perspectives are presented; second, the 
empirical analysis evaluates how each of the three parties has responded to devolution; and, 
finally, the main findings of this analysis are compared and summarised in a conclusion. 
 
STATE STRUCTURE AND ALLOCATION OF POWER IN 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Parties are essential to the dynamic of a federal or regionalised state. Riker (1964:136) 
argued that the territorial balance within the parties mirrors the degree of centralism in the 
federation itself. Notwithstanding the significance of parties, how they are affected by 
changes in a federal structure has not been as closely analysed in the literature (Brzinski 
1999, Heidar 2007). Here, Britain provides a natural laboratory of institutional change. A 
useful comparison may be post-war West Germany, where the new federation effected a 
transformation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) towards a federalised Länder-based 
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organisation (Gabriel 1989:67); another interesting parallel is found in the asymmetric 
devolution in Spain since the early 1980s, where the Popular Party and the Socialist Party 
have chosen different rather than converging organisational models (Hopkin 2003:233-34). 
There is little agreement on how parties respond to devolution and how party response can 
be accounted for theoretically. In the broader literature on federations, a typological 
distinction is often drawn between the cooperative federalism of the German model, where 
parties and public policy mutually reinforce national integration, and the dual federalism of 
the United States and Canada, where policy areas as well as parties are clearly separate 
between the state and federal levels (Mayer 1970, Renzsch 2004). Within both these ideal 
types, parties and governance structures are seen as mutually constitutive, in the tradition 
of Riker (1964). Parties, it seems, are part of the federal structure, and within established 
federations they organise in harmony with the territorial principles of the state itself. 
British parties developed within a unitary state of executive dominance and 
hierarchically organised territorial administration (Lijphart 1999:9-21). Drawing on Riker’s 
view of federalism, one would expect a centralised state to foster similarly centralised 
parties, which has been largely true of Labour and the Conservative Party though less so of 
the Liberal Democrats (Ingle 2000). Devolution however presents the British parties with a 
different environment, where Scotland and Wales are acknowledged as sub-national 
political entities. The fact that devolution in Britain is asymmetric (with primary legislation 
only granted to Scotland, and with England being left out of devolution altogether) does not 
disqualify the use of federal theory on party development. Fundamentally, in a federalised 
polity, parties should divide power across territorial centres while maintaining an 
overarching role for the national party. This corresponds to the stratarchy model, an ideal 
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type derived from federal politics which devises a de-coupling between the mother party 
and her local and regional offspring (Eldersveld 1964; Carty 2004). 
The centralism vs. stratarchy dimension may be seen as a conceptual yardstick along 
which the three British parties can be analysed (table 2.1). Laffin and Shaw (2007) have 
applied a similar centralism vs. stratarchy dichotomy to analyse policy making in Labour. The 
present article moves beyond this focus to consider the internal allocation of power within 
all the three parties and the extent to which this has shifted since devolution was 
introduced. 
 
Table 2.1: Centralism vs. stratarchy in political parties 
 
  Centralism Stratarchy 
General 
characteristics 
Organising principle Unified party Party as franchise 
Power allocation Centralised, unitary Dispersed, federalised 
Policy towards sub-
units 
Hierarchical 
command Delegated autonomy 
        
Indicators of 
organisational 
autonomy 
candidate selection Low autonomy High autonomy 
manifesto formulation Low autonomy High autonomy 
financing of electoral 
campaigns Low autonomy High autonomy 
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Perceiving the line between centralism and stratarchy as essential, one may formulate two 
contrasting hypotheses on how British parties have responded to devolution. Stratarchy will 
be treated here as a functionally driven response to the emergence of multiple electoral 
arenas. Applying the political party as unit of analysis one may predict that parties adapt 
their organisation to the electoral market: where political authority is split between several 
territorial levels, parties will respond by decentralising authority, as “heterogeneity of 
membership, and the subcoalitional system, make centralised control not only difficult but 
unwise” (Eldersveld 1964:9). Centralism will also pose a barrier to the party’s credibility at 
the sub-national level: such a party structure will thus be both dysfunctional and illegitimate 
(van Biezen and Hopkin 2006:16-17). The stratarchical party will allow regional adaptation 
just as a franchise structure allows individual firms to adapt their product to geographically 
diverse consumers. The emergence of stratarchical parties could thus be seen to harmonise 
with what Pierson (2004:105) refers to as actor-centred functionalism. I hypothesise from 
this perspective that: 
 
 a parallel transformation and hence convergence around stratarchy has occurred in 
all the three British parties. Power, in the sense of tasks and responsibilities, will have 
been clearly decentralised from London to the Scottish and Welsh parties. 
 
An institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, would contend that internal party reform 
is mediated by organisational legacy. Changing the view of territoriality requires a new 
ideational settlement, where sub-national interests are balanced against organisational 
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unity. Historically, British parties have found different ways of coping with regional diversity. 
The ideational settlement is institutionalised in the party as the legitimate allocation of 
territorial power. Party development is subject to path dependence: how power has been 
allocated at the formative stage points out a trajectory which will be very hard to reform, 
especially if the legitimating ideas have been institutionalised as essential to the party’s 
identity (Berman 1998:26-27). From an institutionalist perspective, then, decentralisation of 
party structures will be late and inefficient. The only exception to incrementalism will be if 
environmental change is sufficiently profound to shake the foundational principles of the 
party. Such a performance crisis may open a window to deeper internal reform, the result 
may be a critical juncture where the organisation shifts onto an entirely different path 
(Pierson 2004:135, March and Olsen 2006:15). 
I contend that devolution as such should not be sufficiently transformative to present 
parties with a critical juncture. Hence, the institutionalist prediction would be that 
organisational legacies still determine party response to devolution. Such legacies do not 
imply that parties are incapable of adjustment. Overt centralisation of power in London 
would for example go against the principle of devolution and would therefore be impossible 
to maintain. However, what one would expect from an institutionalist perspective is that 
parties make minimal adjustments, while maintaining their distinct organisational legacies. 
Thus, there will be no convergence around stratarchy. I hypothesise from an institutionalist 
perspective that: 
 
 internal allocation of power in the parties has been subject to only late and 
incremental reform and remains different between the parties post-devolution. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data are drawn from ten semi-structured interviews with central party staff in London, 
Edinburgh and Cardiff during 2008 (see Appendix). Party rules and regulations were also 
consulted to obtain concrete information on procedures and allocation of tasks. 
Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their strategic oversight of relations between 
London and the Scottish or Welsh parties, for example from the position of (regional) 
general secretary, chairman or party manager. They were approached as sources of concrete 
information, but with an additional concern to compare perspectives as to whether 
devolution has changed power relationships within the party. 
Along the centralism vs. stratarchy dimension I identified three indicators: candidate 
selection, manifesto formulation and financing of electoral campaigns. Changes in candidate 
selection reflect the allocation of power and, more specifically, the degree of centralism 
within a party (Ranney 1965, Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Katz 2002). Central command here 
typically implies maintaining a list of approved candidates who can apply to a constituency 
party when a vacancy is advertised. Such lists are applied by all the three British parties for 
general elections2, and a similar arrangement was established for the first devolved elections 
in 1999. Devolution gave expectations for more decentralised control over the approved lists 
(Bradbury et al. 2000:52).3 The electoral manifesto is the key policy document produced by a 
political party, and defining who is responsible for writing and ratifying it is therefore a 
concise indicator of power (Hopkin 2003:231). Devolution opened the scope for 
decentralised manifestos for Scottish and Welsh elections, as general elections have only 
allowed for minor variation from the national manifesto.4 Finally, the financing of electoral 
campaigns indicates where the resources, and hence the centre of administrative power, are 
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located in the party (Denver et al. 2003). For each of the three parties I will briefly establish 
its pre-devolution position on these three indicators before considering the development 
thereafter, focusing on the three devolved elections held in 1999, 2003 and 2007.  
 
Labour 
Among the British parties, Labour historically comes closest to being a traditional mass 
party, legitimised from below through its claim to representation of a distinct social class 
(Duverger 1954). Nevertheless, policy-making in the party has typically emerged from 
compromises between parliamentary and trade union elites (Panebianco 1988:94). The 
National Executive Committee (NEC) has been the meeting point between the different 
stakeholders in the party. During the 1990s, Tony Blair’s organisational reforms aimed to 
redress Labour’s perceived lack of cohesion and command. As a consequence, the party has 
moved towards a kind of democratic centralism where individual members are accorded a 
marginal, advisory role to the leadership while activists and trade unions have seen their 
influence diminish (Shaw 2002). 
Labour has historically taken an ambivalent view of devolution. While enjoying a 
strong and consistent support for the party in Scotland and Wales, this has not been in the 
form of a devolved or federalised party (Mitchell 2003:168). Neither the Scottish nor the 
Welsh party holds ex officio representation in the NEC. In Scotland, Labour was known as the 
Scottish Council of the Labour Party until 1994. Labour in Wales, established as late as 1947, 
has been explicitly subservient to London (Morgan and Mungham 2000:89-90). Even today, 
Labour at the devolved level may be seen as regional units of a centralised party (Hopkin and 
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Bradbury 2006:137). Centralism, finally, has been considered indispensable for a social 
democratic approach to redistribution and welfare. 
During the 1990s, Labour took the lead on devolution through the establishment of 
the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh and the Welsh Assembly in Cardiff. Devolution was 
preceded by a general process of centralisation within Labour, as indicated by Blair’s 
organisational reforms.5
 
 This notwithstanding, a functionalist perspective would point to 
stratarchy as an expected consequence of devolution with the party adapting to a new 
institutional framework. From an institutionalist perspective, however, I would expect any 
move towards stratarchy in Labour to be hampered by the party’s historical legacy of 
centralism, which will mean that centralised organisational structures have been 
maintained. 
Candidate selection 
On the selection of Labour candidates in Scotland and Wales, Laffin and Shaw (2007:62) 
claim to observe an informal delegation of power over time. In 1999 the NEC had some 
influence on the approved list through its presence in the candidates committee. In Scotland 
this had the alleged effect that certain candidates deemed too radical were excluded, 
provoking protests that Scottish Labour was implementing orders from London (Hassan 
2002:154). Laffin et al. (2007b:208) however maintain that disputes over candidates equally 
reflected ideological debates within the Scottish and Welsh parties. Since the first devolved 
elections a balance has been attained where the NEC sets the basic framework while the 
candidate selection itself is devolved. According to Roy Kennedy, director of finance and 
compliance in London: 
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Beyond the procedures we let them get on with the business themselves. The national 
party wants to ensure we have some basic principles on selection so that we have 
good-quality candidates, and also that we are sure they apply the agreed procedures 
such as the one-member-one-vote. Once these principles are set we are happy for the 
regional parties to draw the panels up and the constituency parties to do the 
selection.  
 
In Labour as in the two other parties, a distinction is drawn between approved lists for 
general and devolved elections. Nominees for the general election list are admitted on the 
basis of interviews by the Scottish/Welsh Executive Committee (acting on behalf of the NEC) 
and the nominees are then endorsed by London. The list for devolved elections, meanwhile, 
is under the full discretion of the Scottish and Welsh parties.6
The manner in which Labour has handled candidate selection reflects a careful 
balance between the centralised and devolved. The selection process in 1999 was 
challenging for the party, which had the largest number of MPs and a government eager to 
avoid divergence from established policies in London (Bradbury et al. 2000). This resulted in 
a few highly publicised cases of conflict between the party at the national and devolved 
level.
 As for transfers between the 
lists, devolved candidates in Wales have until recently had to go through an additional 
interview to be eligible for general elections: this has now been removed. A similar barrier 
has not existed in Scotland, where the two approved lists are compatible and a transfer will 
be made on request. 
7 Since then, arrangements for candidate selection have been consolidated around a 
largely stratarchical model, as reflected in 2003 and 2007.  
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Manifesto formulation 
Manifesto formulation in Labour as in the other two parties has been clearly in the hands of 
the parliamentary elite (Ware 1987:141). Under the present rules, the NEC together with 
Labour’s Parliamentary Committee and representatives from the National Policy Forum 
(NPF) together decide which elements of the party program are included in the manifesto.8
In Wales and Scotland, the devolved parties have been given considerable scope to 
formulate policy within their areas. Devolved manifestos imitate Labour’s procedure at the 
national level: cutting out the final version is delegated to a group drawn from the 
parliamentary party and the Scottish/Welsh Executive Committee. Even in Wales, where the 
local Labour elite has often been portrayed as a torch-bearer of the party in London, 
manifestos for devolved elections are now defined in Cardiff, in line with the stratarchy 
model. Manifestos for general elections, however, remain the responsibility of the NEC. 
Historically, only slight variations have been admitted (such as the bilingual version for 
Wales). Today, producing manifestos eligible across Britain is a delicate task. In Scotland and 
Wales, devolved policy areas are not affected by a general election, except for the indirect 
effect of spending in England. The solution has been to (re)state in the manifesto the policies 
of Welsh and Scottish Labour, even if the general election will have no effect on devolved 
matters. Coordinating these issues is particularly difficult in Wales due to the complex 
division of competencies. 
 
Labour’s approach to manifesto formulation has seen a clear movement towards 
stratarchy. Remaining challenges, as we have seen, largely concern how to fit devolved 
issues into general election campaigns. This is a challenge which is common to all three 
parties but particularly prevalent in Labour as the governing party at both levels. 
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Financing of electoral campaigns 
Labour is a centralised party in financial and administrative terms. Despite devolution, the 
party has maintained a relatively rigid control of resources at the centre and a direct 
employment relationship between London and Scottish and Welsh party staff. The general 
secretaries may be seen as “territorial managers operating on behalf of the centre” (Laffin et 
al. 2007a:102). There is a long tradition in Labour for concentrating funds at the centre, to be 
(re)distributed on the basis of careful assessment. All individual membership fees are 
processed by the head office in London. The relevant constituency party then receives one-
third of the fee, the remainder is controlled by the head office for redistribution. In years 
with electoral campaigns funding is of critical importance to the central-devolved relations. 
According to Roy Kennedy, director of finance and compliance in London: 
 
We would not give Cardiff and Edinburgh block grants. Even for devolved elections, 
we would have some control over what is going on. We would give some money for 
their work in the office, but we would also look at things like phoning target seats 
from our national call centre, or we would decide to pay for selected activities in the 
constituency parties.  
 
On the surface, this procedure applies equally for devolved and general elections. At a more 
general level, however, the balance between central and devolved funding has changed over 
time. In Scotland, Labour has moved from having its staff fully financed from London to 
seeing about one third of it paid by Scottish Labour. Furthermore, close to two-thirds of 
Scottish Labour’s expenses for the 2007 campaign were covered from Scotland, in sharp 
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contrast with the first devolved election in 1999.9
While financial relations involve a potential for conflict, this tension should not be 
overstated. According to Chris Roberts, general secretary in Wales: 
 In Wales the impression is similar. While 
key personnel and office space are paid by London, most other costs are carried by Welsh 
Labour. The capacity for fundraising at the devolved level has increased. 
 
The agenda would be more “we don’t have enough money” than “what does this 
mean for the future relations between the central Labour Party and Welsh Labour”. It 
tends not to be as rational as that. The issue is: how much money can we raise to 
accomplish what we want? 
 
Thus, Labour formally remains a centralised party in financial terms, but Welsh and Scottish 
Labour have strengthened their role over time, representing a cautious movement from 
centralism towards stratarchy in the financing of campaigns. Caution and incremental 
decentralisation is indeed the general findings with regard to Labour, which goes largely in 
support of the institutionalist perspective on party change. 
 
The Conservative Party 
The Conservative Party, in contrast to Labour, has historically shown little pretence of 
running a democratically driven organisation (Webb 1994:110). The party emerged as a 
loosely organised parliamentary group before the advent of mass franchise. Formally, the 
Conservatives were until the late 1990s constituted by three separate organisations: the 
parliamentary party, supremely headed by the leader, the party’s Central Office, and the 
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party on the ground, as the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. Unlike 
Labour, the annual party conference has never been regarded as more than a rally of the 
faithful, although it may informally have been more influential. Reforms designed by party 
leader William Hague in 1997-98 brought the three pillars of the party together in a single 
structure and created the executive National Board alongside a Conservative Policy Forum. 
Party members were now also to play a role in selecting their leader and had their power 
over candidate selection confirmed. The reforms coupled democratisation with an 
underlying centralisation of power (Judge 2005:85-88, Kelly 2004). 
The Conservative relationship to devolution has been difficult, as the only party to 
campaign against devolution in 1997. Historically, the Conservatives have more than any 
other party been associated with Unionism. Formally detached as the Scottish Unionist Party 
until 1965, the Conservatives in Scotland could present a distinct profile and draw upon 
Protestant and Unionist support (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006:138): in Wales, less autonomy 
has traditionally been granted. During the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, both the 
Scottish and the Welsh Conservatives were subject to centralisation which reversed the 
limited degree of stratarchy within the party. Since a 1998 reform, however, the Scottish 
Conservatives are now again a constitutionally sovereign party (Lynch 2003:169-70). In 
Wales, organisational autonomy has been less extensive as the Welsh party remains 
subordinate to the Conservative Party in London. However, a separate Board has been 
established, and like his/her Scottish counterpart, the Welsh chairman has been given ex 
officio representation in the Board of the British Conservatives.  
On the whole, the Conservative Party historically scores high on centralism but less 
consistently so than Labour. A functionalist perspective would predict a consistent move 
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towards stratarchy in response to devolution, underlined by the Conservative capacity for 
pragmatic adaptation and reform (Ball 2005). An institutionalist perspective would on the 
other hand predict that hierarchical rule from London remains embedded in the party, 
particularly towards Wales and that devolution has only led to incremental decentralisation 
within the party. 
 
Candidate selection 
As in Labour, in order to be elected through the Conservative Party a prospective candidate 
must be admitted to either the general election list or the list for one of the two devolved 
legislatures. Here, the party has made a significant move towards stratarchy: the Scottish 
and Welsh Conservatives both have boards responsible for admitting candidates to the 
devolved lists, which are under their full discretion. For general elections things are 
different, as London holds the power to sanction candidates approved to the lists. 
Nevertheless, much has been invested in developing a Scottish and Welsh profile also for 
general elections. According to Andrea Stephenson, operations coordinator in Scotland: 
 
I think Scotland has suffered in the past from the perception of interference from 
London. By having our own list we are certainly trying hard not to be seen as just 
putting up people from England who are interested in improving their own 
experience. We want people who have strong connections to Scotland, who want to 
fight for a Scottish seat. 
 
Institutional resilience meets critical junctures: (re)allocation of power in three British parties 
75 
 
As we have seen, the Scottish Conservatives have a separate organisational history which 
they have been able to return to and build upon since devolution. In Wales the context is 
different, as the party has a legacy of close identification with London. One strategy to leave 
behind this legacy has been to recruit candidates that are considered Welsh, but under a 
common Conservative brand. Selection procedures reflect a party that is more comfortable 
than before with Welsh autonomy as part of the larger party family. According to Lyndon 
Jones, chairman of the Welsh Conservative Party: 
 
Following the establishment of the Welsh Assembly, we set up a board of assessors 
who were given the job of establishing a list of candidates who wanted to stand for 
the Welsh Assembly. This board is totally governed from here. Its members are also 
used to assess applicants who want to stand for Westminster or European elections, 
and are used in Wales and England, because they are trained to the same standard 
and apply the same criteria for all elections. 
 
Candidate selection in the Conservative Party has by tradition been quite decentralised to 
the constituency level. However, with devolution the significance of the Scottish/Welsh 
parties has been clearly enhanced. The electoral misery in Scotland and Wales has been one 
of the driving forces behind this development. Between the central and the devolved level 
there has been a clear-cut move towards stratarchy, modified only by the sanctioning power 
of London over admissions to the general election lists. 
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Manifesto formulation 
The influence of the party leader on manifestos has traditionally been very strong in the 
Conservative Party, although modern manifestos typically involve a broader range of policy 
expertise. The research department at the Conservative Central Office has seen its role 
reduced while different thematic committees headed by shadow ministers now do much of 
the groundwork, with the final content then determined by the Board in London (Ingle 
2000:60). At devolved elections, manifestos are to a very large extent grounded in the party 
in Scotland and Wales. According to the chairman of the Welsh Conservative Party, Lyndon 
Jones: 
 
In all the devolved areas Welsh Conservatives decide what our positions on those 
issues are.  In short our policies in the devolved areas are “Made in Wales”. Indeed, 
our policies are sometimes different from England in many areas, but that is how 
devolution works. 
 
Discussion with London occurs mainly to avoid outright schisms between policies laid down 
in the manifestos. The following comment from Robert Kaye, special adviser in London, 
suggests how this balancing act occurs: 
 
In devolved elections, the Scottish and Welsh parties are in charge. The policies 
formulated there are not going to be implemented UK-wide anyway. We let them go 
on with their matters as long as we are not essentially contradicting each other. We 
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are not trying to impose the same policies across the UK... But there is an informal 
convention not to be difficult but rather help each other out at the different elections. 
 
The fear that the regional parties might be “essentially contradicting each other” illustrates 
how stratarchy is not really put to the test before the party has shouldered governmental 
responsibility at either the national or the sub-national level. Enhanced autonomy to the 
Welsh Conservative party has thus proved to be electorally rewarding but remains untested 
in terms of substance and hard policy choices. In Scotland, the authorship of the manifesto 
lies with the parliamentary leader of the party who leads the manifesto group. During the 
process the group will consult with London, but there is no formal power of sanction by 
Central Office. In Wales, it is the devolved party’s policy director, a Welsh Assembly Member 
(AM) who is responsible for the manifesto. The documents are finally ratified by the party 
Boards in Edinburgh and Cardiff. In the general election manifesto, Edinburgh and Cardiff are 
allowed their own sub-sets of devolved policies. Here, the shadow ministers for 
Scotland/Wales will play a considerably larger role, and the content is communicated with 
the Conservative party leader, who is ultimately responsible for the manifesto at general 
elections. All in all, the formulation of electoral manifestos has been extensively 
decentralised, an arrangement which, responding to electoral market and the desire for a 
Welsh and Scottish party brand, fits neatly with the development captured by the stratarchy 
thesis. 
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Financing of electoral campaigns 
In terms of finances, the Conservative Party has historically granted more sub-national 
autonomy than Labour. In Scotland, the party has been independent in financial terms from 
London (Kellas 1975:111-12). Over the last fifteen years, streamlining of campaign 
techniques has led to a generally enhanced control from the centre: also, at general 
elections, strategic management from the Conservative central office has grown in 
importance (Denver et al. 2003:546). Management from London is however far less 
prevalent at devolved elections which are our main focus here. 
In Scotland, the devolved party is self-financed, except for the funding of 
parliamentary by-elections where London gives financial assistance. Scottish membership 
fees are retained in Edinburgh. To the Welsh Conservatives the issue is more complicated: 
the party has to a large extent been funded from London and these arrangements are only 
slowly beginning to change. Funds are still mainly received in Cardiff in the form of block 
grants from the party head office. The individual constituency parties are mainly responsible 
for their own campaign funding. However, in both Scotland and Wales some constituencies 
receive special treatment from London. Targeted seat are given special support at general 
elections, and this activity largely by-passes Edinburgh and Cardiff. As long as the two sides 
agree, however, this causes little controversy. According to Andrea Stephenson, coordinator 
in Scotland: 
 
The fact that we are a separate party doesn’t mean we don’t talk to them, it doesn’t 
mean we don’t share best practices. Moreover, strategic priorities are normally quite 
straightforward. We first of all have to find the best solutions for the party. 
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The picture that emerges of devolved electoral campaigns is one of full financial autonomy 
in Scotland and somewhat less autonomy in Wales. In both cases, however, the individual 
constituency parties shoulder a large part of the financial burden. Finally, to the extent that 
London has a more direct impact in Cardiff than in Edinburgh, campaign financing again 
reflects a kind of asymmetrical stratarchy. Extensive moves have been made in the 
Conservative Party away from centralism. In this regard, the party’s development supports 
the stratarchy thesis to a larger extent than Labour. However, the moves have been partial 
and only in Wales have clear ruptures occurred from the party’s organisational and 
ideational legacies.  
 
The Liberal Democrats 
Like the Conservatives, the Liberal Party emerged from a parliamentary group well before 
universal suffrage: yet, in organisational design the two parties followed different paths. The 
Liberals developed a largely decentralised party organisation: at the same time, MPs were 
autonomous from their constituency parties and decoupled from the organisation on the 
ground (Panebianco 1988:89). This created a hybrid party: essentially elitist in its 
parliamentary politics while at the same time distinctly decentralised and geared towards 
membership influence (Whiteley et al. 2006). During the twentieth century, the grass-roots 
dimension of Liberal politics attained the strongest impact. Moreover, the federal structure 
of the party (akin to its proposed policy for the government of Britain) prepared the ground 
for a stratarchical approach to the party. 
Localism and federalism remained the guidelines for the Liberal Democrats which 
resulted from the merger with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1988. The constitutional 
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separateness of English, Welsh and Scottish Liberal Democrats has been maintained, with 
the federal party a unifying structure above. In light of the general perception of centralised 
British parties, the party thus stands out as an exception, which has been further enhanced 
by the centralisation of Labour and the Conservative Party from the 1960s onwards. 
Significantly, a federalised party structure also meant that, among the three dominant 
parties, the Liberal Democrats were the best prepared for devolution - even if a symmetric 
federation of England, Scotland and Wales was what the party had initially opted for 
(Bogdanor 2001:128). Thus, while a functionalist perspective would predict an easy 
realisation of stratarchy in response to devolution, institutionalism would make a similar 
prediction on the basis of the party’s federalist legacy. 
 
Candidate selection 
The selection of parliamentary candidates has from the start been a completely devolved 
issue for the Liberal Democrats, and only nuances can be added to this picture since 
devolution. In Scotland and Wales, selecting candidates for both Parliament in Westminster 
and the legislatures in Edinburgh and Cardiff is under the discretion of the state parties. This 
creates a system where it will be more or less the same procedure whether you are selecting 
a prospective Welsh MP or AM, but the Welsh procedures differ from the Scottish 
procedures which again differ from the English procedures. The federal party is thus blocked 
from interference over candidate selection. The remaining potential for contention concerns 
transfers between the various approved lists. There is a committee meeting biannually to 
bring together the selection boards of England, Wales and Scotland. One of the problems 
they have to consider is that acceptance for the list in England does not equal being 
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accepted for the Scottish list, where they have a two-tier approval (similar to the 
Conservative Party) reserving particularly qualified candidates, or in Wales, where they have 
a grading system. 
With devolution, a further differentiation of candidates between England, Scotland 
and Wales appears to have emerged. The approved lists for general elections are 
coordinated, so that a prospective candidate admitted in England will be eligible also for a 
Scottish or Welsh seat. For devolved elections, however, a policy conversion is required: 
while in Wales, this is a mere formality, in Scotland the process involved is more demanding. 
According to Stephen Peters, chair of campaigns and candidates in Scotland: 
 
We need to know the candidate and that they have been through our training. If 
someone is approved down south, they will still have to go through some sort of 
assessment here. You should be aware of the logic created by devolution; we have to 
ensure that candidates are cognisant of the policy areas that have been devolved to 
the Scottish Parliament. 
 
The fact that candidate selection procedures differ slightly between the state parties is 
considered a natural property of a federalised party. Still, there is some anxiety in London 
that different standards of approval apply. On candidate selection, the Liberal Democrats 
thus reflect some of the virtues but also challenges raised by a stratarchical approach. 
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Manifesto formulation 
Centralism may be a question of capacity as well as desired allocation of power. To the 
Liberal Democrats, the sheer lack of resources in Scotland and Wales previously raised a 
barrier to policy development, to the extent that party relations could be seen as just as 
centralised as those of Labour (Laffin et al. 2007b:215). Policy capacity is however one area 
where much has changed in the party over the last few years and where devolution clearly 
has had an impact. While the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and Wales have comparatively 
small party offices, parliamentary support staff have added tremendously to the party’s 
policy-making capacity. According to Ben Stoneham, headquarters director in London: 
 
Scotland for example is so much more able to do its own policy making, it has 
research people in Parliament who can do all the background research that we never 
had before. That is a huge improvement in our resource and capacity. 
 
Electoral manifestos are subject to a more formalised process than the running policy 
development in the parties. Both the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats enjoy full 
autonomy over manifestos for devolved elections. Their Policy Committee is responsible for 
the document, which must be finally endorsed by party conference. Significantly, manifestos 
for general elections are drawn up on the basis of what the party believes should be 
devolved rather than what is formally devolved today. This leaves some scope for confusion: 
in cases where the Scottish or Welsh party goes too far, the constitution of the Liberal 
Democrats states quite bluntly that the Federal Policy Committee 
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shall have the right to be consulted upon, and in the case of a conflict (but after 
consultation with the State Party concerned) to override any proposal to be contained 
in the General Election manifesto of any State or Regional Party…10
 
 
This is however rarely played out in practice. Stephen Peters, chair of campaigns and 
candidates in Scotland, comments: 
 
Central regulation of divergence would go against our idea of a federal party. What 
we try to do is ensure there is a Liberal thread, that there are principles which we 
agree on and which will be there. In Scotland we are looking for Scottish solutions to 
Scottish problems. Also, we are talking about coalition politics which means you can't 
just go out and deliver your electoral manifesto. After a series of negotiations, the 
resulting program for government is going to be a compromise... 
 
Under devolution, the Liberal Democrats have obtained governmental power through 
coalition arrangements with Labour, in Edinburgh (1999-2007) as well as in Cardiff (2000-03). 
As reflected in a number of initiatives, a federal party does not necessarily imply policy 
divergence. On the contrary, the party has communicated closely between Scotland, Wales 
and London, leading to “nationalization or homogenization, rather than a denationalization 
or regionalization, of public policy” (Laffin 2007:666). Political practice has thus been 
remarkably convergent despite the internal autonomy granted by the party’s constitution, 
signifying that formal stratarchy may be coupled with close internal harmonisation. 
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Financing of electoral campaigns 
The Liberal Democrats are the least well resourced of the three dominant parties in Britain, 
and once again one meets the maxim that it does not matter as much who controls the 
money as whether there is any. Over the last few decades, campaigning for the Liberal 
Democrats has been a membership-driven affair. According to Judge (2005:97) “the limited 
resources of the party’s central organisation means that responsibility for constituency 
campaigns, beyond key target seats, still remains primarily devolved to local constituency 
parties”. The party’s headquarters both at the national and devolved level therefore play a 
very small role in campaigns beyond providing some training and encouragement (Denver et 
al. 2003:547). 
Membership fees in the Liberal Democrats are divided between the state and federal 
parties. For the principal reason that the Welsh and Scottish parties are smaller, they are 
helped out financially by the federal party. This is particularly relevant during election 
campaigns. Such funding often entails some specific requirements as to how the money 
should be applied. According to Ben Stoneham, headquarters director in London: 
 
Inevitably, there is some negotiation. Again, there is an element of devolution, so 
Scotland has a campaign officer, but our campaign expertise is mainly a federal 
resource. If we were giving, say, two hundred pounds (sic) to the Scottish party, 
inevitably we would say we want this money to be spent on target seats, we don’t 
want to see it used on a national advertisement campaign. 
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Spending decisions for devolved elections hence take the form of negotiation rather than 
command. The process is somewhat different for general elections, where funding from 
London is larger and more direct, according to Stoneham: 
 
The negotiation then is much more with individual constituency parties rather than 
state parties. Of course they can take views from the state parties as to which are the 
target seats, but then the federal campaigns committee has representatives in 
Scotland and Wales on it… Normally the federal party will decide with the individual 
constituency parties how that money is spent.  
 
All in all, the limited resources of the Scottish and Welsh parties create a financial 
dependence on the federal party. Furthermore, the fact that funding is accompanied by 
spending requirements ensures that the Liberal Democrats are not as close to stratarchy on 
campaign financing as they are on candidate selection and manifestos. The general 
impression is one of a near-completed stratarchical party, with financial decentralisation the 
remaining hurdle. 
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CONCLUSION 
In his classic account of parliamentary candidate selection in British parties, Ranney 
(1965:273) summarised that “Labour has the most formal central control of the three parties 
and has used it the most; the Conservatives have somewhat less and have used it very little; 
and the Liberals have little central power or influence”. This is not far from how one may 
conclude with regard to allocation of power in the three parties post-devolution. Such 
continuities support the institutionalist assumption that structures laid down in the 
formative period of a party are maintained despite later changes in its environment 
(Panebianco 1988). Overall, there are clear limitations to how much the parties have 
changed as a result of devolution.11
 
 The observation that distinct organisational trajectories 
may prevail under devolution is supported by research on Spanish parties (van Biezen and 
Hopkin 2006, Fabre 2008). An interesting parallel can also be drawn to the supra-national 
level, where the emergence of the European Parliament has had negligible effect on national 
party organisations (Mair 2000, Poguntke et al. 2007). Estimated (current) positions of the 
three parties on the centralism vs. stratarchy dimension are given in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Indicators of organisational autonomy: positions in 2007 
  Labour The Conservative Party 
The Liberal 
Democrats 
Indicators of 
organisational 
autonomy 
candidate selection (Largely) stratarchical (Largely) stratarchical 
(Very) 
stratarchical 
manifesto 
formulation 
(Largely) 
stratarchical (Largely) stratarchical 
(Very) 
stratarchical 
financing of 
electoral 
campaigns 
(Largely) 
centralised 
(Largely) stratarchical 
in Scotland / (largely) 
centralised in Wales 
(Largely) 
centralised 
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At the outset I formulated two competing hypotheses concerning party response to 
devolution. The stratarchical hypothesis stated that a parallel transformation and hence 
convergence around stratarchy has occurred in all the three British parties, while the 
institutionalist prediction was that internal allocation of power in the parties has been 
subject to only  late and incremental reform and remains different between the parties post-
devolution. On the basis of the empirical analysis, I find that the institutionalist hypothesis of 
stability and incremental change is lent considerable support by data on the British parties. 
Clearly, the parties have not converged around a stratarchical model. In Labour and the 
Conservative Party, reform has been slower than the functionalist thesis would predict, and 
organisational change has followed separate trajectories in each of the parties. 
As argued by Pierson (2004:131), actor-centred functionalism may “suggest a world 
of political institutions that is far more prone to efficiency and continuous refinement […] 
than the world we actually inhabit”. Existing organisational structures typically remain 
despite functional pressures to reform. Functionalism may not be a bad place to begin if one 
wishes to hypothesise on the direction of reform over time: parties do respond to 
environmental change, and, in the case of devolution, they do turn (if only cautiously) 
towards more stratarchical arrangements. Change, however, is mediated by organisational 
legacies which delay reform and maintain the idiosyncratic character of each individual 
party.  
When does organisational legacy have the strongest impact? Comparing Labour and 
the Conservative Party may be instructive here, as both parties have changed since 
devolution, but in various forms and to varying degrees. Developments in Labour, with its 
legacy of centralism, largely correspond with the institutionalist perspective. The party has 
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moved incrementally towards stratarchy, decentralising candidate selection and the 
formulation of manifestos while remaining a largely centralised party in financial terms.12
These observations of Labour and the Conservative Party are theoretically useful. 
Although it was suggested that devolution has not amounted to a critical juncture to the 
parties, applying an institutionalist perspective should entail a more nuanced inspection of 
concrete actors and events. If one party (or a sub-national section of that party) suffers 
disproportionately as the result of a reform, it can indeed be faced with a sufficient shock to 
facilitate profound change. Devolution seems to have shaken the foundations of the 
Conservatives in Wales, introduced as it was against the party’s will and coinciding with a 
historical low in its support. This may have opened a window of opportunity for extensive 
reform, which when exploited led to a reorganisation of the party; a critical juncture. Labour 
meanwhile represents a contrasting example where the party both in Scotland and in Wales 
has avoided a decisive break from its centralised organisational legacy. Does it mean that 
organisational legacy is considered more important in Labour, particularly with regard to 
centralism (McKenzie 1963)? An alternative, more event-driven interpretation would be that 
stability has prevailed in the absence of a performance crisis and with considerably larger 
risks related to internal reform, as Labour has served in government both in Edinburgh, 
 
The Conservative Party, on the other hand, has been through more profound, but also more 
diverse, change. Traditionally portrayed as stereotypically unionist, the party has responded 
to devolution by revising its approach to party management – particularly so in Wales, 
where enhanced autonomy has been introduced on candidate selection and the formulation 
of manifestos. Furthermore, both the Welsh and Scottish parties are now represented ex 
officio in the national Board of the party.  
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Cardiff and London. Electoral strength in Scotland and Wales also means that the central 
party in London has an interest in maintaining a unified approach and that (a portion of) its 
Welsh and Scottish MPs agree as they are opposed to seeing their influence and cohesion in 
Westminster undermined (Morgan and Mungham 2000:112-13). 
Devolution could be seen within the broader framework of multi-level governance 
and the shift away from the Westminster model as organising perspective (Bache and 
Flinders 2004, 33). British party politics is in a process of transition, with pressures to 
decentralise towards the sub-national level. As seen in the analysis above, party response to 
these pressures is non-linear, deeply affected by party legacy as well as situational 
constraints. An institutionalist perspective can make a valuable contribution to this field 
through a refined conception of change. For example, while organisational legacies may be 
overcome, such extensive reform is typically preconditioned by a window of opportunity 
which may open in the wake of electoral failure. Further research should consider the role of 
political entrepreneurship in this reform process. Closer study is also needed of the defining 
features of the stratarchical relationship which may ensue between parties at the national 
and the devolved level, what Carty (2004:12) refers to as “a franchise contract that defines 
the essence of a particular party’s intra-organisational bargains”. Britain provides fertile 
terrain for studying the effect of federalisation on political parties, a process which is likely 
to continue in the years to come.  
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APPENDIX 
Interviews conducted for the article 
 Lyndon Jones, chairman, Welsh Conservative Party, Cardiff 1 February 2008. 
 Robert Kaye, special adviser on devolution, Conservative Party, London 16 January 
2008. 
 Roy Kennedy, director of finance and compliance, Labour Party, London 15 January 
2008. 
 Christian Moon, deputy head of policy and research, Liberal Democrats, London 16 
January 2008. 
 Stephen Peters, chair of campaigns and candidates, Liberal Democrats, Edinburgh 29 
January 2008. 
 Chris Roberts, general secretary, Welsh Labour, Cardiff 31 January 2008. 
 Andrea Stephenson, operations co-ordinator, Scottish Conservative Party, 30 January 
2008. 
 Ben Stoneham, headquarters director, Liberal Democrats, London 15 January 2008. 
 Lesley Quinn, general secretary, Scottish Labour, Glasgow 30 January 2008. 
 Ian Walton, party manager, Welsh Liberal Democrats, Cardiff 1 February 2008. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 Special arrangements are also created for the Greater London Authority (from 1999) and Northern 
Ireland, but these will not be dealt with in the present article. 
2 Throughout this article, general election refers to elections for Parliament in Westminster. 
3 Devolved elections also introduced regional lists as supplement to the individual constituency 
candidates. This part of the candidate selection process is not discussed in the present article. 
4 The Liberal Democrats are an exception here, as their general election manifestos have had 
devolved sections since the party’s foundation. It could be argued that only policies with nation-wide 
or repercussive effects would be susceptible to centralised control. In the present analysis, however, 
focus is directed towards the general control over manifesto formulation. 
5 With regard to Labour’s approach to the Scottish and Welsh parties, there is an interesting parallel 
to the relationship between Labour in London and its party group in the European Parliament. Here 
the home party has also been accused of excessive control through its influence over candidate 
(re)selection (Messmer 2003). 
6 The caveat should be added that formally, any candidate that is accepted anywhere has to receive 
endorsement from the NEC. 
7 One prominent example is the election of Dennis Canavan as an independent candidate after being 
rejected from Labour’s approved list in Scotland, another is the fall of Alun Michael as party leader 
and first secretary in Wales in 2000; Michael had been elected one year earlier following strong 
pressure from the party in London (Laffin et al. 2007a:95-96; Bradbury et al. 2000:58). 
8 Labour Party Rule Book, Clause V.2. 
9 Financing of the 1999 campaign referred to in Laffin et al. (2007a:102). Estimates for 2007 supplied 
by the General Secretary of Scottish Labour, Lesley Quinn. 
10 The Constitutions of the Liberal Democrats: The Constitution of the Federal Party, Article 7.3. 
11 Hopkin and Bradbury (2006), observing all three parties on political recruitment, electoral 
campaigns and policy making in the devolved institutions, find similar support for the argument that 
each of the parties remains close to its organisational past. 
12 Laffin et al. (2007a:102,105) conclude that Labour wavers between centralised and decentralised 
control on key indicators, of which administration and finance remain the most centralised. 
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ABSTRACT 
What does the creation of subnational legislatures entail for the work of parliamentary 
representatives, and by what guidelines does the cross-level relationship evolve? This article 
considers the issue in the context of British devolution, relating the analysis of 
parliamentarians to the question  of how parties adapt. The empirical analysis, drawing 
on a series of interviews with Welsh Assembly Members (AMs) and Members of Parliament 
(MPs) from Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, shows that the 
infrastructure for communication between AMs and MPs differs considerably between the 
parties. Moreover, there are also key differences between parties with regard to how 
relations between individual representatives are resolved. Drawing upon insights from the 
institutionalist literature, I argue, first, that the creation of subnational legislatures 
challenges party cohesiveness and, secondly, that how this challenge is met by the parties is 
guided by their distinct ideational and organisational legacies with regard to devolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Subnational legislatures are a familiar phenomenon under federalism as well as in the 
increasing number of regionalised states in Europe. With the Scottish Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales in operation since 1999, Britain has become a significant 
member of the latter group.1
The analysis singles out Wales for further investigation. In contrast with the Scottish 
Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales (the Assembly) does not have primary 
legislative powers.
 In the research on British parties, devolution has led to 
enhanced attention towards the consequences for parties of multi-levelness (Hopkin and 
Bradbury 2006, Hough and Jeffery 2006, Laffin et al. 2007). A different research avenue has 
highlighted the interaction between Parliament and the devolved legislatures (Horgan 2004, 
Hazell 2007). The present article aims to integrate the analysis of elected representatives 
with the issue of party adaptation to devolution. What (formal and non-formal) structures 
have been established by the parties to facilitate cross-level interaction between 
parliamentarians? Moreover, where differences occur between the parties, how can these be 
accounted for? 
2 However, with regard to cross-level interaction between 
parliamentarians the Welsh case is particularly fruitful: one of the consequences of 
devolution is that, contrary to in Scotland, Members of Parliament (MPs) share identical 
constituencies with the 40 (out of 60) Assembly Members (AMs) that are elected from 
single-member constituencies.3 The constituency basis of parliamentary representation is a 
deeply embedded feature of the British system of government (Birch, 1964; Lundberg, 
2007). Consequently, the arrival of new representatives was expected to cause tension with 
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incumbent MPs (Russell and Bradbury 2007:98). More generally, the emergence of 
subnational legislatures could exert pressure not only on individual representatives but also 
on the ability of parties to remain cohesive across territorial levels; cohesiveness is here 
understood as the extent to which organisational and ideological structures are sufficiently 
unitary for a statewide party to be seen as one organisation with shared political aims across 
its territory. Statewide parliaments and ditto political parties were integral to the creation of 
a national political space, what Caramani (2004) refers to as the nationalisation of politics. 
Devolution may suggest a step towards reversal of this pattern. How parties – and, by 
implication, parliamentarians – respond to this development is thus significant for the polity 
as a whole. 
In scholarly debates on devolution and political parties, the relationship between 
parliamentarians has only briefly been addressed (Bradbury and Mitchell 2007). This article 
contributes to the field through a comparative study of the structures of interaction 
between AMs and Welsh MPs in Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. 
The next section gives a brief review of research on relations between parliamentarians 
under devolution. Thereafter, the theoretical framework grounds the study in two 
institutionalist hypotheses on party reform. Thirdly, the main part of the article presents the 
empirical analysis based on interview data from a small set of constituencies where AM and 
MP represent the same party – assessing, first, the institutional gravity hypothesis 
concerning AM/MP relations in general, then the party legacies hypothesis concerning 
structures of interaction in each of the three parties. Fourthly and finally, the results and 
wider implications are summarised in a conclusion. 
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PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES, PARTIES AND 
DEVOLUTION 
Although constitutional supremacy remains vested in Westminster and no autonomy is 
granted to England, devolution has transformed the British polity towards a quasi-federal 
state (Bogdanor 2003, Loughlin 2004). Referenda in 1997 prepared the ground for 
subnational legislatures in Scotland and Wales, the first elections being held in 1999 for a 
Scottish Parliament (with primary legislative and tax-varying powers, limited to three per 
cent on income tax) and a National Assembly for Wales (with secondary legislative and no-
tax-varying powers). 
 The asymmetry between Scottish and Welsh devolution creates different sets of 
relations between parliamentarians. Devolution to Scotland is based on clear-cut division of 
competencies, enabling a more transparent (though hardly unambiguous) division of labour 
between MPs and Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Powers devolved to Wales 
however are limited and less clearly defined. One of the consequences is a porous division of 
labour between AMs and MPs. At the parliamentary level, this has been enhanced by the 
Government of Wales Act of 2006 which extends the legislative initiative of the Assembly 
under the precondition of close interaction with Westminster and a pivotal role for the 
Secretary of State for Wales.4 At the constituency level, the absence of clear jurisdictions 
between AM and MP (and the conceivable confusion among constituents) means that each 
is at risk of invading the policy turf of her counterpart. Russell and Bradbury (2007:112-13) 
find a fusion of responsibilities between AM and MP, with the latter often taking on 
casework which is formally devolved. Interaction between AMs and MPs in the constituency 
is thus affected by their overlapping mandates from the Assembly and Parliament.5 
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However, the AM/MP relationship in each individual constituency is also affected by party 
culture, which appears to have an opaque but significant effect on how individual relations 
are resolved (Bradbury and Mitchell 2007: 142). Such reference to party culture, tradition 
and legacies has become commonplace not only in studies of parliamentarians but also in 
accounts of party organisational reform in response to devolution. An initial expectation in 
Britain was that statewide parties would converge around the decentralised party model 
favoured by federalism (Mitchell and Seyd 1999; cf. Chandler and Chandler, 1987). What 
comparative studies shown however is considerable heterogeneity in parties’ allocation of 
power following regionalisation. Factors such as party family and government incumbency 
are significant barriers against any uniform decentralisation: moreover, individual party 
legacies also impact on party reform (Swenden and Maddens 2009, Detterbeck and Hepburn 
2010). Studies of British parties under devolution have drawn similar conclusions: parties 
change in different ways and to different degrees in response to regionalisation (Hopkin and 
Bradbury 2006, Fabre 2008, Bratberg 2010). There are thus numerous related findings in the 
empirical literatures on elected representatives and party organisation. Many of these 
findings highlight the institutional variables mediating between functional requirements of 
the (multi-level) environment and the political or organisational response. The present 
article attempts to flesh out such an institutionalist approach in more explicit terms. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Assessing the relationship between AMs and MPs, one hypothesis could be that it depends 
exclusively on individual and idiosyncratic factors. Here however I will proffer two 
alternative positions – one derived from organisational theory and one from historical 
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institutionalism – to address the AM/MP dynamic within each of the three dominant 
statewide parties. The organisational and the historical institutionalist positions are 
complementary. Both are grounded in institutionalism, which has inspired a broad range of 
research over the last two decades but which also has a much longer pedigree in political 
science (Simon 1947, Selznick 1957). Institutionalist approaches emphasise how (individual 
and collective) agency is affected by institutions – that is, “the formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of 
the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996:938). The institutionalist approach to 
decision making is also reflected in Allison’s (1969) classic study of the Cuba crisis, where the 
bureaucratic politics paradigm states that “where you stand depends on where you sit”: 
actors operate according to different role conceptions and loyalties embedded in the 
organisational structure (Allison 1969:707,711). 
From the institutionalist perspective, devolution has enabled subnational legislatures 
as distinct arenas for recruitment, socialisation and the promotion of territorial interest 
(Morgan and Mungham 2000). The Assembly creates a set of organisational loyalties 
(supported also by parliamentary posts and salaries) which supplement the party affiliation 
of AMs and MPs. Loyalties towards the Assembly are expected to centre upon the 
promotion of Welsh interests within the UK settlement and the strengthening of the 
Assembly’s political strength in relation to London and Westminster. This development could 
cause tension within the statewide party, something which should then be reflected in the 
way parliamentarians from the two levels interact. What I will term the institutional gravity 
hypothesis states that: 
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 devolution has inspired loyalties to subnational institutions that rival the statewide 
party identification, causing intra-party tension between AMs and MPs. 
 
However, the legislature is only one of the two primary structures in which AMs and MPs 
integrated. Parties constitute the other organisational affiliation of fundamental importance. 
Two affiliations are thus brought to the fore – party and legislature – each of which affects 
the role orientation and thus the policy focus of the individual representative. 
How do parties adapt to this development towards a new, and potentially competing, 
source of identification? Historical institutionalism would emphasise that organisational and 
ideational legacies continue to affect decision making long after they were created (Judge 
2005: 10-11). Organisational structures affect the way problems are dealt with and adequate 
responses developed; moreover, organisational “memory” ensures that responses to 
pending challenges are developed from what historical practice has laid down as appropriate 
in the party.  Following this logic, dominant legacies within the party will also guide the way 
it responds to environmental change by (re)allocating power and responsibilities. Extensive 
reform occurs primarily when an external shock opens a window of opportunity for 
rethinking fundamental principles of the organisation (Egeberg 2003:120). Elsewhere, 
stability prevails: path dependence suggests that once a set of operating procedures and 
guiding principles has been established, self-reinforcing processes make it increasingly 
difficult to return to the branching point where a specific policy or organisational structure 
was adopted (Pierson 2000, Thelen 2003). Policy decisions in a formative phase of political 
parties are significant examples of such path-making events (Panebianco 1988:163). Indeed, 
one may argue that parties should be particularly prone to path dependence in policies as 
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well as organisational structures: parties’ internal and external justification is built upon the 
legacies they maintain.6
Thus, a historical institutionalist approach to party change would suggest that change 
is late and incremental, and that when it occurs it will be guided by ideational and 
organisational structures laid down in the past. With regard to devolution, how the 
territorial dimension has been accommodated in the party structures at an earlier stage (for 
example, the degree to which parties have been hierarchically structured around London) 
provides the basis for adapting to devolution. Not only do these legacies impact on collective 
structures in the party: they are also expected to affect the role orientation of 
parliamentarians and their cross-level structures of interaction. The party legacies 
hypothesis states that: 
 
 
 adaptation to the devolved settlement – as reflected in the extent and form of 
coordination between AMs and MPs – differs systematically between the parties in 
line with distinct party legacies. 
 
The present empirical study only comprises the three dominant statewide parties in Britain; 
Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. Omitting Plaid Cymru from the 
analysis requires an explanation: in the present analysis, it is primarily the territorial dynamic 
in statewide parties operating across the UK that is the focus of research. This is however 
not to disregard that the cross-level dynamic of parliamentarians both from the Welsh and 
Scottish nationalist parties is relevant: indeed, such a study would be a useful addendum to 
the investigation in this article. 
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How, then, do the three statewide parties differ in their historical approaches to devolution? 
Wales has historically been a region of one-party dominance, by the Liberal Party from the 
latter half of the nineteenth century then by Labour since the early 1920s (Bogdanor 
2001:145); although Labour was reduced at the 2010 general election, the party retains 26 
of the 40 Welsh MPs. Traditionally, Conservatives, Liberals and Labour represent different 
approaches to devolution. While the Conservative Party throughout its history has been a 
unionist party opposed to the emergence of devolved legislatures, the Liberal Party – and its 
successor, the Liberal Democrats – has been in the opposite position of promoting a federal 
Britain. Labour has been located somewhere between the two poles, balancing a 
commitment to centralised redistribution and welfare with electoral strength in the 
periphery and particular concern for Scotland and Wales.  
Labour’s ambiguous stand on devolution to Wales is deeply rooted in the party´s 
historical position there. Labour expropriated the Liberals’ role as defender of the 
geographical periphery, but the party always highlighted class over geography as identity 
marker (Bogdanor 2001:150-51). The party thus developed an ambiguous relationship to 
Wales, as champion of the emerging working class but with a distant – and at times 
discouraging – view of Welsh language and tradition. The party’s class politics governed from 
the centre was projected on industrial Wales, where social deprivation and industrial strife in 
the inter-war decades demonstrated the need for state regulation. This perception was 
further consolidated with the post-war expansion of the welfare state (Morgan and 
Mungham 2000:71). However, with the cautious resurgence of Scottish and Welsh 
nationalism in the 1970s, Labour hurried in a manifesto commitment in 1974 to create 
legislatures in Edinburgh and Cardiff. When referenda were held on the issue in 1979, they 
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failed marginally in Scotland and overwhelmingly in Wales: Labour was split on devolution, 
with Neil Kinnock one of the leading “No” campaigners in Wales. During the Thatcher years, 
Labour continued to play the leading role in devolution debates, its general election 
manifesto in 1992 proposing a regional tier for London, a parliament for Scotland, and an 
assembly for Wales (Deacon and Sandry 2007:9). The Welsh Labour Executive was 
determined to keep the debate inside the party rather than opting for a cross-party 
convention as in Scotland. Discussions displayed some acrimony, with a cleavage emerging 
between devolutionists and sceptics who were numerous among Welsh Labour MPs 
(Morgan and Mungham 2000:112-13). By the time the proposals for an Assembly were 
finalised, tension over the devolution settlement had cooled off although candidate 
selection would later generate some unrest within the Welsh party branch (Laffin et al. 
2007). As a party organisation, Labour has since devolution continued to emphasise unity 
across levels while cautiously permitting more leeway for its party branches both in Scotland 
and Wales. I hypothesise that parliamentary cross-level interaction in Labour will be 
infrequent and formal: individual AM/MP relations will vary between proximity and 
remoteness, reflecting the ambiguous legacy of devolution in the party. 
The Conservative Party campaigned consistently against devolution in 1979 as well as 
1997. Since then, it has changed its profile towards a decentralised unionist position which is 
also reflected in the party structures (Lynch 2003, Bradbury 2006). At a special conference in 
1998, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party reformed itself to gain enhanced 
autonomy over finances, candidates and policy formulation. For the Welsh Conservatives, 
change was less fundamental: although the party branch would now have a separate 
leadership and party board, it was more dependent on London in financial and policy terms 
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(Ingle, 2000:69). Calls are heard within the party for devolution to proceed with tax-varying 
powers in Scotland and a law-making parliament in Wales, yet the party in London “remains 
deeply sceptical of advancing devolution” (Deacon and Sandry 2007:9). Again, the 
Conservatives in Wales are the most clearly affected by the maintained power of the 
leadership in London, reflecting a perception of Welsh subordination (Evans 2002). On this 
basis, I hypothesise that parliamentary cross-level interaction in the Conservative Party will 
be  limited and formal, reflecting the remoteness and hierarchy which will also prevail 
between individual AMs and MPs. 
The Liberal Democrats are the party which has been most deeply and consistently 
committed to devolution, even if a full-fledged federal settlement has been its stated aim. 
Succeeded by Labour as the predominant Welsh party in the wake of the First World War, 
the Welsh Liberal Democrats thereafter disappeared into the wilderness, only to slowly 
resurrect over the last three decades. Operating as a state party within the federal party 
structure, the Welsh Liberal Democrats are autonomous in policy formulation and 
administration. Yet, they lean heavily on the federal party in London with regard to financial 
resources, policy development and campaigns. The Liberal Democrats backed the devolution 
proposals behind the 1979 and 1997 referenda, but would prefer a law-making and tax-
raising Welsh Parliament alongside regional assemblies in England. These would be overseen 
by a federal parliament in London (Deacon and Sandry 2007:9-10). Among the Liberal 
Democrats I hypothesise that parliamentary cross-level interaction will be frequent and 
informal, implying regular exchanges between the Westminster and Assembly groups and 
close and non-hierarchical relations between individual AMs and MPs. 
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METHODS AND DATA 
The empirical analysis draws upon data from eighteen semi-structured interviews with AMs 
and MPs from Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats conducted between 
January and May 2008. For each of the three parties, three constituencies were initially 
chosen in which the party holds both the AM and MP. The two representatives in each 
constituency were interviewed either in person or by telephone. Regrettably, it proved 
impossible to obtain consent from all the selected AMs and MPs, especially from the 
Conservative side: while the Liberal Democrats representatives in all three constituencies 
were interviewed, only two Labour pairs and one Conservative pair were complete. These 
interviews were supplemented by similar talks with other AMs and MPs, where a small 
selection was made to reflect variation in constituency type (urban/rural), the 
representatives’ gender, tenure and size of majority (see Appendix). The interviews were 
conducted to acquire concrete information on working procedures and allocation of tasks 
between the two parliamentarians as well as personal assessments of the relationship at 
constituency level and the collective relationship between the parliamentary groups. 
Interview data thus concerned the representative’s priorities between different tasks of 
representation, concrete information on the AM/MP infrastructure in the constituency, 
views on their relationship as well as the collective inter-parliamentary arrangements in the 
party.  
 The empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. The first part discusses the relationship 
between AMs and MPs, whereby the institutional gravity hypothesis is assessed. In the 
second part I address the party legacies hypothesis concerning differences between the 
parties. To what extent have different structures of interaction between parliamentarians 
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been established in response to devolution – and to what extent can party legacies help 
explain the form and strength of these arrangements? 
  
INSTITUTIONAL GRAVITY: THE AM/MP RELATIONSHIP IN 
WELSH CONSTITUENCIES 
In the three devolved elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007, Labour maintained its hold on a 
majority of the 40 single-member constituencies in Wales. The main difference from general 
elections was a lower number of seats for Labour and a relatively higher number for Plaid 
Cymru. Electoral research confirms that voters prioritise differently at devolved elections, 
where Plaid is seen as more relevant and attractive by voters who otherwise support one of 
the statewide parties at general elections (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006). Following the 2005 
general election and the 2007 Assembly election, Labour had 24 constituency AMs and 29 
Welsh MPs; the Conservative Party five and three respectively; the Liberal Democrats three 
and four; while Plaid Cymru had seven constituency AMs and three MPs.7 Throughout the 
decade of devolution, the majority of Welsh constituencies have been represented by the 
same party in both legislatures: as of 2009, there were 32 constituencies of this type.8
Compared with split constituencies, sharing a constituency with a party colleague 
should normally provide for a sound working relationship, something which is supported by 
earlier research (Bradbury 2007:152). However, co-representation does present challenges 
even if the AM and MP share party and political outlook. According to Jenny Willott, Liberal 
Democrat MP: 
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You have to be careful you’re not treading on each other’s toes... You have to always 
make sure you are considering the other representative, making sure she is up to 
date, that you are not responding to something she has already responded to or 
contradicting her… There are lots of things you need to be thinking about that you 
wouldn’t need to consider if you were one person in the seat. 
 
Here, I will consider general observations with regard to the AM/MP interaction, assessing 
the hypothesis that devolution has inspired loyalties to subnational institutions that rival the 
statewide party identification, causing intra-party tension between AMs and MPs. Three 
indicators on the strength of the AM/MP relationship were investigated. In all joint 
constituencies I checked whether the two representatives shared a constituency office and 
other forms of infrastructure. The interviews focussed on whether there was a systematic 
difference in policy focus between the AM and MP and whether there was a perceived 
difference of prestige. Finally, the channels of recruitment for the two legislatures as a whole 
were examined. I will briefly go through these points in turn.  
In 15 of the 32 constituencies where the AM and MP were from the same party as of 
2009, they also shared a constituency office.9 This arrangement sometimes involves 
overlapping staff responsibilities, and it may also imply joint surgeries. Several interviewees 
pointed to the practical advantages of co-location, such as tight coordination and easy 
access for constituents who often do not know whether they should address the AM or the 
MP. Where representatives have chosen separate offices it often reflects a wish to act 
autonomously, although in a handful of rural constituencies the separation of offices is 
determined by geography. Where infrastructure is shared, this facilitates continuous 
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exchange of casework between the AM and the MP. It also permits closer communication on 
policy initiatives and electoral strategy. Campaigning in Wales is difficult, with both AMs and 
MPs formally restricted to a limited number of policy areas and having to balance the 
sometimes differing priorities of Cardiff and London. Some of the closest AM/MP 
partnerships in terms of infrastructure also display the clearest partnership in electoral 
strategy. Consider the following quote from an AM: 
 
We take the view that it is all about us winning a political seat. If we were to start 
getting fuzzy about who deals with what, out there in the public’s eye… We feel it is 
much better to present a unified scenario: we are your politicians to represent you. 
This joint approach is sometimes more important than the legal distinction of our 
roles. What we do is to say as we come to an election we will turn up the heat for the 
one of us who will thus get the bigger profile. 
 
In terms of priorities and tasks, is there a systematic difference in outlook and focus 
between AMs and MPs? This is an important question which combines actual tasks with the 
perception of representative role. Life in the Assembly or Parliament offers different 
institutional environments. Clearly, where you are located also affects representatives’ 
approach to constituency and Welsh issues. According to one AM:  
 
I think Welsh MPs have a similar disadvantage to Scottish MPs. You will be heading 
for London on Monday morning and returning to your constituency on Thursday 
evening. Quite a few AMs, however, are in a distinct advantage as we go home to our 
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constituency every evening. It means we can focus more heavily on constituency 
work, being able to attend meetings, hold surgeries – and often during the week and 
not only on Friday which is the constituency day. There is a distinct advantage in that. 
 
It is a clear impression from the interviews that AMs have a different function vis-à-vis the 
constituency due to their stronger presence there. However, while AMs may see more of 
their voters, it does not entail that they conduct fundamentally different tasks from the MPs. 
Many interviewees emphasised that representative roles and the tasks they entail are often 
similar for all representatives, although the AM may conduct them more frequently. 
Responding to queries, holding surgeries and maintaining a public profile are essential parts 
of this work.  
With a devolved legislature, a shared party affiliation is challenged by 
parliamentarians’ identification with separate legislatures and separate policy processes. 
Brand (1992:247) identified how Scottish MPs were socialised into an arena where territorial 
interests rapidly disappeared behind the UK-wide political agenda. In the Welsh case, while 
MPs may maintain a self-perception as guardians of their constituency as well as Welsh 
interests, they are integrated in UK-wide party groups. Moreover, Welsh MPs conduct their 
daily work in policy areas offering limited opportunity to promote home interests: some may 
work in devolved areas such as health and education where policy will apply primarily to 
England. Here, it appears that a geographical cleavage between London and Cardiff is 
nurtured by separate politics in the two legislatures. Jenny Willott, Liberal Democrat MP, 
suggests that work in Parliament inspires a Westminster outlook: 
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MPs specialise anyway because there are so many issues that unless you specialise 
you are not going to achieve anything anywhere. So you have to focus, and whatever 
you choose is always going to be of limited interest to your constituents. I work on 
justice issues: well, not everyone has been to prison, has a relative in prison, not 
everyone has been a victim of crime... 
 
Political representation in Wales is ambiguous in relation to status and authority in the 
constituency. Geographically, AMs duplicate MPs, but in terms of remuneration MPs are 
considerably better rewarded, a fact that has already been subject to extensive debate 
(NAW 2009).10
 
 The issue of hierarchy is relevant all the way from the leadership (concerning 
the role of the (Shadow) Secretary of State vs. the leader of the Welsh party) to the 
individual representatives. In the interviews, I dealt with perception rather than formality: 
concerning the different mandate of AMs and MPs, is there a perceived difference in 
prestige between them? Due to its historical and symbolic significance, Parliament has an 
obvious privileged status in the British polity. This is reflected in its relationship with the 
Assembly, which, according to interviewees, trickles down to the individual representatives. 
The following statement by a Labour AM is representative of the majority of AMs 
interviewed: 
MPs are very much seen as the senior figures, and I think that will remain the case for 
a very long time. The relative responsibilities are different, and the MPs have the full 
law-making capabilities whereas the Assembly until 2006 dealt mainly with secondary 
legislation. Many of the big policy areas like defence, foreign affairs, benefits, 
Article 2 
112 
 
taxation, the Home Office are still with Westminster. And on top of that we are the 
new kids on the block. 
 
At the individual level, this sense of hierarchy is perhaps the most visible where the MP was 
in Parliament well before devolution was introduced. This is a typical constellation in Labour: 
in 18 of the party’s 24 shared constituencies in 2008, the MP had longer parliamentary 
tenure than the AM. Within the two other parties, only one Liberal Democrat MP was in 
Parliament prior to devolution, and none of the Conservative MPs. Interestingly, however, 
interviews with Conservatives and Liberal Democrats revealed a significant deference to 
London, which suggests that this is a general trait among AMs. 
To the extent that different role orientations are generated in the two legislatures, 
they may be enhanced by limited recruitment between them. Prior to devolution it was 
suggested that Britain would imitate other European nations such as Germany and Spain, 
where regional tenure has been a veritable springboard for political careers at the national 
level (Mitchell and Seyd 1999:94). One could also expect the subnational legislature to be a 
final destination after serving at the national level. Interestingly, neither upward nor 
downward transfer has occurred to any large degree. With regard to moving up, only three 
of the 40 Welsh MPs elected in 2005 had a past as AMs.11 In the opposite direction, by 2008 
only three AMs had experience from Westminster, all three holding privileged positions in 
the Assembly.12 Data on how many representatives had actually stood for election showed 
that only six MPs had run unsuccessfully for the Assembly, while four of the 2007-11 AMs 
had been unsuccessful candidates for Westminster.13 All in all, the limited exchange 
between the legislatures signals that neither a stepping-stone perception of moving from 
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the Assembly to Parliament nor the returning home perception of moving from Parliament 
to the Assembly cast much light on the career patterns of Welsh politicians. 
Interview data support the notion of the Assembly as an alternative career track, 
officially promoting a different set of values (coalition politics, inclusiveness) and a different 
political focus (localism and domestic Welsh issues). On this basis, a distinction could be 
drawn between the specific Welsh scope of the Assembly and the UK-wide policy focus of 
Welsh MPs. According to Morgan and Mungham (2000:199), “[t]he Assembly signals a 
wholly new political arena, with its own rules, its own codes and its own networks of trust 
and reciprocity: it is not, in other words, Westminster writ small”. Taken together, the 
observations of infrastructure, policy focus, prestige and recruitment together lend qualified 
support to the hypothesis that devolution has inspired loyalties to subnational institutions 
rivalling the statewide party identification, creating intra-party tension between AMs and 
MPs. 
The significance of parliamentary committees is not much analysed above as the 
focus is primarily towards constituency structures of interaction. In Westminster, the Welsh 
Affairs Committee (WASC) is responsible for scrutinising all government policy in Wales still 
governed from London (Deacon and Sandry 2007:114). Moreover, the committee also plays 
an essential role under the post-2006 arrangements in scrutinising legislative requests from 
the Assembly in the form of Legislative Competence Orders.14 Indeed, a convincing 
argument could be that the WASC pulls against any perception of gravity. However, despite 
its strengthened role in the Westminster machinery, the extent to which committee work 
aids intra-party cohesiveness is an open question. The WASC only comprises around a fourth 
of the Welsh MPs, and Welsh interests are less pervasive on the agenda of other select 
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committees as well as on the floor of the House.15
 
 The much broader Welsh Grand 
Committee encompasses all Welsh MPs and may discuss freely on Welsh issues, but meets 
only intermittently and has become less used under devolution (Hazell 2007:254-55).   
PARTY LEGACIES: GUIDANCE FOR THE AM/MP 
RELATIONSHIP  
The analysis in the previous sections suggests that the rise of a subnational legislature 
fosters the development of a separate class of politicians centred in the Assembly. To what 
extent do parties mediate this development? The historical institutionalist hypothesis 
assumed that the relationship between AMs and MPs differs between the parties, as a 
reflection of distinct party legacies. This section accounts for each of the three parties in this 
light, looking first at the relationship between the parliamentary groups and then at the 
constituency level. 
 
Labour16
In Labour, the high number of AMs and MPs would suggest a solid institutional framework 
for interaction. Indeed, the Welsh part of the Parliamentary Labour Party is large in number 
and has, historically, yielded considerable influence and significant contributors to the party 
leadership. The existing infrastructure between the parliamentary groups is however rather 
limited: the most explicit platform is a contact group between the two parliamentary groups 
which, according to the rules, is supposed to meet once a year.
 
17 None of the interviewees 
described the forum as essential to the running affairs in each of the parliamentary groups 
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although, principally, liaison between Cardiff and London is considered important. Often, the 
task is seen as pertaining to the party structures rather than parliamentary groups: a general 
observation from Labour AMs and MPs is that relations are relevant primarily between 
individual representatives and secondly within the framework of Welsh Labour (cf. Horgan 
2004). The limited inter-parliamentary contact in the party is illustrated further by the fact 
that councillors in local government have been relatively isolated from both AMs and MPs.18
In the brief account of Labour’s historical view of devolution given above, much 
emphasis was placed on ambiguity – with regard to devolution of power to the Assembly as 
well as internal autonomy for Welsh Labour. This was the basis of the prediction that a 
diversity of different and partly contradictory views would characterise AM/MP relations in 
the party. To a large extent this prediction was supported by the interviews. In 
constituencies where both representatives are new, things look different from cases where 
the MP has a long tenure pre-devolution. According to Ann Clwyd MP: 
 
 
I have been the MP for my constituency for over 24 years.  People still come to me in 
large numbers with various problems.  Sometimes these are problems that ought to 
be dealt with by the Councillors or the AM. It is difficult to turn a constituent away, 
although I do try to channel them to the appropriate elected member. 
 
Varying degrees of seniority clearly affects how relations evolve. So many of Labour’s Welsh 
MPs have long experience in Westminster that it might be their seniority rather than party 
legacy that best explains the stronger sense of hierarchy and detachment. From a more 
general perspective, however, interviewees lend some support to the view that Welsh 
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Labour MPs have limited contact with their counterparts in the Assembly. AMs and MPs in 
Labour share a legacy where Welsh Labour was a regional section of the statewide Labour 
Party. Shaking off this legacy has been a drawn-out affair, marking a considerable contrast to 
Scotland where a separate policy and organisational platform was established prior to 
devolution (Lynch and Birrell 2004). As of 2008, ten of the party’s 29 Welsh MPs had passed 
more than 15 years in Westminster. A generational change may well be required to change 
the existing pattern of AM/MP relations, much in line with what a historical institutionalist 
emphasis on inherited structures and “stickiness” would suggest. Meanwhile, a power-
seeking incentive ensures that there is awareness of the mutual dependence of party work 
at different levels. According to one Labour AM: 
 
The Labour Party seems to prosper as a whole, so any of its composing parts affects 
the others. The Assembly, Westminster as well as local government – we always need 
to consider the effect of our decisions on the party’s electoral prospects. I think there 
is a strong understanding that we all sink or swim together. 
 
The Conservative Party19
The Conservative Party, with its small and recently established group in Westminster, draws 
mainly on (quite extensive) non-formal relations to coordinate policy between Parliament 
and the Assembly. The party has established Welsh telephone conferences on a weekly basis 
involving the shadow secretary for Wales, the party’s House of Lords spokesman on Wales as 
well as the MPs, AMs and the party’s Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for Wales. 
There is however little in the sense of roundtable discussions and meetings between AMs 
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and MPs, something which was lamented by several interviewees. The impression of an 
ongoing learning process is apparent in the Conservative Party, which has changed 
extensively its profile in Wales over the decade of devolution (Evans 2002, Kelly 2003). In the 
words of one AM: 
 
Until three years ago we didn’t have any MPs at all. Thus essentially, the Assembly 
group was working very much in isolation. But we do rely on our MPs in the House of 
Commons, as a lot of what involves us is obviously discussed there, including 
conferring more powers to the Assembly. We need to follow up what our MPs are 
doing. So a greater deal of coordination is required, a greater deal of effort on both 
sides. 
 
The history of the Conservative Party in Wales reflects a clear command from London and a 
very limited organisational autonomy. With power in the party centralised in London, 
electability for Westminster has been in focus at the local level without any clear 
intermediate layer in Cardiff. On this basis, I hypothesised mutual detachment between the 
parliamentary groups and clear hierarchy also at the individual level between AMs and MPs. 
While the first prediction of detachment is lent some support by the data, interviews show 
that individual relations between AMs and MPs are more diverse than initially perceived. 
According to Stephen Crabb MP: 
  
We are starting from a different base. In Labour they will have MPs who have been in 
Westminster for forty years... In the Conservative Party I don’t think there is a feeling 
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of superiority, but there is a feeling of competitiveness. There are certain issues that 
are clear, for example health and education are devolved, but there are other areas 
that are grey, where the responsibility falls somewhere between Westminster and the 
Assembly. I think there is a potential for competitiveness between certain MPs and 
AMs as to which of the groups should be taking the lead on these issues. 
 
This sense of competition may be related partly to individual ambition and partly to genuine 
uncertainty on the division of tasks. In the process of embracing a Welsh identity the 
territorial issue may become visible in the party, but, contrary to what one might expect, I 
did not find clear evidence of any conflict between the AMs and MPs. Two of the party’s 
three MPs in 2008 have a past as AMs, and personal relations are strong. One would 
however assume that if the prospect of a larger Conservative group in Westminster 
materialises, clearer guidelines on inter-parliamentary liaison will be needed. 
 
The Liberal Democrats20
The Liberal Democrats, on the whole, have developed more elaborate structures for 
coordination between parliamentary groups: likewise, representatives here appear to be the 
most satisfied with the arrangements in hand. AMs and MPs collectively provide for a weekly 
telephone conference where information on agendas and policy issues is exchanged. Inter-
parliamentary coordination is a well-known phenomenon in the Liberal Democrats, as party 
elites have used these non-formal links rather than party discipline to maintain cohesiveness 
between policy initiatives in each of the subnational legislatures and Westminster (Laffin 
2007:651). The significance of informal contacts, between policy spokespersons, 
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backbenchers and staff, was emphasised by several interviewees. According to Jenny 
Randerson, AM for Cardiff Central: 
 
We are more or less in continuous contact. There are copies of press releases 
circulated. Our staff correspond regularly. There are also formal away days twice a 
year where we meet MSPs and MPs, such as in Westminster last month. We would 
look at the bills passing through Parliament and how these affect Wales. It is very 
close liaison. The away day is formalised. And then there’s of course the informal part 
that happens on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Formally, there is no official status in the party for the AM/MP relationship, which has 
developed on an operational basis. This also means that the linkage depends on personal 
commitment, which may vary over time. According to one Liberal Democrat MP, “as two 
corporate groups, the AMs and MPs do not have a very close, or very intimate, relationship”. 
The inter-parliamentary structures of the Liberal Democrats are however more elaborate 
than those developed by its two rival parties. 
With reference to the historical backdrop of the party, I hypothesised that AM/MP 
relations in the Liberal Democrats would be close and egalitarian and that a joint front would 
prevail at both Assembly and general elections. Significantly, what was revealed in the 
interviews was a far from equal status of AMs and MP. The other part of the prediction, 
however, of proximity and teamwork is largely supported by the interview data. Such 
cooperation is ensured through the institutionalised meeting points referred to above. 
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Furthermore, the Liberal legacy is reflected in an often explicit emphasis on localism, which 
makes the party begin in the opposite end compared to Labour and the Conservative Party: 
 
I think as Liberal Democrat it is very easy to emphasise the constituency guardian 
role. That is because it is embedded in a fundamental philosophy that is rooted in 
localism and emphasises our belief in the individual. So logically, it flows from that, 
that you are a servant of your constituency. Casework is a very important part of this 
role.21
 
 
Likewise, the federal structure of the party has guided the party’s response to devolution in 
both an organisational and normative sense. Just like subnational legislatures are building 
blocks in a federal state, separate parliamentary groups should be inherent to a federal 
party. According to Mick Bates AM: 
 
The fact that we have weekly link-ups with our colleagues in Westminster – where we 
discuss the legislative processes in both assemblies, and how we will react to them – 
is a very, very important part. And one that you would expect from a party that 
believes so much in federalism. 
 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the notion of the MP’s superiority has considerable power 
among the Liberal Democrats. This is an observation which holds truth across the three 
parties, lending credence to the notion of Westminster’s supreme role in British political life 
(Judge 1993). Among the interviewees, there was a near-universal agreement on the 
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superior status of MPs, a view which appears to be as strongly entrenched among the Liberal 
Democrats as in Labour. 
 
CONCLUSION 
What does the creation of subnational legislatures entail for the work of parliamentary 
representatives, and by what guidelines does the cross-level relationship evolve? This article 
has analysed relations between AMs and MPs in Wales, focussing on links between 
representatives who share both party and constituency affiliation but operate in separate 
legislatures. Devolution in Wales has contributed to a separate career track centred on the 
Assembly. Interestingly, there has been little mutual recruitment between the Assembly and 
Parliament, reflecting that the former is neither a springboard to Westminster nor an end 
station for Welsh MPs. The perception that the Assembly reflects a different set of political 
values from Westminster has been stated both as a political ambition and as a scholarly 
observation and was supported by the interviews conducted for this article. There is thus a 
general tendency that devolution has inspired loyalties rivalling the statewide party, in line 
with what I referred to as the institutional gravity hypothesis. 
How parties respond to this challenge can be seen, inter alia, in the form and 
intensity of cross-level parliamentary interaction. I found that the infrastructure for 
communication between AMs and MPs differs considerably between the parties. Between 
the parliamentary groups, the relationship is more formalised and eagerly pursued by the 
Liberal Democrats, less developed and more cumbersome in Labour, and informal and 
flexible (though somewhat lacking in substance) in the Conservative Party. These contrasts 
reflect the respective party legacies with regard to devolution (the egalitarian approach of 
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the Liberal Democrats, the latent centralisation of Labour, the hierarchy and pragmatism of 
the Conservative Party). A more controversial observation is that party legacies also guide 
the way relations between individual representatives are resolved. Admittedly, constituency 
AM/MP relations are affected by circumstances such as ideology, age and experience, and 
generational shift among Welsh MPs enhances the leeway for developing new sets of 
relations. There is thus considerable scope for personality in how the AM/MP dynamic 
unfolds in individual cases. However, party legacies do add significant explanatory leverage 
with regard to the strength and form of the AM/MP relationship. 
Accounting for party legacies implies to go beyond party family in order to elucidate 
how particular features of the individual party’s history come to have causal power on 
organisational structure and policies today (Hopkin 2009). The idea that collective norms and 
party legacies influence the preferences and behaviour of individual representatives is a 
long-held, though often underspecified assumption in party literature (Judge 1993; see also 
Drucker 1979). Likewise, the argument that “external” legislatures generate separate 
loyalties is familiar from the literature on the European Parliament (Scully 2005). The 
mechanisms by which this influence occurs, such as socialisation and peer pressure, have not 
been approached in this article but clearly merit further study. 
The two main hypotheses assessed here also invite further elaboration and 
assessment. One could speculate, for example, that the institutional gravity hypothesis is 
more influential where the subnational legislature has a broader remit and a clearer 
separation of powers from the national level: within Britain, the Scottish Parliament would 
be a suitable case. With regard to the party legacies hypothesis, the empirical analysis 
indicates that legacies matter more where the territorial division of power has been more 
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fundamental to the party’s constituent ideas. In Britain, the Liberal Democrats stands out as 
the paradigmatic example: a party preaching federalism and embodying the same ideas 
through political practice. Parties play a significant role in shaping the multi-level polity 
which arises in Britain. Understanding the ways by which they adapt to the creation of 
legislatures below (and above) the national level merits enhanced attention in the years to 
come. 
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APPENDIX 
Interviews conducted for the article 
 Lorraine Barrett, Labour AM for Cardiff South and Penarth, email 24 April 2008. 
 Mick Bates, Liberal Democrat AM for Montgomeryshire, telephone 10 April 2008. 
 Christine Chapman, Labour AM for Cynon Valley, telephone 9 May 2008. 
 Ann Clwyd, Labour MP for Cynon Valley, London 1 April 2008. 
 Stephen Crabb, Conservative MP for Preseli Pembrokeshire, telephone 9 April 2008. 
 Jeff Cuthbert, Labour AM for Caerphilly, telephone 28 April 2008. 
 Wayne David, Labour MP for Caerphilly, telephone 24 June 2008. 
 Paul Davies, Conservative AM for Preseli Pembrokeshire, telephone 8 February 2008. 
 John Griffiths, Labour AM for Newport East, telephone 29 April 2008. 
 Carwyn Jones, Labour AM for Bridgend, telephone 14 May 2008. 
 Jonathan Morgan, Conservative AM for Cardiff North, telephone 19 May 2008. 
 Lembit Öpik, Liberal Democrat MP for Montgomeryshire, telephone 27 March 2008. 
 Jenny Randerson, Liberal Democrat AM for Cardiff Central, Cardiff 1 February 2008. 
 Chris Roberts, Welsh Labour general secretary, Cardiff 31 January 2008. 
 Kirsty Williams, Liberal Democrat AM for Brecon and Radnorshire, telephone 29 April 
2008. 
 Mark Williams, Liberal Democrat MP for Ceredigion, telephone 6 May 2008. 
 Roger Williams, Liberal Democrat MP for Brecon and Radnorshire, London 1 April 
2008. 
 Jenny Willott, Liberal Democrat MP for Cardiff Central, London 2 April 2008. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 Devolved legislatures within the UK also include the Northern Ireland Assembly: due to its particular 
characteristics in structure and composition however it is outside the scope of the present article and will not 
be further analysed here. 
2 On 9 February 2010 the Assembly voted unanimously (under section of the Government of Wales Act 2006) 
to call for a referendum in Wales on extended legislative powers. Following the general election on 6 May, the 
incoming Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated to the House of Commons that a referendum should be 
scheduled for 2011. See ‘David Cameron says Welsh Assembly referendum in 2011’, BBC online 25 May 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/wales_politics/10155091.stm, accessed on 10 June 2010. 
3 The additional member system applied for Assembly elections combines forty AMs from single-member 
constituencies with twenty list AMs. In Scotland, identical constituencies for Westminster and the Scottish 
Parliament were applied from 1999 until 2005, when the number of seats for Westminster was reduced from 
72 to 59 prior to the general election. 
4 The Government of Wales Act 1998 created the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) as one corporate body. 
The Assembly opted for a de facto separation between the NAW and its executive, the Welsh Assembly 
Government (WAG). The separation was codified in the Government of Wales Act 2006, which also provided 
for a limited delegation of law-making powers from Westminster. Under the new arrangements, the Houses of 
Parliament may grant the Assembly powers to legislate on a case-by-case basis in twenty defined policy areas, 
following a request from the WAG, Assembly Committees or individual AMs (WASC 2010a). These procedures 
will be simplified if the Assembly powers are extended as a result of the expected referendum in 2011 (cf. 
endnote 2). 
5 Cf. Patzelt (2007), who finds cross-parliamentary interaction in Germany reflects the cooperative form of the 
federal system. 
6 See also Harmel and Janda (1994) for an explanation of stability based upon the incentives of party elites.  
7 Additionally, there was one independent representative in both legislatures. 
8 Excluding constituencies which due to border changes were not identical at the two elections. 
9 Data collected through the respective Assembly offices of all AMs in April-June 2008. 
10 As of 2010, the official pay for AMs is £53,852, while the MP equivalent is £64,766. In addition, allowances 
apply for travelling, accommodation and office costs. Numbers quoted from official figures at 
http://www.assemblywales.org/gen-ld8055 and http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-
lords/members/pay-mps/, accessed on 10 May 2010. In 2009, an independent panel proposed, among a 
number of recommendations, that the automatic link between MP and AM salaries should be broken and an 
independent review body be created to set the salary levels for each four-year Assembly term (NAW 2009) 
11 The three MPs in question were David Jones, Conservative MP for Clwyd West, a regional AM in 2002-03; 
David Davies, Conservative MP for Monmouth, AM for Monmouth in 1999-2007; and Alun Michael, Labour MP 
for Cardiff South and Penarth, a regional AM and First Minister in the WAG in 1999-2000. 
12 The three were Rhodri Morgan (Labour AM for Cardiff West, party leader and First Minister in the WAG in 
2000-09), MP from 1987 to 2001; Dafydd Elis-Thomas (Plaid Cymru AM for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and presiding 
officer of the Assembly since its inception in 1999), MP from 1942 to 1992 and since then a life peer in the 
House of Lords; and Ieuan Wyn Jones (Plaid Cymru AM for Ynys Mon and party leader), MP from 1987 to 2001. 
13 Data based on official biographies at the Assembly and Westminster websites consulted in September 2008. 
Among the four AMs who had run for Parliament, three were Conservatives, which may reveal a maintained 
perception in that party of the Assembly as a stepping-stone. 
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14 In addition to this legislative procedure, introduced by the Government of Wales Acts 2006 (cf. endnote 4), 
some legislative requests from the WAG bypass the WASC in being submitted directly to Whitehall for inclusion 
in UK bills (WASC 2010b; cf. Hazell 2007). 
15 In the 2005-10 Parliament, the WASC consisted of eleven MPs, ten of whom represented Welsh 
constituencies. 
16 Interview data on Labour cover AMs and MPs from Bridgend, Caerphilly and Cynon Valley, as well as 
additional interviews with the AMs for Newport East and Cardiff South and Penarth.  
17 Chris Roberts, general secretary of Welsh Labour, interview 31 January 2008. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Interview data on the Conservative Party cover Preseli Pembrokeshire (South-West Wales) and Cardiff North. 
Only in the former have both the AM and MP been interviewed, whereas Cardiff North is covered by the AM. 
All other relevant representatives in Wales declined being interviewed. 
20 Interview data on the Liberal Democrats cover Brecon and Radnorshire, Cardiff Central and 
Montgomeryshire, in all three constituencies both the AM and MP have been interviewed. The party’s fourth 
Welsh MP, representing Ceredigion, was also interviewed for the article. 
21 Jenny Randerson AM, interview 1 February 2008. 
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Multi-level parties in process: 
Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their 
home parties 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Regional autonomy and European integration present national institutions with a double 
challenge, potentially diluting national authority both from below and above. The interaction 
between the two processes adds a particular dynamic, as when regions forge direct links to 
the EU bypassing the nation state. The present article looks at three British parties from this 
perspective, focusing on the autonomy of party branches in Scotland and Wales in relation to 
their Members of the European Parliament. The empirical analysis confirms that devolution 
has enhanced the potential for regional autonomy in the parties. However, this has had little 
practical effect on European policy making, where national unity prevails. The limited effect 
of devolution can be explained, first, by the hegemonic status of national party unity and, 
secondly, by the disadvantages of operating alone in the European Parliament. An interesting 
parallel can be drawn to the way subnational authorities relate to EU institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional autonomy and European integration present national institutions with a double 
challenge, potentially diluting their authority both from below and above. Britain is an 
instructive example. Here, the political power of London has been constrained by 
regionalisation in the form of devolution to the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales since 1999.1 In the same period, policies emanating from the European 
Union (EU) have continued to permeate both national and regional politics (Bache 2008). 
Devolution implies a new set of opportunity structures at the regional level, changing the 
terrain in which political parties operate. The research question discussed in this article is 
whether devolution has also enabled regional party branches to obtain more autonomy from 
the statewide parties in European policy making. Such autonomy should be visible in 
enhanced discretion over the selection of candidates and programmes as well as in the 
forging of direct links to the EU level. British parties are particularly relevant in this regard 
since Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) since 1999 have been elected on a 
regional basis, using Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and nine English regions as 
constituencies. The United Kingdom (UK) is one of only five EU member states using regional 
rather than statewide lists for European Parliament (EP) elections: regional representation 
has been opposed by other member states with a strong territorial dimension, such as Spain 
(Corbett et al. 2007:19).  
In the party literature, regional autonomy and federalisation have largely been 
analysed from a domestic perspective, focusing on party strategies and allocation of power 
between the national and regional level (Chandler and Chandler 1987, Hrbek 2004). 
Meanwhile, a separate research agenda considers party reform in response to European 
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integration (Mair 2000, 2006, Raunio 2002, Poguntke et al. 2007). Uniting the two empirical 
processes, one below and one above the nation state, could help conceptualise parties in 
states which are both more regionalised and more closely integrated than before. As this 
development is visible in a number of other EU member states, most conspicuously Belgium 
and Spain, it also opens a scope for comparative research (Brzinski 1999, Giordano and 
Roller 2002). 
The present article discusses the concept of the multi-level party and investigates it 
empirically on the basis of Scottish and Welsh representation in the EP. Devolution implies a 
recognition of Scotland and Wales as political entities. Subnational authorities are allowed to 
co-represent the British government when relevant issue areas are debated in the Council. 
Moreover, the Scottish and Welsh executives have also forged their own links with the 
European Commission (Heggie 2006, Moore 2008). The research question is a corollary of 
this general observation of regional empowerment. To what extent does the emerging 
acknowledgement of regional interests at the EU level also apply to British political parties? 
What will be called the stratarchical party hypothesis suggests that with devolution, 
authority over key decisions will be delegated to regional party branches and that direct 
lines of accountability will emerge between these and their MEPs. The unitary party 
hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that party unity prevails when approaching the EP 
and that regional autonomy is negligible: MEPs’ primary loyalties are to the party in London 
and regional party branches are largely irrelevant to politics in the EP. 
The next section of the article gives a brief review of parties and territoriality, 
followed by an elaboration of the two hypotheses. In the empirical analysis, drawing on 
party regulations and interview data, the hypotheses are assessed against the three 
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dominant statewide parties in Britain – Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democrats. Empirically, the stratarchical party hypothesis is supported by formal indicators 
of regional autonomy. However, when it comes to policy development, the unitary party 
prevails, supported by a cohesive parliamentary group and close liaison with (albeit not 
instruction from) London. Stratarchy is restrained from unfolding, first, by the hegemonic 
status of national party unity and, secondly, by the disadvantages of “going it alone” for 
regional branches in the EP. On the latter point, an interesting parallel can be drawn to the 
way in which subnational authorities relate to EU institutions. 
 
PARTY ORGANISATIONS AND TERRITORIALITY 
In the development of European unitary states, parties and the nation state were intimately 
connected.2 Parties typically organised around a strong territorial centre alongside political 
authorities. Party development also reflected the emergence of a national political space in 
which new social groups were mobilised and structured around basic political cleavages 
(Rokkan 1970, Caramani 1996). This centripetal logic was further strengthened by the rise of 
welfare states in the twentieth century, reducing territorial diversity through public 
intervention and redistribution (Rokkan and Urwin 1982). Over the last two decades, 
regionalisation in several European states has nuanced the notion of unitary parties and 
engendered a new avenue of research. While territorial allocation of power in parties has 
often been addressed in the literature on federalism (Truman 1955, Riker 1964, Hrbek 2004), 
more recent studies have widened the debate from federal to regionalised states and drawn 
parallels between them (Deschouwer 2003, Hopkin 2003, Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 
Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). 
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Empirical studies have found that party reform in response to regionalisation is often 
gradual, incremental and affected by contextual factors such as leadership and electoral 
success. According to developments in Belgium and Spain, party structures respond, but 
often belatedly, to regionalisation or federalisation (Swenden 2002, Fabre 2008). These are 
characteristics which are also recognisable in Britain (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006, Bratberg 
2010). Nevertheless, much clarification remains in order to account for party reform in 
response to the emergence of a regional level of government. Does decentralisation of 
power within parties follow directly from the creation of regional legislatures? Moreover, 
what can explain the differences in the way parties respond?3  
In the relatively thin literature on the impact of European integration on national 
parties, organisational change is seen as limited (Mair 2006, Poguntke et al. 2007), the 
process elite-driven and relatively inconsequential for the mass membership (Raunio 2002). 
British parties, likewise, have only made minor organisational changes in response to 
European integration (Geddes 2006, Carter and Ladrech 2007). Bringing the regional level 
into these analyses should be conducive to a better understanding of party change. 
Particularly useful to research on multi-level parties would be a clear account of the 
allocation of power between party sections at the regional, national and European level. 
Empirical research should include not only the national-regional and the national-European 
dynamic, but also the regional-European relationship. The present article directs the 
attention precisely towards the interaction between the regional and the European branches 
of British parties. To the extent that regional party branches enhance their autonomy from 
statewide parties in European policy making, this contributes a new dimension to both the 
regionalisation and Europeanisation debates in the literature. 
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THE STRATARCHICAL AND THE UNITARY PARTY: TWO RIVAL 
HYPOTHESES 
The potential for internal conflict in parties represented at several territorial levels has been 
a common topic in research on multi-level parties, including devolution in Britain (Holmes 
2007, Laffin et al. 2007). It has also been a topic in research at the European level (Gaffney 
1996). Devolution and European integration may be seen as concurring pressures on parties 
to allocate power and control away from the centre. Reform of party structures may thus 
enhance the autonomy for MEPs as well as for regional party branches. The multi-level party 
could be tentatively defined as a party organisation with multiple lines of accountability and 
a division of authority between relatively autonomous party sections below and above the 
national level.4 While the national level remains the hub of the multi-level party, regional 
branches have obtained extensive autonomy to match the territorial structure of the polity. 
Moreover, MEPs should be expected to supplement their accountability to the statewide 
party with loyalties to the regional branch as well as to the relevant Europarty. 
The stratarchical party hypothesis brings out the full implications of the multi-level 
party by predicting extensive decentralisation and delegation of authority. According to this 
view, representative institutions at different territorial levels require innovation and 
diversification, upon a platform of consensus on shared ideas (Carty 2004). A unitary 
message at all elections could be counter-productive, especially when faced with the 
competition from ethno-regionalist parties (van Biezen and Hopkin 2006:15). Regionalisation 
of elections should also enable regional branches of the party to establish a more direct 
relationship with EU institutions, particularly towards the EP group to which the party 
adheres (Tatham 2008). Where regional constituencies are applied for EP elections, lines of 
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accountability could bypass the national core of the party to run directly from the MEPs to 
their regional party branch (figure 4.1).5  
 
Figure 4.1: The party as a multi-level organisation 
 
    Europarty 
 
 
Statewide party 
 
 
Regional party branch   Regional party branch 
 
 
There are certain organisational preconditions for direct links between the regional and 
European level to emerge. The stratarchical party hypothesis would assume:  
 
- extended regional autonomy over candidate selection for EP elections 
- distinctly regional profiles in party manifestos for EP elections 
- enhanced (including financial) regional responsibility for the electoral campaign 
- policy development in a direct relationship between MEPs and the regional party 
branch 
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The second and alternative hypothesis would be that a strengthening of the territorial levels 
below and above the nation state has had little effect on the parties. Given the limited effect 
on British parties of both European integration and devolution (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006, 
Carter and Ladrech 2007), one could expect the interaction between the two processes to be 
relatively inconsequential. While hesitant in decentralising power at home, parties have also 
been cautious towards the European party associations, attempting to “serve as the 
principal gatekeepers within the European electoral arena, and hence seek(ing) to 
monopolise access and to dominate the agenda” (Mair 2000:38). This confirms the 
perception of a national political space with unified external representation, akin to the view 
that member states are the building blocks in the EU (Hepburn 2008). It also corresponds to 
how subnational authorities have channelled their interests through shared British positions 
rather than lobbying EU institutions alone (Bulmer et al. 2006). This statewide party 
approach I define as the unitary party hypothesis. Two possible causes could be suggested 
here: organisational reform could be slow and incremental in response to changes in the 
party’s environment, with the stickiness of past arrangements (that is, the unitary party of 
the past) leaving a lasting stamp (Panebianco 1988, Pierson 2004); or, parties could place 
strong emphasis on the ideal of national unity in Europe, which will leave little room for 
reform towards autonomy for regional branches. Empirical indicators of centralisation would 
be:  
- candidate selection on the basis of statewide approved lists 
- a statewide manifesto for EP elections  
- electoral campaign directed by the statewide party 
- policy development under the ultimate command of the statewide party 
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These hypotheses and the accompanying set of indicators are aimed as a conceptual 
elaboration of multi-levelness, that is, how parties respond to the legislatures at the 
European and the regional level. Regionalisation of the parties’ European policy could, in the 
longer term, serve to consolidate territorial differentiation at home. In Britain, the 
implications would be of importance for the party system, which may fragment into 
different systems for Scotland and Wales, and for the statewide institutions in London, 
where a federal role for the Houses of Parliament is a possible scenario (Lynch 2007, 
Bogdanor 2003). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The following section of the article presents the empirical analysis evaluating the two 
competing hypotheses and drawing on data from a series of semi-structured interviews with 
party staff in all the three parties and supplemented with party regulations. Interviews were 
mainly conducted with the top executive level (general secretary, chairman etc.) in the 
regional party branches and also included personnel with special responsibility for candidate 
selection and campaigns (Appendix). The interviewees were asked to provide concise 
information on the relevant indicators and in addition state their general views on how the 
relationship between the regional party branch and MEPs was perceived within their party. 
In addition to party staff, two previous MEPs were interviewed on the balancing between 
regional, national and European concerns in their EP parliamentary group. The following 
analysis looks particularly at the internal allocation of power with regard to EP elections but 
will also take into account the ongoing liaison between Scottish and Welsh party branches 
and their MEPs. While elite interviews with party executives may not reveal the full extent of 
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informal channels of policy influence, they do give a precise picture of how candidates are 
selected, campaigns financed and manifestos formulated. The informal liaison in the form of 
contact patterns between MEPs and regional party officials and parliamentarians is only 
tentatively analysed here and clearly merits a separate study, for which the present article 
could provide a suitable backdrop. 
 
Candidate selection 
How candidates are selected reflects the control over representation in a party and is 
therefore a useful indicator of internal changes resulting from territorial reform (Gallagher 
and Marsh 1988, van Biezen and Hopkin 2006:17). The selection of EP candidates changed 
considerably in all the British parties with the introduction of regional constituencies in 
1999. Transforming the system of single-member constituencies to one based on party lists 
carried an obvious potential for central intervention. This was most clearly prevalent in 
Labour, where a selection board nominated by the NEC was given the task of picking and 
rank-ordering candidates for the lists from a pool of regionally proposed candidates. The 
process was particularly important as Labour’s large EP group would be sharply reduced with 
the introduction of proportional elections coupled with a loss of electoral support. The party 
leadership took the opportunity to eliminate a number of MEPs who had been critical to 
ideological moderation in the party under Tony Blair (Wring et al. 2000). Candidate selection 
for the EP also coincided with the controversial nomination processes for the first elections 
to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, where Labour was again accused of 
NEC-initiated exclusion of candidates on ideological grounds (Laffin et al. 2007:93-95). The 
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other two parties chose ostentatiously democratic methods in 1999, by letting a broadly 
composed selection board in each region draw up a shortlist of candidates whose rank-order 
was then voted over by the regional party members. Since the one-off venture in 1999, 
Labour has converged towards the two other parties. This left the following procedures in 
place for the EP elections of 2009: 
In Labour, incumbent MEPs are re-selected as the first candidates of the list, provided 
that a majority of the constituency parties in the region endorse their candidacy. Applicants 
for the remaining candidacies are assessed by the regional executive, where a shortlist is 
ratified and divided in a male and female list. An all-member ballot first decides the rank-
order of the incumbent candidates – who are placed on top of the list – and then ranks the 
new candidates, who are zipped (male-female-male-female) to obtain gender equality. The 
agreed list of candidates equals the total number of MEPs from the region (Carter and 
Ladrech 2007:69). Scotland and Wales are no different from English regions in terms of 
procedures. The important fact to observe in light of devolution is that Scotland operates its 
own separate list of approved candidates maintained by the Scottish executive committee. 
The party in England and Wales shares a pool of approved candidates. These lists are 
overlapping for Westminster, devolved and EP elections: a candidate can be applicable to all 
three. The number of candidates opting for Europe is however considerably lower than for 
Westminster and devolved elections. 
The Conservative Party has procedures similar to Labour but without the default 
priority for incumbent candidates and with a more limited practice of gender equality. As in 
Labour, Scotland operates a separate list of approved candidates. These will be eligible for 
devolved, Westminster and EP elections depending on the preferences of the individual 
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candidate. Candidates from the approved list are invited to apply and are then assessed by a 
regional meeting of constituency chairs and senior party representatives who draw up a 
shortlist of candidates which is then subject to an all-member ballot. Incumbent MEPs are 
automatically included on the shortlist – however, they are not placed on top of the list by 
default, as this is for the regional meeting to decide. The candidates are then rank-ordered 
by an all-member postal ballot, the only remaining pre-requisite being that the highest 
available position should go to a woman. 
In the Liberal Democrats, candidate selection for all elections is devolved to the 
parties in Scotland, Wales and England. In the English party, responsibility for the EP 
candidate selection process is delegated further to regional party branches. Scotland, Wales 
and England have separate lists of approved candidates: transfer between the lists is easily 
arranged for Westminster and EP elections but involves a brief additional assessment for 
devolved elections, particularly in Scotland (Bratberg 2010). For European elections, the 
Scottish and Welsh executives are responsible for agreeing a shortlist of candidates 
corresponding to the number of seats in the region. Such a shortlist is not required by the 
party´s regulations: in fact it was omitted for the 2009 EP election in both Scotland and 
Wales due to the low number of applicants.6 The regional selection committee organises an 
all-member postal ballot to rank-order the list. Prior to the ballot, the candidates are 
presented in a small number of hustings across the region. Incumbent MEPs are given no 
default priority on the list and are thus subject to the ballot on the same basis as new 
candidates. 
In sum, in all three parties, there is very little in the sense of centralised control over 
candidate selection in Scottish and Welsh party branches. I therefore conclude that on the 
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surface, the indicator of candidate selection seems to fit well with the stratarchical party 
hypothesis. However, if the hypothesis is taken to imply a privileged position for Scotland 
and Wales compared with English regions, the results are far less convincing. Except for the 
fact that the Scottish party branch in all three parties administers its separate list of 
approved candidates, the selection process as such is decentralised to the executive and 
members of each electoral region. Decentralised control over candidate selection is in itself 
an interesting finding, as party lists and electoral regions arguably give a higher scope for 
control from the centre than the system of single-member constituencies which otherwise 
prevails in Britain. Yet, apart from the 1999 arrangements in Labour, candidate selection has 
been strongly devolved to the regional branches, and from these branches to the individual 
members, much like selection for devolved elections. The list of approved candidates is 
separate in Scotland and (in Labour and the Conservative Party) shared for England and 
Wales, leaving little scope for formal intervention from London over candidatures. One often 
encounters in the literature the idea of national party control. According to Hix (2002:696), 
“it is the principals that control candidate selection (the national parties) who ultimately 
determine how MEPs behave”: likewise, Raunio (2000:221) contends that “procedures for 
candidate selection ensure that most MEPs will remain loyal to their national parties”. These 
assessments focus exclusively on the relationship between the national level and the 
Europarty. However, when regional party branches are taken into account the picture in 
Britain is one of regional empowerment rather than control by the statewide parties. 
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EP electoral manifestos and campaigns 
Analysing the process behind manifestos for European elections is far from straightforward. 
As members of broader Europarties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats are committed to the 
shared policy framework established at the European level, while the Conservative Party has 
enjoyed a larger margin of manoeuvre due to its semi-detachment from the European 
People´s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) coalition.7 The statewide manifesto of all 
three parties is slightly modified to allow for distinctive emphases in Scotland and Wales.  
Labour exemplifies this territorial filtering down process with particular clarity. A 
member of the Party of European Socialists (PES), Labour takes the agreed PES document (to 
which its own MEPs have contributed) as a basis. To finalise Labour´s own manifesto, the 
party leadership in London is squarely in charge, mirroring the tradition in Labour of 
ensuring central control over the manifestos for Westminster elections (Minkin 1992:6, 
Carter and Ladrech 2007:73). Ratified by the NEC, the manifesto is then adapted to separate 
versions in Scotland and Wales. According to Colin Smyth, general secretary of Scottish 
Labour: 
 
The party as a whole is signed up to the PES manifesto, and that will form the basis of 
the UK manifesto. The British Labour Party will take those pledges and apply them to 
a UK context. It is natural that, for campaigning purposes, we will have a separate 
Scottish version of that document which will highlight those issues and policies that 
are most relevant to Scotland. This will be signed off by the executive of the Scottish 
Labour Party, but it will be fundamentally based on the documents from the PES and 
then from British Labour.8 
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With regard to the campaign itself, there will also be adaptation in Scotland and Wales – 
reflecting, for example, the particular importance of agriculture and fisheries as EU-related 
issues in Scotland. Compared with the electoral manifestos, however, it is far less obvious 
that the Scottish and Welsh deviate more from a putative London message than do the nine 
electoral regions in England.9 In terms of finances, the Scottish and Welsh branches 
contribute to the EP campaign, but less so than at devolved elections. If there is any 
aspiration in Scottish and Welsh Labour of using Europe to strengthen their autonomy, this is 
hardly visible with regard to electoral campaigns. 
In the Conservative Party, manifestos for EP elections are developed by a committee 
headed by the shadow foreign secretary. The final document is ratified by the shadow 
cabinet. Compared with manifestos for Westminster elections, EP elections allow broader 
influence for MEPs, particularly through the delegation leader and deputy in the EP (Carter 
and Ladrech 2007:74). The Scottish and Welsh versions of the manifesto will be adapted 
versions, reflecting not different policies for different parts of the country but the commonly 
agreed leeway to highlight what the party finds particularly relevant in either Scotland or 
Wales.10 To formulate these revisions is a task for the Scottish and Welsh party boards. As in 
Labour, the regionalised manifesto is normally introduced by a senior figure in the party. 
Interestingly, compared with devolved elections, there is less of an emphasis on distinct 
Scottish or Welsh issues for the EP manifesto and campaign.11 Consequently, there is little 
deviation from the shared British template. 
The Liberal Democrats are a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE), from which the basic points of it EP manifesto are taken. Developing the 
manifesto for EP elections remains a top-down process, guided by the party leadership in 
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London, with the shadow foreign secretary and the deputy leader playing prominent roles 
(ibid.). The final manifesto is ratified by the Federal Policy Committee. Except for the fact 
that MEPs are more extensively consulted in relation to EP manifestos, the process is 
essentially the same as the one for Westminster elections (Ingle 2000:193). From the 
perspective of the regional branches, distinguishing itself from the British line is seen as 
inconsequential if not counter-productive. This is seen both in manifestos and campaigns. 
While campaign funding and strategy is mainly generated in Edinburgh and Cardiff, the key 
messages emanate from the British party. Regional variation, again, amounts to framing a 
message adapted to regional interests, a logic which applies to English regions as well. 
According to Martin Hayman, chief executive in the Scottish Liberal Democrats: 
 
It is emphasis not policy that will be different. Moreover, one Scottish MEP is not 
going to change party policy on Europe. It is a case of having five bullet points that 
are highlighted for Scotland rather than a policy of our own.12 
 
In sum, then, regional autonomy over manifestos and campaigns is present but limited in all 
the three parties. A general assessment of manifestos and campaigns places the British 
parties somewhere between the stratarchical and the unitary party. Scottish and Welsh 
party branches develop and ratify their own versions of the EP manifesto, something which 
distinguishes them from the English regions, where no such adaptation is possible. However, 
given that this room for manoeuvre has led to no substantial policy deviation, there appears 
to be little beyond symbolic value in the separate manifestos produced in Scotland and 
Wales. In terms of financing and managing the campaigns, again, the Scottish and Welsh 
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party branches again enjoy more autonomy than English regions but compared with the 
practice in electoral campaigns for the Scottish and Welsh legislatures, autonomy at 
European elections is less significant. 
 
Policy development 
The final indicator to be considered is the extent to which regional party branches are 
involved in policy development by drawing upon direct links with their MEPs. Research on 
the EP tends to focus on the potential tension between parties at the national level and the 
Europarty groups in the EP (Ladrech 2007:950). MEPs commonly enjoy considerable 
autonomy from their national parties. Exceptions may occur where legislation of particular 
national importance enters the EP agenda and/or parties in government wish to coordinate 
with policies promoted through the Council (Raunio 2000:221, Messmer 2003:202). The 
observation that a party whip (be it from London, Edinburgh or Cardiff) would be considered 
illegitimate is confirmed by interviews in all three parties. Carter and Ladrech (2007:76-78) 
refer to high autonomy and low accountability as characteristics of MEPs. National parties 
are poorly supplied with either sticks (such as re-selection, which is for the regional parties 
to decide) or carrots (such as EP committee assignments, which pertain to the Europarty 
groups). In the absence of strict accountability, policy coordination and consultation form 
the basis of the relationship between MEPs and their home parties. What role do the 
regional party branches play in this respect? 
Of the three statewide parties, Labour has the most elaborate system of contact 
between MEPs and London.  Drawing on its link system, Labour´s spokespersons on the 
various policy areas in the EP are invited to cabinet-level teams working on policy 
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development in London  (Messmer 2003). Although the substantial impact of the link system 
should not be overestimated, it clearly ties MEPs closer to government policy making as 
influence is exchanged against consultation.13 From Scotland and Wales, no similar link 
system is entertained by the party apparatus or the subnational authorities. Moreover, there 
are no staff resources in Scottish Labour dedicated specifically to the EP or liaison with 
MEPs. On the other hand, MEPs do take part in policy-making processes in both Scotland 
and Wales. According to Scottish general secretary Colin Smyth: 
 
In terms of party structure, it is not fundamentally different from how it works for 
Members of Parliament (MPs) or Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). There is 
an MEP in the Scottish executive, in the Scottish Policy Forum which establishes policy 
for the Scottish Parliament – and in the joint liaison committee which meets 
occasionally to bring together all the parliamentary groups representing the party in 
Scotland.14 
 
Similar arrangements are also present in Welsh Labour, which distinguishes Scotland and 
Wales from regional party branches in England. The fact that MEPs are formally included in 
domestic policy processes gives considerable influence, considering the low number of MEPs 
compared to their counterparts in the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments. When it comes 
to influence by regional branches upon their MEPs, however, there is little indication of 
Scottish and Welsh Labour trying to impact the work of their MEPs. Rather, it was repeatedly 
emphasised in interviews that decisions and voting in the EP falls back on internal 
deliberation in the EP group and consultation with the national party rather than with 
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regional party branches: there is not a separate European policy process for Scottish or 
Welsh Labour. 
The Conservative Party has developed a pattern of contacts between MEPs and 
London broadly in line with Labour´s link system, but less formalised – and, crucially, not 
developed in government. In most policy areas, the party´s spokespersons in the EP will be in 
regular, informal contact with the relevant frontbench team in Westminster. This also 
involves occasional participation in the weekly meetings of the different policy teams in 
Westminster. With regard to communication with Scotland and Wales, different 
arrangements are in place. In Wales, a weekly telephone meeting unites the party´s Welsh 
MPs and AMs with its single MEP. The Scottish party branch has less regular liaison between 
the levels, drawing upon regular information briefings from the two MEPs and a broad range 
of informal contacts, also running via the Scottish Parliament´s information office in Brussels.  
At the more formal level, in both Scotland and Wales, the MEPs are represented at the 
regional executive as well as in the front-bench teams formulating policy for the Scottish 
Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. With regard to European policies, the policy focus 
driven by committee assignment in the EP was stressed by interviewees. Scottish interests 
are mainly seen in the focus on sectoral interests such as agriculture and fisheries. MEPs are 
encouraged to see a Scottish dimension also through their exposure to policy-making 
processes at home. Nevertheless, decision making in the EP is seen predominantly, if not 
exclusively, through the prism of the statewide party, and liaison with regionalist parties 
from other member states to promote the EP’s regional dimension has not been on the 
regional branches’ agenda. 
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The Liberal Democrats have a short history in the EP, winning its first two seats in 1994. 
However, with the electoral reform in 1999, its representation has risen to twelve MEPs in 
the 2004-09 parliament. Liaison between the EP group and the party leadership in London 
remains non-formalised, but there are extensive contacts between spokespersons and 
frontbench teams in the shadow cabinet, mirroring the arrangements in the Conservative 
Party. With regard to Scotland, a weekly telephone conference unites MPs and MSPs with 
the Scottish MEP. In the 2004-09 parliament there was no Liberal Democrat MEP from 
Wales. A single MEP gives little scope for ambitious policy promotion on behalf of the 
Scottish party branch – moreover, when acting in the EP the conception of national party 
unity has a strong hold also on the Liberal Democrats. In anticipation of votes in Brussels, 
there is a close liaison not only with Westminster but with the Federal Policy Committee of 
the party. The state parties in Scotland and Wales will typically be indirectly informed. This is 
a revealing example of how internal party democracy in the Liberal Democrats in the context 
of EU issues means conferring policy issues to the statewide party rather than regional 
branches – despite the autonomous position of the latter in domestic policy. Thus, in the EP 
context, Scotland and Wales are primarily electoral regions. Where representation does 
matter, is in bringing substance to the international credentials of the Scottish party branch. 
According to chief executive Martin Hayman: 
 
It is essential that we have the opportunity to look more widely than the Scottish 
context... [I]t is essential to our profile that we have a voice in Europe, someone who 
can speak on our behalf – and also authoritatively here in Scotland – from a European 
angle.15 
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In sum, it is clear that representation in the EP does matter to regional branches in all the 
three parties. However, the importance attached to regional MEPs is very rarely reflected in 
policy choices deviating from the national line. This is confirmed by voting data from the 
2004-2009 parliament showing great correspondence between Scottish and Welsh MEPs 
and MEPs from English regions with regard to loyalties towards the statewide party groups 
in the EP.16 Scottishness and Welshness thus becomes more an issue of role conception than 
one affecting voting and policy output. Interviewees in all three parties stressed the 
opportunity for tending to particular policy areas, exemplified by the focus on agriculture 
and fisheries characteristic of Scottish MEPs.17 While such emphasis is useful for highlighting 
regional interests within the party, it does not set Scottish or Welsh interests apart from the 
rest of Britain or stimulate alliances with regions in other EU member states. Policy 
development is predominantly an activity for the Europarty group, supported by liaison 
between MEPs and their statewide parties. With regard to policy development, the three 
British parties thus operate largely in concord with the unitary party hypothesis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Devolution, according to Wayne David MP, “provides the opportunity for people to be 
parochial, inward-looking, introspective. But it also gives them the opportunity to be 
outward-looking, externally oriented – embracing not just Welsh solutions to Welsh problems 
but also what we can learn from the best of Europe”.18 While engagement with Europe may 
be a touchstone of much political discourse, the form that engagement should take remains 
disputed in Scotland and Wales, with lofty visions of a “Europe of the regions” co-existing 
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with mundane references to the EU in domestic policy debates (Haesly 2001, Hepburn 2006, 
Preston 2008). 
This article has focused on the Scottish and Welsh branches of three British parties in 
light of two competing ideal types, the stratarchical party and the unitary party. The 
indicators assessed in the analysis present an interesting pattern. On candidate selection, all 
three parties come close to the stratarchical party hypothesis: selection is completely 
devolved to the electoral regions – in Scotland, furthermore, party branches administer a 
separate list of approved candidates. With regard to EP electoral manifestos, these fall 
between the stratarchical and the unitary: manifestos are presented as separate documents 
in Scotland and Wales, yet differing in style and emphasis rather than content from the 
British manifesto. Electoral campaigns, meanwhile, are largely devolved and thus guided by 
distinct regional strategies, as predicted by the stratarchical party hypothesis. 
On these elements of formal power, then, the statewide British parties have granted 
Scottish and Welsh party branches considerable autonomy on EU affairs in line with the 
conception of stratarchy. It is on the fourth and final indicator, that of policy development, 
that the stratarchical party hypothesis does not hold sway. In all three parties, policies in the 
EP are largely worked out in the dynamic between the MEPs and the Europarty, with the 
occasional intervention of the statewide party leadership. MEPs are committed to policies 
laid down in the statewide manifestos and also by rewards and penalties directed by the 
Europarty in the EP. In the formal activity of voting, as well as the informal process of 
responding to events, the statewide party and the Europarty trump the regional party 
branch. Interestingly, this seems to be no less the case in the Liberal Democrats than in 
Labour or the Conservative Party, despite the former´s federal constitution. 
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Table 4.1: Unitary vs. stratarchical: results on four indicators of autonomy in the Scottish 
and Welsh party branches 
 
Candidate selection Stratarchical 
EP electoral manifestos Semi-stratarchical 
EP campaigns Stratarchical 
European policy development Unitary 
 
Thus, formal stratarchy does not in itself lead to factual regional autonomy. In the 
theoretical section, two possible causes were mentioned in support of the alternative, 
unitary party hypothesis: organisational reform could be late and incremental, with 
structures reflecting previous centralised arrangements; or, a strong conception of national 
party unity in Europe could prevail. The empirical analysis shows that organisational 
structures can hardly account for the statewide focus of the MEPs: indeed, as discussed 
above, organisational reform has been sufficient for Scottish and Welsh party branches to 
operate more autonomously in Europe. What has restrained a more ambitious use of this 
autonomy is in part the conception of party unity and in part strategic concerns. First, 
national party unity remains a hegemonic principle in parties operating on the European 
scene, as seen in the subordination of Scottish and Welsh MEPs to statewide strategies and 
policies. Secondly, from a strategic point of view, given the small number of MEPs from each 
region, it is clear that more leverage can be obtained by addressing regional interests 
through cohesive EP party groups. 
The largely domestic focus of research on multi-level parties marks an interesting 
contrast to the public administration literature, which has seen vigorous debates on the 
dynamic between regional autonomy and enhanced European integration (Jeffery 1997, 
2000, Marks et al. 2002, Moore 2007). With subnational authorities invited to engage more 
directly with EU institutions during the 1990s, concerns were raised that these could 
Article 3 
154 
 
“undermin(e) the role of national governments acting as gatekeepers to resists unwanted 
policy initiatives from Brussels” (Bache et al. 1996:297). Empirical research has shown that 
expectations for regional empowerment were overstated: regional interests are 
acknowledged to a greater extent than before, but largely channelled through national 
governments (Jeffery 2000). In the British case, Scottish and Welsh subnational authorities 
find that their views are best promoted through privileged access to member-state 
representation rather than “going it alone” by liaising with the Commission or the Council 
(Bulmer et al. 2006). The parallel to the dynamic between regional party branches, national 
party and Europarties is incisive: what the findings in the present article suggest is that the 
way in which parties adapt to multi-level politics mirrors regional representation in Europe 
per se. In the British case, the “Europe of regional party branches” hence remains a vision 
unlikely to prevail against the hegemonic status of national party unity and the difficulty of 
autonomous action in the EP. 
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APPENDIX 
Interviews conducted for the article 
 Wayne David, Labour MP for Caerphilly, London 24 November 2008. 
 Brian Duggan, campaign officer (EPLP), Labour, London 25 November 2008. 
 Joanne Foster, chief executive, Welsh Liberal Democrats, telephone 10 March 2009. 
 Norman Fraser, selection convener for the European elections, Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, telephone 24 February 2009. 
 Martin Hayman, chief executive, Scottish Liberal Democrats, Edinburgh 19 February 
2009. 
 Chris Huhne, Liberal Democrats MP for Eastleigh, London 25 November 2008. 
 Rachel Maycock, assistant for the EPLP in the Prime Minister’s Office, Labour, London 
25 November 2008. 
 Mark McInnes, party director, Scottish Conservative Party, Edinburgh 20 February 
2009. 
 Andrew Reeves, deputy director of campaigns, Liberal Democrats, telephone 13 
December 2008. 
 Chris Roberts, general secretary, Welsh Labour, telephone 27 March 2009. 
 James Temple-Smithson, head of the MEPs’ London Office, the Conservative Party, 
London 24 November 2008. 
 Colin Smyth, general secretary, Scottish Labour, Glasgow 20 February 2009. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 The Scottish Parliament (with primary legislative and limited tax-varying powers) and the National Assembly 
for Wales (with secondary legislative and no tax-varying powers) were established subsequent to referenda in 
1997 and were first elected in 1999. Northern Ireland, due to its particular historical and political context, is not 
investigated further in this article. 
2 In federal systems, the relationship between party unity and national integrity is more complex. Riker´s (1964) 
view that party structures mirror the constitutional structure of the (federal) state has remained relatively 
uncontested. In Britain, the unitary party model has largely prevailed; the federalised structure of the Liberal 
Democrats (and the preceding Liberal Party) and the semi-autonomous status of the Conservative and Unionist 
Party in Scotland are exceptions to this rule. 
3 Here, theoretical refinement could also clarify how party adaptation is not a simple question of centralised vs. 
decentralised allocation of power but involves different forms of detachment and varying strategies for 
regional empowerment (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010, Thorlakson 2009). 
4 While the multi-level party can be analysed in organisational terms, it can also be approached by way of 
multiple (and conflicting) discourses and identities, as shown by Moon (2008). 
5 A clear inspiration for the bypass thesis can be found in the public administration literature, where direct 
interaction between EU institutions (primarily the Commission) and autonomous governmental agencies has 
been theorised and researched (Egeberg 2006). 
6 In Wales, the number of applicants and seats (four) corresponded perfectly. In Scotland, the number of 
applicants just exceeded the number of seats (seven), but all were nevertheless admitted to the all-member 
ballot. 
7 The Conservative Party was an allied member of the EPP-ED until the 2009 EP election, after which the party 
broke the alliance to take part in the newly created European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG). 
Whether the new group will require tighter coordination of the manifestos is doubtful, as the ECRG has been 
explicitly formed to counter the federalist ambitions of the EPP-ED. 
8 Colin Smyth, interview with author, 20 February 2009. 
9 Rachel Maycock, interview with author, 25 November 2008. 
10 James Temple-Smithson, interview with author, 24 November 2008. 
11 Mark McInnes, interview with author, 20 February 2009. 
12 Martin Hayman, interview with author, 20 February 2009. 
13 As stressed by several interviewees, the link system has been developed and practised only with Labour as a 
governing party. How it will be adapted in opposition (for example, whether it will be organised along the briefs 
of shadow secretaries rather than cross-departmental policy areas) is unclear. 
14 Colin Smyth, interview with author, 20 February 2009. 
15 Martin Hayman, interview with author, 20 February 2009. 
16 Loyalty scores of all roll-call votes in the sixth parliament (2004-09) show that MEPs from Scotland and Wales 
have a similar propensity as MEPs from English regions to support the majority view of (i) the statewide party 
and (ii) the Europarty. In each of the cases, moreover, the statewide party commands somewhat more support 
than the Europarty: this is most prevalent in the Conservative party, but even here the difference is relatively 
small (average values for Conservative MEPs are 88,5% support of statewide party’s majority view vs. 73,6% for 
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Europarty majority). I am grateful to Bjørn Høyland, Dept of Political Science, University of Oslo, for supplying 
the data for these estimates. 
17 In the sixth parliament, five of Scotland´s seven MEPs held EP committee assignments on regional 
development (C 12), agriculture and rural development (C 13) and/or fisheries (C 14).  
18 Wayne David was Welsh MEP and leader of the PES group 1994-98 and has since 2001 been MP for 
Caerphilly. Interview with author, 24 November 2008. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article addresses the diverging policies of England and Scotland since 1999 on the issue 
of tuition fees. While the UK Parliament has introduced (and henceforth enhanced the level 
of) tuition fees for students at English universities, the Scottish Parliament has refuted fees in 
two successive stages. In this article I trace the political processes leading to divergence, 
followed by a comparative analysis of the relevant parliamentary debates. I find that while 
all the three statewide parties have differed internally between arguments promoted in 
London and Edinburgh, Labour stands out as the party with the highest thematic consistency. 
The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, are distinctive in highlighting the chance to chart a 
separate course for Scotland. Finally, despite the diverging policy tracks of London and 
Edinburgh, there is a trend towards convergence between the legislatures in the thematic 
focus of debates. The article finishes by reflecting upon the challenges posed by policy 
divergence – to parties and to public policy provision – in a regionalised state such as Britain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The creation of subnational legislatures increases the potential for policy divergence within 
the borders of the state. Such divergence represents in many ways what decentralising 
reform is for: encouraging innovation and enhancing regional responsiveness (Sturm 
2006:156). However, divergence also raises a number of dilemmas. Differences in welfare 
provision may counter the requirement that social citizenship be reflected in equal rights 
across the state (Craig et al. 2008). Moreover, the cohesiveness of statewide political actors 
is put to the test in the face of territorial divergence. Parties, in particular, must work out a 
balance between allowing for internal diversity and ensuring that overall unity is retained. 
The dilemmas of policy divergence are exemplified by higher education policy in Britain since 
devolution, the creation of a Scottish Parliament and a National Assembly for Wales in 1999. 
While the UK Parliament has introduced and henceforth enhanced the level of tuition fees 
for students at English universities, the Scottish Parliament has refuted the principle of fees; 
first by replacing them with a redistributive graduate endowment, then by abolishing 
student payment altogether in 2008.1 The issue of tuition fees has served to highlight the 
divide between the supposedly market-oriented England and the left-leaning politics in 
Scotland; the Scottish debate has furthermore been nurtured by what is perceived to be a 
distinct academic tradition. 
In this article I recapture the processes leading to diverging tuition fees regimes in 
England and Scotland. Secondly, through an analysis of key parliamentary debates in London 
and Edinburgh, I investigate whether Anglo-Scottish divergence is reflected in the rhetoric of 
each of the statewide parties. The intention is not to give a causal account of why different 
policies on tuition fees have emerged. Rather, I seek to establish what ideas and arguments 
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have been raised in each of the legislatures. Does the issue of tuition fees reflect a conflict of 
ideas between London and Edinburgh? More specifically, to what extent is internal 
divergence discernible in each of the parties, and what implications may this have for their 
cohesiveness as statewide political actors? 
The analysis reveals that although all the three statewide parties differ between 
London and Edinburgh in their arguments on fees, Labour is by far the most consistent due 
to its sustained emphasis on social justice and enhanced university funding. Arguments from 
the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats are found to differ more between London 
and Edinburgh; the Liberal position is furthermore distinctive in emphasising the opportunity 
to chart a separate course for Scotland. Finally, while the policy processes have led to Anglo-
Scottish divergence over tuition fees, overall there is a tendency towards convergence 
between the legislatures in the thematic focus of the debates. This is driven, it is 
hypothesised, by the acknowledgement of challenges which are shared by policy makers in 
higher education across Europe. The next two sections of the article trace the policy 
trajectory of tuition fees in the UK Parliament (Westminster) and the Scottish Parliament 
(Holyrood) respectively. Part four accounts for varying ideological positions towards fees for 
higher education. In part five, qualitative content analysis is applied to map the arguments 
used by parliamentarians from Labour, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats in 
the two legislatures. The article concludes by revisiting some of the dilemmas posed by 
decentralising reform, to party cohesiveness as well as to the users and providers of higher 
education. 
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THE PATH TOWARDS (VARIABLE) TUITION FEES – LONDON 
Britain, like most West European countries, went through a considerable widening of access 
to higher education during the four decades from 1960 onwards (Greenaway and Haynes 
2003:150). Meanwhile, public investment in universities did not match the growth rates of 
student numbers, a fact which became increasingly obvious under the Conservative 
governments from 1979 to 1997. Since 1962, a system of public grants covering full-time 
students had been in place to help young people through higher education. Under this 
regime, undergraduates paid no fees for tuition, and their living costs were covered by a mix 
of means-tested maintenance grants, social security and parental contributions (Callender 
2006:106). In 1990, loans for students’ living costs were introduced, available to all full-time 
students through the Student Loans Company (SLC) at a real interest rate of zero. At the 
same time, maintenance grants were frozen and then gradually cut in the succeeding years.  
The tuition fees debate started from the acknowledgement that both universities and 
students were underfunded and that recruitment of students from poorer families remained 
stubbornly low (Barr 2003:371). Introducing tuition fees proved to be one of the most 
controversial policies of the Labour government in office from 1997. Indeed, the second step 
of reform in 2003-04 would come closer than Iraq to ending Tony Blair’s premiership 
prematurely (O’Leary 2007:468). The point of departure was given by the Dearing 
committee (1997), whose recommendation was that flat-rate tuition fees be introduced to 
strengthen the funding of British universities. Fees would be covered by student loans with 
deferred repayment (collected subsequent to graduation through an added rate of income 
tax). Both the main parties had been evasive about higher education policy during the 1997 
campaign. The Conservative Party were well too aware of the existing shortcomings in the 
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sector, while Labour was cautious not to raise the prospect of tuition fees for fear of losing 
its fragile support in the middle class (Stevens 2004:87). Furthermore, Labour was 
committed to retain Conservative overall spending for the first two years in government, 
and this self-imposed constraint became decisive for the further course of events. 
In response to the Dearing Report, Labour announced its own plans for tuition fees 
which differed radically from Dearing’s recommendations (Newall 2008:137). Rather than 
opting for fees with deferred repayment, the government introduced fees of £1,000 a year 
to be paid up front (i.e. when entering a university course). This reduced the requirement for 
public funds in the short term; however, access for poorer students had to be supported by 
wide-scale means-testing of fees, which reduced the effective income for universities 
(O’Leary 2007:472). The burden to student finances was increased by the fact that remaining 
maintenance grants from the 1990 reform were abolished. From 1998, loans provided the 
only universal measure of public support to students. The reform was carried through by the 
government, with the Liberal Democrats voting against the bill and the Conservatives 
abstaining.  
 The perception of failed reform laid the grounds for the process which ensued 
between 1998 and 2004. Under a regime which satisfied neither universities nor students, 
David Blunkett, education secretary until 2001, wavered between acknowledging the need 
for enhanced university finances and opposing an American-inspired system of variable fees. 
A dominant view in Labour was that paying tuition fees up-front was holding back working-
class participation. Charles Clarke, Blunkett’s successor from 2002, was adamant that a 
transition must be made from up-front fees to a system of deferred contributions. This was 
initially interpreted as support to Gordon Brown’s favoured alternative of a graduate tax 
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(Peston 2005:313). However, when Clarke’s scheme was presented in a White Paper in 
January 2003, it was in the form of variable tuition fees, to be covered by student loans.2 
The White Paper was followed by fierce political debate, culminating in the Higher 
Education Bill, which boomeranged between the two Houses of Parliament before finally 
receiving the Royal Assent on 1 July 2004. The Act affirmed that universities would be 
permitted to charge variable fees limited to £3,000 per year. Fees would be covered by loans 
at zero interest rate, with repayment starting as the graduate’s salary reached £15,000. A 
wide array of bursaries for students from low-income families was introduced to placate 
internal opposition in Labour: furthermore, the Office for Fair Access was established to 
ensure equitable recruitment (Woodhall and Richards 2008:198-99). Yet, at the second 
reading in the House of Commons, the government won by the knife-edge margin of five 
votes from a majority of 160: the majority was ensured by 46 Scottish Labour MPs voting 
with the government, even though the reform would not apply in Scotland.3 The debate over 
top-up fees largely became an internal Labour struggle: the Liberal Democrats had been 
consistently against tuition fees in all forms, while the Conservative opposition had 
suggested a number of policies on tuition fees between 2001 and 2005 but ended up voting 
against the bill in Parliament (O’Leary 2007:477,481). 
 
FROM FREE EDUCATION TO GRADUATE ENDOWMENT AND 
BACK – EDINBURGH 
Subnational autonomy has prepared the ground for party systems in Scotland and Wales 
which differ significantly from the bipartisan logic of Westminster. The rejuvenated Scottish 
National Party (SNP), now the governing party in Edinburgh, promotes a territorial agenda 
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while also tilting the political debate to the left. The same pattern, although less clear-cut, 
appears with Plaid Cymru in Wales. In both territories, the significance of nationalist parties 
is enhanced by the proportional electoral system which encourages genuine multi-party 
politics to emerge (Paterson et al. 2001, Lynch 2007). As a result, Labour must pursue 
policies in Scotland and Wales which are acceptable to the left and perceived as sufficiently 
Scottish or Welsh (Greer 2004:11). Indeed, Scottish policy divergence has been seen as 
reflecting a more left-leaning political culture – universalist in its approach to public services 
and egalitarian in its view of social justice (Keating 2005b:458). The debate on tuition fees is 
highly relevant in this regard: the Scottish university tradition is typically portrayed as 
egalitarian and open towards local communities in contrast to the more elitist and 
specialised institutions in England (Humes 2008:69; cf. Davie 1961). 
In education policy, Holyrood controls the entire system from primary school to 
university, a power which extends to decisions on fees. Devolved responsibility for higher 
education is a well-known characteristic of regionalisation. Nevertheless, the autonomy 
acquired by Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales in this regard is extensive in a European 
context (Paterson 2001:142). The issue of tuition fees was immediately raised in Edinburgh 
subsequent to devolution: the committee created to look into the issue became the first 
public inquiry commissioned by Holyrood (Newall 2008:132). Published in late December 
1999, the Cubie report proposed that up-front tuition fees be abolished in Scotland. The 
preferred alternative to tuition fees was a so-called graduate endowment to be set aside for 
bursaries to students from low-income families (Woodhall and Richards 2008:193). Social 
inclusion, especially in the form of robust maintenance grants for poorer students, was a 
centrepiece of the report. 
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The graduate endowment which was subsequently introduced drew upon the Cubie 
committee but was also a compromise within the Labour/Liberal Democrats coalition. With 
the exception of Labour, there was consensus among all parties in Edinburgh on the 
abolition of fees (Parry 2002:315-16). Labour had campaigned to retain the means-tested 
tuition fees introduced in Westminster for all British universities in 1998. The Liberal 
Democrats had ardently opposed this policy: the endowment landed between the two 
alternatives, acknowledging that students should contribute but avoiding fees in the form of 
payment for university courses. The governing coalition ensured the passage of the bill 
through Holyrood, in the face of SNP and Conservative opposition. The new scheme was 
effectuated from the academic year 2001-02, requiring graduates (with some exceptions) to 
pay the endowment of £2,000 through an addition to their student loan. Payment would 
commence when earnings reached £10,000; later, this sum was raised to £15,000. The 
endowment was presented as progressive due its obvious redistributive element and the 
fact that payment would begin only when students were on a steady salary (Woodhall and 
Richards 2008:193). Moreover, the reform meant that more government expenditure could 
be spent on research and infrastructure as students themselves would help finance poorer 
students through the endowment. 
Scottish higher education has hardly operated in a world of its own since 1999. Many 
of the pressures faced by Scottish universities are shared across the UK, and much of the 
political agenda has been set by London. Yet with regard to tuition fees, Holyrood has 
chosen an alternative path to that of Westminster. Neither up-front tuition fees nor the 
second step of variable fees with deferred repayment has found any resonance north of the 
border. In 2003, the second coalition agreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
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pledged not to introduce the top-up fees which was now on the agenda in Westminster: all 
parties in Scotland were opposed to the course of the Labour government in London 
(Keating 2005a:431). Rejecting tuition fees had been a statement of free higher education; 
the endowment was not a fee but a gesture of solidarity between richer and poorer 
students. However, there was widespread concern that the regime was not working as 
intended. Only a small proportion of students from low-income families were exempted 
from paying the £2,000 endowment. Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the scale only a 
small number of students paid the endowment directly: most chose to pay alongside their 
student loan, meaning that the endowment fund remained stagnant. To neutral observers it 
was not obvious that the Scottish model was more socially progressive than a system of 
rigidly means-tested tuition fees; neither did it bring the extra funds to universities which 
had been at the core of the debate in England (Woodhall and Richards 2008:194-95). 
The combined assessment of these aspects of the graduate endowment led to the 
next dramatic turn in the fees saga in Scotland: on 28 February 2008 Holyrood ratified 
legislation initiated by the SNP government abolishing the endowment altogether.4 At this 
stage, the government leant on the support of the Liberal Democrats, while Labour and the 
Conservatives opposed abolition. According to the latter parties, an independent review 
would give a better foundation for reform. Abolishing the endowment would mean an 
increase in state expenses towards bursaries, which could lead to a reduction in government 
funding for teaching and research. Moreover, as the income stream from tuition fees 
remained closed in Scotland, the funding gap between Scottish and English universities was 
likely to increase over time. 
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IDEOLOGY, PARTY POLITICS AND THE ISSUE OF TUITION 
FEES 
Assessing tuition fees is difficult on the basis of a conventional left/right dimension. Free 
higher education provided by the state is a position recognisable from Scandinavian welfare 
states. Yet in liberal economies with a class bias in higher education and a clear career 
benefit from university degrees, tuition fees could be portrayed as progressive. The 
provision will be they are means-tested and that financial support is awarded to poorer 
students. In the English context it has thus been argued that free higher education implies 
that “the taxes of the hospital porter pay for the degree of the old Etonian” (Barr 2003:274). 
Rather than subsidising the middle class, is the argument, public services should be targeted 
towards the needy. However, the bias in recruitment is more pronounced in England than in 
Scotland, where the student population is larger in proportion and more equally distributed 
across class. Following this logic, one could argue that introducing means-tested tuition fees 
is a plausible centre-left strategy in England (although a risky one, given that Labour support 
also includes a considerable section of the middle class). In Scotland, meanwhile, higher 
education has acquired such a universal character that tuition fees would be damaging even 
to traditional supporters of the left (cf. Ansell 2008:190-91). 
There is clearly some validity in these predictions given the state of the English and 
Scottish educational systems and the class composition of party support. However, the 
realities of tuition fees reform are complex and cannot be projected from a crude 
assessment of winners and losers. First, higher education not only yields an individual 
benefit but also delivers required competence to the nation and could be perceived on this 
basis as worthy of public funding. Secondly, views about tuition fees are also part of a wider 
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debate concerning public services, where different welfare regimes provide contrasting 
criteria for what is politically and morally sustainable (Esping-Andersen 1996, Rothstein 
1998). For example, irrespective of whether free higher education is a privilege for the 
middle class, it may be seen as part of the collective responsibility for high-standard public 
services (Keating 2005b:458). Thirdly, the university sector itself could make the case for 
higher funding with far less concern for the cost allocation between students and the state 
(and between different categories of students). The question then becomes which party 
takes the universities’ side. 
 In the context of Westminster, Labour in government has been consistent promoters 
of fees for higher education alongside widening recruitment and strengthening research 
funding. The Conservative Party has since the mid-1990s differentiated itself from Labour in 
suggesting that public expenses to higher education should be reined in, university 
autonomy increased and further student expansion met with caution. However, firm policy 
commitments have been limited, and the party has since 2005 moved closer to Labour in 
accepting top-up fees and wider recruitment (O’Leary 2007:481). The Liberal Democrats 
have occupied a position slightly to Labour’s left on many issues of welfare provision and the 
public sector more generally (Russell 2005). The party was consistent in opposing fees and 
has promoted higher education free at the point of use, with a higher rate of income tax to 
cover the deficit in university funding. In the 2010 election manifesto, the commitment to 
abolition of fees was watered down due to the fiscal consequences of recession. 
Behind these UK-wide cleavages there are divisions that are particular in Scotland. 
Scottish education policy balances between separation from the London agenda and a 
number of shared developments, such as the rise of management ideals and tightening 
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constraints on public funds (Gillies 2008:86-87). Disagreement on education policy has been 
more abrasive in the past: Labour saw education as a battleground for egalitarianism and 
social justice while the Conservative Party was the party for selection, individual ambition 
and institutional autonomy. In Scottish Labour, the self-perception is one of radicalism and 
authenticity in implicit contrast to the statewide party. In practice, this differentiation has 
only had minor policy consequences (Hassan 2004). The Scottish Conservatives have 
obtained enhanced autonomy within the party since 1997 and have worked to develop a 
Scottish dimension to Conservatism, more communitarian and conscious of the more 
collectivist orientation north of the border (Lynch 2003). The Scottish Liberal Democrats 
have taken the role as defenders of meritocracy, protective of the public sector but more 
permissive than Labour of local autonomy and variation. Readily installed as a federal party 
prior to devolution, the Liberal Democrats have opted for decentralised decision making and 
tight communication between the Scottish and Welsh branches (Bradbury 2006). In 
Scotland, the SNP has been located within the broad Lib-Lab consensus in education policy, 
adding its own flavour by relating collectivist solutions to a distinct Scottish patriotism 
(Gillies 2008:84-86). The next section of the article looks closer at how parties have argued 
for their positions in parliamentary debates over tuition fees in Westminster and Holyrood. 
 
 IDEAS IN CONTEXT: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES IN 
WESTMINSTER AND HOLYROOD 
The parliamentary debates over tuition fees offer useful comparative data, as comparison 
can be drawn over time, between parties and between the statewide parties in London and 
the subnational party branches in Scotland. The intention with the empirical analysis was to 
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map the arguments applied within each of the legislatures in relation to tuition fees. This 
was done by way of qualitative content analysis, a method which strikes a middle way 
between two of the most widely used methods for textual analysis; quantitative content 
analysis and discourse analysis (cf. Hardy et al. 2004). Quantitative content analysis is 
conducted by measuring the frequencies of relevant words or phrases in carefully defined 
texts (Krippendorf 2004). Counting and comparing implies that meaning is seen as constant 
and detached from context; while this method results in high reliability, validity may suffer 
as structures that guide how ideas are communicated and received in a given context are left 
in the dark (Bergström and Boréus 2000:78-84). On the opposite side, in discourse analysis, 
counting is discouraged and texts are primarily approached as part of a larger body of 
cultural practice (Fairclough 2003). Although discourse analysis has considerable virtues, 
reliability is one of its weaker points. Indeed, discourse analysts have often taken care to 
distance themselves from criteria such as validity and reliability by contending that empirical 
research is an inherently interpretive exercise.5 
Qualitative content analysis seeks to avoid the limitations of both these approaches 
to text. Ideas or arguments rather than specific words or phrases are registered. Moreover, 
their frequency is only one aspect of the analysis; just as important is a careful assessment of 
why given ideas are significant and how they match established patterns in a wider historical 
context. Typical data may be political debates where all parties involved draw upon inherited 
ideological positions which form the basis for addressing new political issues. For the present 
analysis of debates on tuition fees, the coding proceeded from a preliminary reading of 
transcripts from the relevant parliamentary exchanges in Westminster and Holyrood. From 
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this initial study, I constructed an analytical scheme summarising the dominant arguments. 
Eight significant themes were found to be prevalent (Table 5.1): 
 
Table 5.1: Dominant themes in parliamentary debates over tuition fees 
 Theme Typical argument(s) in debates 
1 Social justice and 
recruitment of poor students 
The proposal marks a significant step forward in recognising the 
needs of students from poor families. 
2 Attraction to all students The new funding arrangements will make it more difficult to 
attract students across the social scale. 
3 University needs The higher education sector is in urgent need of funds for 
teaching and research to maintain their standards. 
4 Higher education as 
individual investment 
A university degree is an investment towards future job and 
income. 
5 Implications for welfare 
state 
Charging tuition fees is another step towards the marketisation 
of public services / We should (should not) fund higher 
education from general taxation / Student support should 
(should not) be universal in kind. 
6 Implications for universities Tuition fees will enhance the requested autonomy/flexibility for 
universities / Fees will aggravate the distinction between first- 
and second-class universities 
7 Effectiveness of 
arrangement 
Too much money will be lost in administering the system / 
Tuition fees are the most effective way of raising funds. 
8 Scottish distinctiveness Scotland has its own tradition of education and welfare / 
Devolution gives the opportunity to chart a separate course 
from London. 
 
 
This framework was then applied to map the arguments in the most significant 
parliamentary debates preceding each piece of legislation. In Westminster, these were the 
second readings of the Teaching and Higher Education Act (16 March 1998) and Higher 
Education Bill (27 January 2004). In Scotland, the equivalent debates were on the Graduate 
Endowment Bill (27 January 2000) and the Graduate Endowment Abolition Bill (28 February 
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2008).6 To exemplify how the analytical scheme was applied, consider the following 
statement by Paul Holmes, Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament (MP) for Chesterfield, in 
the Westminster debate on 27 January 2004: 
 
Variable fees will deter low-income students. Even more important, as many 
Members have said, variable fees will mean that students who go to university will 
not make choices based on their academic ability—as they should—but on their 
ability to pay. They will attend the cheaper universities. 
 
In this textual segment two arguments were coded: the negative effect on recruitment of 
poor students (1) and the negative implications for universities (6) in encouraging a two-tier, 
hierarchical system. The aggregate results from the coding of arguments from the debates 
are shown below (table 5.2). The arguments which were categorised through this process 
cover the thrust of the debates. Significantly, all categories (with the possible exception of 
the fees-supportive statement that education is an individual investment (4)) were plausible 
both in favour of and in opposition to tuition fees. A Labour representative would, for 
example, be able to argue for the introduction (or increase) of tuition fees by emphasising 
that students from poorer families would not have to pay. This is important, as the analysis 
aimed to highlight which themes were dominant rather than which parties were for or 
against the principle of fees, which has already been reviewed above. What is quintessential 
there is to what values and priorities arguments from each of the parties were related. 
Moreover, the analysis aims to consider whether there are systematic differences between 
parliamentarians in Westminster and their party colleagues in Holyrood. 
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Table 5.2: Allocation of arguments: parliamentary debates in Westminster (1998/2004) 
and Holyrood (2000/2008) on the issue of tuition fees 
   Labour Cons Lib Dems SNP7 Total 
1 
Social justice and 
recruitment of 
poor students 
Westminster 34% (45) 
19,5% 
(22) 
14% 
(8) N/A 
25% 
(75) 
Holyrood 34,5% (20) 
8% 
(2) 
28% 
(10) 
24,5% 
(15) 
26% 
(47) 
 W/H difference  -0,5 11 -14  -1 
2 Attraction to all students 
Westminster 24% (32) 
18,5% 
(21) 
23% 
(13) N/A 
22% 
(66) 
Holyrood 24% (14) 
36% 
(9) 
33% 
(12) 
29,5% 
(18) 
29% 
(53) 
 W/H difference  0 -17,5 -10  -7 
3 
University needs 
(more funds to 
maintain quality) 
Westminster 19% (25) 
14% 
(16) 
17,5% 
(10) N/A 
17% 
(51) 
Holyrood 21% (12) 
24% 
(6) 
8% 
(3) 
1,5% 
(1) 
12% 
(22) 
 W/H difference  -2 -10 9,5  5 
4 
Higher education 
as individual 
investment/ 
benefit 
Westminster 6% (8) 
9% 
(10) 
5% 
(3) N/A 
7% 
(21) 
Holyrood 5% (3) 
4% 
(1) 
0% 
(0) 
0% 
(0) 
2% 
(4) 
 W/H difference  1 5 5  5 
5 
Implications for 
welfare state 
(taxation, 
targeting etc.) 
Westminster 9,5% (13) 
9% 
(10) 
17,5% 
(10) N/A 
11% 
(33) 
Holyrood 7% (4) 
16% 
(4) 
14% 
(5) 
28% 
(17) 
16,5% 
(30) 
 W/H difference  2,5 -7 3,5  5,5 
6 
Implications for 
universities 
(autonomy, 
flexibility etc.) 
Westminster 6,5% (9) 
17,5% 
(20) 
8,5% 
(5) N/A 
11% 
(34) 
Holyrood 3,5% (2) 
4% 
(1) 
0% 
(0) 
0% 
(0) 
1,5% 
(3) 
 W/H difference  3 13,5 8,5  9,5 
7 Effectiveness of fees arrangement 
Westminster 1% (1) 
12,5% 
(14) 
14% 
(8) N/A 
7,5% 
(23) 
Holyrood 1,5% (1) 
0% 
(0) 
0% 
(0) 
3% 
(2) 
1,5% 
(3) 
 W/H difference  -0,5 12,5 14  6 
8 Scottish distinctiveness 
Westminster N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Holyrood 3,5% (2) 
8% 
(2) 
17% 
(6) 
13% 
(8) 
10% 
(18) 
 SUM  100% (133+58) 
100% 
(113+25) 
100% 
(57+36) 
100% 
(61) 
100 % 
(303+180) 
 Average difference  1,4 10,9 9,2  5,6 
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General empirical patterns 
As reflected in table 5.2, there are a few general differences between the debates in 
Westminster and Holyrood which should be noted. First, while the Westminster debates 
were particularly concerned with the recruitment of poor students (1), arguments in 
Holyrood were more oriented towards the attraction of all students (2). Protecting poor 
students from the burden of fees was a dominant theme in Westminster: in Holyrood, the 
debate was more about protecting the student population as such. Moreover, the 
Westminster debates placed a larger emphasis on the implications for universities in terms 
of autonomy, flexibility etc. (6). Here, the concern for competitiveness, within Britain and 
beyond, was a much more visible feature in Westminster. Another theme where 
Westminster initially scored higher was university funding (3), but this argument rose to 
equal prominence in the second of the two debates in Holyrood when it was grasped by 
Labour and the Conservatives. Finally, in Scotland, the implications for the welfare state (5) 
were a prevalent theme, due to the recurring reference to free public services among the 
ranks of Liberal Democrats and Scottish Nationalists.8 
 With regard to developments over time, there are further interesting patterns to 
observe. In the Westminster debates, Labour MPs reduced the overwhelming emphasis on 
student welfare in the 1998 debate to delve more into the consequences for the university 
sector in 2004. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats conduct a shift of focus from 
poor students to all students, encouraged by the effects of variable fees on students from 
the middle class. In Holyrood, there is a movement over time both among Labour and 
Conservative MSPs from student welfare to the needs of the university sector (thus echoing 
Labour development in Westminster). The Liberal Democrats and the SNP, meanwhile, 
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moved towards a stronger focus towards implications for the welfare state and the 
underlying philosophy of public services. 
 In order to measure development over time, the parliamentary debates could be 
paired, comparing 1998 vs. 2000 and 2004 vs. 2008. The results in terms of internal party 
differences are similar to the aggregate pattern of table 5.2, with the partial exception of the 
Liberal Democrats where the Westminster/Holyrood contrast was greater in 1998/2000.9 It 
should be noted that the debates do not fully correspond since rather different proposals for 
student payment were debated on each of the occasions. The contrast in proposed 
legislation is largest in the second pair of debates; while the bill in Westminster in 2004 
concerned extending tuition fees, in Holyrood four years later the issue was about abolishing 
the graduate endowment. Nevertheless, it is possible with some caution to draw a set of 
observations about broader developments in the debates. Seemingly, the focus on attracting 
all students across social class has become more widely shared by the two legislatures. This 
is reflected in the shift of focus in Westminster from poor students in 1998 to all students in 
2004, closing the gap with debates in Holyrood where wide access has been consistently 
emphasised. Moreover, the issue of implications for universities has become a more widely 
shared concern over time, and here it is the exchange in Holyrood which has caught up with 
an established pattern in Westminster. Overall, the pattern is one of modest convergence in 
the focus of debates if one compares 1998/2000 with 2004/2008. This is a significant finding 
which could reflect that as devolution comes of age, maturity entails similar focus and 
awareness about shared challenges. The financial state of the university sector is an obvious 
example of concerns which are shared by parliamentarians in Westminster and Holyrood 
alike. 
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Comparing the parties 
Overall, the Labour groups in Westminster and Holyrood are considerably more consistent 
than their Conservative and Liberal Democrat counterparts with regard to thematic focus. 
Labour MPs and MSPs score high on recruitment of poor students and on university funding, 
and relatively high on attraction to all students: on all three accounts, the proportion is 
remarkably stable in each of the two legislatures. 
 
Labour 
The leading party in Westminster throughout the period and in Holyrood until the 2007 
election, Labour has played an essential part in the debates over tuition fees from 1997 
onwards. Labour stands out as the party with the most consistent focus on poor students. 
Arguments about the recruitment of students from low-income families were the main line 
of defence in both the first and second phase of tuition fees reforms in Westminster: 
meanwhile, it was also the focus of the attacks against the reforms from the party’s back 
benches. In Holyrood, Labour’s parliamentary group defended the proposed graduate 
endowment in 2000 and voted against its abolition in 2008, on both occasion without 
internal dissent. For all the differences between the debates, categorisation of the 
arguments applied by Labour MPs and MSPs shows a remarkable convergence in what 
priorities were claimed to matter most to the party: the effect on wider recruitment of 
students. A typical example of the progressive case for student payment was raised by 
Malcolm Chisholm, Labour Member of Holyrood (MSP) for Edinburgh North and Leith, who 
stated in the debate on 27 January 2000: 
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Labour has the primary objective of widening access to higher education, in particular 
for those from low-income backgrounds who would not have gone to university in the 
past. This is the point that people who praise the old funding arrangements should 
remember. Those arrangements did not deliver that wider access for students from 
low-income backgrounds. I am, therefore, delighted that today's package restores a 
measure of grant to such students. That is the best thing about the package. 
 
Apart from the concern for wider recruitment, Labour’s position as governing party is 
reflected in arguments about university finances; the introduction of fees is portrayed by 
MPs as the difficult, but right decision for the longer term. References were also made to the 
goal of attracting all students (thus evading the focus on low-income background), but on 
this argument, Labour parliamentarians were outnumbered by Conservative and Liberal 
counterparts. Interestingly, only rarely did arguments concern the significance of universal 
welfare provision: Labour arguments in favour of the graduate endowment (Holyrood) and 
either in favour of or opposing tuition fees (Westminster) focused upon the effect on 
widening recruitment. In Westminster, some reference was made to wider issues of the 
welfare state. Lynne Jones, MP for Birmingham Selly Oak, exemplified this focus when she 
stated in the 1998 debate: 
 
What is wrong with returning to the principle of a progressive taxation system that 
pays for the welfare state? I do not accept the argument, which grew over the 
Thatcher years, that we cannot afford the welfare state. We are a far richer country 
than we were when the welfare state was established. Productivity has increased and 
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our national wealth has grown. If we do not pay through taxation, we have to pay by 
some other means. 
 
Labour arguments overall reveal an overall consistency in focus, across time and between 
the two legislatures. However, it must be acknowledged that shared priorities do not 
necessarily entail corresponding political views. A concern with social justice could imply 
support or opposition to the proposed legislation in Westminster: one may note, for 
example, the statement by the Secretary of State, Charles Clarke preceding the 2003 debate, 
where social justice and university funding were the two recurrent themes. The analysis of 
Labour shows that centre-left arguments are located in similar categories across the 
territorial divide. The empirical substance, however, has diverged increasingly over the 
decade passed since devolution. 
 
The Conservative Party 
Interestingly, the Conservative Party shows a much larger difference than Labour between 
arguments raised in each of the legislatures. In Westminster, recruitment of poor students, 
attraction to all students, university finances and the wider implications for the university 
sector all received considerable attention in the debates. Meanwhile, in Holyrood, less focus 
was directed towards recruitment of poor students and more towards the general attraction 
to students and the (increasingly difficult) state of university finances. The latter point was 
particularly prevalent in the 2008 debate, where it was the dominant reason that the 
Conservatives rejected the SNP’s abolition of the graduate endowment. What the 
Conservative Party and Labour both requested was a committee of inquiry to consider the 
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future financial state of Scottish universities in the new competitive environment with 
England. 
Conservative arguments about the implications for universities were much more 
prevalent in Westminster. To a large extent this concerned the insufficient freedom for 
universities. Reference was made to the American experience with “a great variety in the 
quality, level and types of higher education” driven by autonomous universities operating in 
a market system”.10 A similar pattern of party arguments was found in the debate over the 
Higher Education Act 2004. According to Tim Yeo, MP for South Suffolk and Shadow 
Education and Health Secretary, nobody were to “fantasise that the Bill opens a door to 
more independence for universities; it does precisely the opposite. It brings all universities 
under tighter political control than ever before. It will inflict damage on our universities, 
including those that aspire to be world class.” 
 In Westminster, attention was shared between poorer students and the concern for 
all students; there was a move between the 1998 to the 2004 debate, where the burden of 
payment on the middle class would be larger. Conservative MPs were now concerned with 
the squeeze of the middle classes, who were neither poor enough to be helped by the grants 
being introduced nor wealthy enough to rely upon family aid. In Holyrood, by contrast, the 
concern for all students rather than a focus on the poorer section was consistent in 
Conservative arguments throughout the 2000 and 2008 debates. The party also drew in 
doubt the effectiveness of the regime, arguing that too much money would be spoilt in the 
bureaucracy and loan arrangements. Enhanced autonomy was again the key Conservative 
concept to restore the excellence of English universities. 
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The Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrats have been the most consistent of the three statewide parties in its 
opposition against tuition fees and arguments for improving university’s dire financial state 
through a higher rate of income tax. Arguments were neatly distributed between concerns 
for low-income students and for those from the middle class. The Liberal Democrats were 
portrayed as the party of students and of a traditional approach to the welfare state. This 
position could easily be extended to a concern for public services more generally. At the 
time of the second reform in Westminster, it could thus be argued that variable fees would 
introduce yet another step in the alleged marketisation of public services. According to Phil 
Willis, Liberal Democrat MP for Harrogate and Knaresborough: 
 
We all know that the Bill is not simply about higher education—the Prime Minister 
has been at pains to point that out. It is about changing the way in which this country 
pays for its public services. That is at the heart of it. The Bill is stage one of a process 
that will see responsibility for paying for child care, transport, and health and social 
care shift from general taxation to the individual. 
 
Interestingly, the question of university finances was consistently underplayed by the Liberal 
Democrats in debates in Holyrood. Similarly, implications for the universities were not a 
prevalent issue of concern. Liberal arguments in both legislatures related to the need to 
protect students and the pernicious consequences of marketised higher education. In 
Holyrood, this was combined with an emphasis on the need to strike a separate Scottish 
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path. Partly, this was justified as a way to render justice to subnational autonomy, partly to 
defy the perceived neoliberalism of the Labour government in London.  
 
Scottish distinctiveness 
In debates in Holyrood, the Liberal Democrats were alone among the three statewide parties 
in emphasising Scottish distinctiveness. According to this line of thought, it was Edinburgh’s 
mandate to opt for a different policy than London in line with the path assigned by Scottish 
history and the will of its people. Conservative MSPs were unwilling to apply this argument, 
and in Labour it took the cautious form of designing Scottish solutions in line with its special 
needs. However, where Scottish distinctiveness is given its most effective form is, not 
unexpectedly, in the rhetoric of Scottish Nationalists. In the debate preceding the abolition 
of the graduate endowment in January 2008, Bill Wilson, SNP MSP for West of Scotland: 
 
If most Scots or MSPs were asked what Scots can be most proud of and what marks 
us out above all else, I believe that they would say "Education." Scotland was the first 
nation to introduce comprehensive education. It had four universities by 1583 and 
free education for 100 years. What became of that proud heritage? It was 
squandered by new Labour and the first two Scottish Executives. A hundred years of 
free education was replaced by education for a price, and 100 years of access for all 
was replaced by education for the wealthy. A hundred years of principle was 
abandoned by New Labour. Today we can reclaim the proud traditions of Scotland 
and return to the fundamental principles of free education. 
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Over the last decades, a reconstruction of Scottish political identity has appeared which 
integrates Scottish distinctiveness with opposition to allegedly neoliberal politics originating 
in London (Keating 2005b:458). Whether or not this distinction between London and 
Edinburgh stands up to scrutiny in policy terms, it has certainly had an impact on the identity 
construction and political rhetoric promoted within Holyrood (Mooney et al. 2008). It comes 
as little surprise that the SNP is the party most willing to integrate higher education into a 
broader narrative about its political project. In its perception of a social democratic contract 
with the Scottish people, the SNP links the ambition of social justice to Scottish 
independence as the fulfilment of Scotland’s political identity (Scott and Mooney 2009:381-
82). Interestingly, the Liberal Democrats, the only of the three statewide parties with a fully 
federalised structure consisting of England, Scotland and Wales, are also more comfortable 
with the idea of territorial divergence between the constituent parts of Britain. This has 
been confirmed by the party’s policy and coalition strategies since 1999. To Labour, policy 
divergence is less of a virtue. As illustrated by the debates in Westminster and Holyrood, 
there is considerable agreement on what matters are most important to the party (such as 
the consequences for students from low-income families). To Labour, the issue at stake is 
not what values should be prioritised in each constituent territory, but rather how 
divergence can be delimited and contained to serve the purpose of overall cohesiveness. The 
Conservative Party hovers between these contrasting positions on devolution, 
uncomfortable with policy divergence but willing in practice to adapt its arguments and 
strategy to the political context. 
That context, it should be noted, is different between London and Edinburgh. In 
Holyrood, the most significant feature of the decisive debates of 2000 and 2008 is the 
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remarkable consensus on the aims for Scottish higher education; the key division in the 
debates in 2000 and in 2008 ran between Labour and the SNP and concerned what 
measures would be most effective in ensuring access for students from all classes. This 
reflects a dynamic in Scotland where social inclusion and redistribution are increasingly  
central to the political rhetoric of both Labour and the SNP, the two leading forces in 
Scottish politics post-devolution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Policy divergence could be seen as an inevitable consequence of autonomy; in Scotland and 
Wales, diverging policies since 1999 include areas such as health (Greer 2004), education 
(Keating 2005a) and housing (Stirling and Smith 2002).  Divergence is a genuine product of 
subnational politics, where different political majorities cause different policy outcomes 
within the state borders. Any political party operating in this context confronts the task of 
coordinating positions and ensuring that unity of purpose is maintained (Deschouwer 2006). 
The entrenchment of centralisation in a context of subnational legislatures would go against 
the dynamic of territorial reform and could be electorally counterproductive. Meanwhile, 
autonomy cannot be stretched too far, for reasons of (ideological and organisational) 
cohesiveness as well as the implications for public policy. 
 In the area of higher education policy, devolution has given political clout to a 
Scottish distinctiveness in higher education which has been latent for centuries but lacked 
decision-making powers (McCrone 2008). Given its symbolic significance as a debate on 
public services, the issue of tuition fees is also useful to analyse the wider implications of 
subnational autonomy. Scottish autonomy has indeed been accommodated in different 
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ways by each of the statewide parties. Labour faces the classic dilemma of social democratic 
parties on the question of territorial reforms (Keating 2004). How should social justice and 
redistribution be operationalised when politics is devolved from the nation state? 
Interestingly, in the case of higher education, Labour has acknowledged diverging 
preferences across regions yet maintained a consistent thematic focus, highlighting the 
situation for poorer students and the need for government intervention. The Conservative 
Party reflects the pragmatic adaptability where concerns, values and strategies shift with 
political context but the loyalty towards the broad middle class is maintained. The Liberal 
Democrats, finally, are the most explicit champions of diversity within a federalised Britain. 
This is also the party where Scottish distinctiveness finds its natural place.  
What are the longer-term effects for public policy when subnational legislatures are 
created? Interestingly, in the British case, while polices on tuition fees have diverged since 
devolution, the focus of parliamentary debates has converged over time. Student 
recruitment across class and implications for universities (funding and flexibility) are themes 
which appear to be increasingly shared by parliamentarians in Westminster and Holyrood. 
This is the paradox of subnational autonomy: while policies diverge, the concerns and 
thematic foci are increasingly similar. Convergence reflects an acknowledgement that 
London and Edinburgh are faced with shared challenges and constraints. Moreover, these 
shared challenges also generate the expectation that on tuition fees, converging policies will 
also (re)emerge. Different regimes for tuition fees represent a challenge both to users and 
providers of public services. Difficulties are created for student mobility, as different fees 
arrangements now exist for students crossing the internal borders between England, 
Scotland and Wales. Moreover, financial equity is under attack as English universities race 
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away with the aid of income from fees (Newall 2008, Trench 2008). Under the prevailing 
fiscal arrangements, Scotland receives less public funds from London by default as financing 
of higher education in England becomes less and less a responsibility for the public purse 
(Keating 2005a:433). Whatever the outcome of this development, the tuition fees debacle 
shows that parties have an essential role to play in managing divergence. Arguably, the 
integrative function of parties is relevant on two different dimensions: maintaining their own 
cohesiveness as statewide organisations and ensuring consistency between policies in 
constituent parts of the state. Britain is a case where these challenges are likely to increase 
in a harsher financial climate: more reflection, academic and political, will thus be required 
in the years to come. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 In Wales, the power to decide on tuition fees was only devolved to the Welsh Assembly in 2004. Thereafter, 
fees were first abolished then reintroduced in 2005 but in a sharply modified form which includes a universal 
grant to all Welsh students in Wales covering about two-thirds of the fee. The trajectory in Wales will not be 
further analysed in this article. 
2 Deferred repayment implies that loans are offered at zero interest rate (controlled for inflation), with 
repayment commencing once the graduate has reached a basic threshold, then calculated as a percentage of 
the salary and subsiding after a given number of years (e.g. 25), if the entire loan has not been repaid. The 
alternative to this subsidised loan arrangement is a regular mortgage-type loan with fixed term payments. 
3 The five SNP and 10 Liberal Democrat MPs voted against the bill, as did five Labour MPs and the independent 
George Galloway. Three Labour MPs, including Robin Cook, abstained. See ‘Scots MPs attacked over fees vote’, 
BBC 27 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/3432767.stm accessed on 14 December 
2009. The 72 Labour representatives who voted against the Second Reading of the bill equalled the largest 
second-reading rebellion on a bill by government MPs since the Second World War (Cowley and Stuart 
2005:23). 
4 See ‘MSPs vote to scrap endowment fee’, BBC online 28 February 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/7268101.stm accessed on 11 December 2009. 
5 See Bevir and Rhodes (2002) for a useful summary and Angen (2000) for a critical review of this position. 
6 Parliamentary Hansard from Westminster was accessed on 6 February 2010 at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980316/debtext/80316-09.htm and 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040127/debtext/40127-06.htm#40127-
06_head1. Parliamentary report from the Scottish Parliament was accessed on 8 February 2010 at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/officialReports/meetingsParliament/or-00/or040601.htm and 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/officialreports/meetingsparliament/or-08/sor0228-
02.htm#Col6487. 
7 SNP arguments from Westminster are omitted due to the limited number of interventions by its MPs. 
8 The effectiveness of tuition fees in raising funds (7) was more debated in Westminster, certainly as an 
argument against Labour’s proposed legislation. However, effectiveness was also a central part of SNP’s case 
for abolishing the fees. In the 2008 debate, it was prevalent in the ministerial statement by Fiona Hyslop 
(Cabinet Secretary for Education and Lifelong Learning) preceding the debate. 
9 Comparing the 1998 vs. 2000 debates, the average Westminster/Holyrood difference in frequency of 
arguments is 4,7 for Labour, 14,5 for the Conservative Party and 14,7 for the Liberal Democrats. Similar 
numbers for the 2004 vs. 2008 debates were 3,1 for Labour, 15,7  for the Conservative Party and 6,9  for the 
Liberal Democrats. The tables are not included in the article due to the limited space available. 
10 Robert Jakcson, Conservative MP for Wantage, 16 March 1998. 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: PARTY OFFICIALS (ARTICLE 1) 
LONDON/EDINBURGH/CARDIFF (JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2008) 
Purpose: gain information about allocation of powers (and changes in these over time) with 
regard to (i) candidate selection, (ii) the formulation of electoral manifestos and (iii) funding 
of electoral campaigns in the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales of 1999, 2003 and 
2007. [Note: differences over time, differences between Scotland and Wales] 
 
General issues 
1. On a dimension between centralisation on the one hand and stratarchy or 
decentralisation at the opposite extreme, where would you say that the party is 
placed today? (Where would you place your party as compared with the two other 
dominant parties?) 
2. To what extent has there been a change over time along this dimension? If such 
change has occurred, how is this to be explained? 
3. To what extent has federalisation of the party been a necessary consequence of 
devolution? 
4. Would you agree that being in government in Westminster and/or Edinburgh and 
Cardiff is decisive to how distribution of power within the party has occurred? 
5. To what extent has the party adapted over time to a devolved Britain? In the distribution 
of tasks and responsibilities between London and the devolved parties, are any general 
changes discernible between the elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007? 
 
Candidate selection 
Constituency candidates 
1. To what extent has control over candidate selection been considered important by 
the party in London? 
2. Is candidate selection, with regard to individual MSP/AMs today strictly an issue for 
the devolved parties?  
3. Are candidate selection procedures for prospective MSPs and the AMs different from 
those regarding Scottish and Welsh MPs? 
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4. Have these procedures changed over time, i.e. in the period 1999-2003-2007? 
5. Are there differences in how this has been handled in the Scottish and Welsh parties? 
If so, is this due to the regional parties themselves or subject to central command? 
 Nomination through screening to approved list 
 Short-listing in constituency (selection committee?) 
 Selection (executive committee or plenary OMOV?) 
6. Where twinning of constituencies has been conducted, to what extent has this been 
conceived as a problem by the devolved parties?  
List candidates 
7. Have the arrangements for selecting list candidates changed over time? Are these the 
same in Scotland and Wales? 
 
8. When and if list candidates have been decided upon by a committee from the 
national level, to what extent has this caused tension in the devolved parties? 
9. With regard to candidate selection, on the dimension from centralisation to 
stratarchy, where would you place the party? (1-5) Compared with the other parties? 
 
Formulation of electoral manifestos 
10. Who is responsible for drafting the manifesto, and who holds the power of 
ratification? 
11. To what extent is the full membership involved in this process? 
12. Are there differences between Scotland and Wales in these respects? 
13. To what extent does the formulation of devolved election manifestos differ from the 
process prior to (UK-wide) general elections? 
14. On the dimension from centralisation to stratarchy, where would you place the party 
today? 
15. Has there been any change over time in how the formulation of manifestos for 
devolved elections is organised? 
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Funding of electoral campaigns 
16. How are the devolved parties financed? To what extent are they subject to 
centralised funding from London? [buildings, personnel…] 
17. How are campaigns financed in the individual constituency? 
18. For Scottish and Welsh constituencies, are these procedures the same for devolved 
elections as they are for general elections? 
19. With regard to manifesto formulation, on the dimension from centralisation to 
stratarchy, where would you place the party? 
20. Has there been any change over time in how electoral campaigns are financed? 
21. To what extent do these arrangements differ from how English constituencies finance 
electoral campaigns? 
 
 
Party culture, ideas and pragmatism 
22. Back in 1999, how prepared would you say that your party was to decentralise power 
to its branches in Scotland and Wales? 
23. To what extent would you say that the response of your party to devolution has been 
guided by an explicit consideration of the distribution of power between the national 
and devolved levels – as opposed to pragmatic adaptation? 
24. What is the role of the ideological heritage of the party in this respect? 
25. To what extent do you feel that your party differs from the other two in terms of how 
devolution has been handled? How do you explain this contrast? 
26. Is there a sense of stability in terms of how devolution should be handled within the 
party? Is the 1999-2007period recognised by consolidation or a sustained potential 
for change? 
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APPENDIX 3 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: WELSH AMs AND MPs (ARTICLE 2) 
CARDIFF + TELEPHONE (SPRING 2008) 
Purpose: gain information about infrastructure for interaction – individually between AMs 
and MPs sharing constituency and party affiliation as well as collectively between Assembly 
and Westminster parliamentary groups. Moreover, investigate whether there is a perceived 
difference of focus and prestige between AMs and MPs and whether cross-level interaction 
through the party is seen as satisfactory today. 
 
General issues 
1. In your view, how has the party in general responded to devolution over the last 
decade? 
2.  To what extent have relations within the party changed over time, between the 
Welsh party and London? 
3. In your view, how has the party’s traditional policy towards devolution affected the 
internal relations between London and the Welsh branch since 1999? 
4. Has the party’s territorial organisation prior to 1999 affected how the structures for 
interaction between AM/MP arrangements have developed? 
5. How do these debates affect your work in the constituency and the relationship with 
your AM/MP counterpart? 
 
AM/MP dynamic 
6. With regard to the parliamentarians, what relationship has emerged between the 
MPs and the AMs, formally and informally? 
7. What collective arrangements have been created for policy exchange between the 
parliamentary groups in Westminster and the Assembly? 
8. On an individual basis, how are tasks distributed between yourself and the Assembly 
Member from your own constituency? 
9. On a practical note, how are constituency tasks distributed between the two 
parliamentarians in your constituency? Do you share an office there, and/or do you 
hold common surgeries? 
10. Is there a potential for rival interests in how tasks and attention are distributed, or do 
you simply see a common interest in promoting the party? 
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11. In what ways does your role as parliamentary representative differ from your AM/MP 
counterpart? 
12. To what extent does the AM/MP dynamic differ in a constituency where they are 
both from the same party as compared with one where they have different party 
affiliations? 
 
Focus and prestige 
13. Do you see any systematic difference between an AM and an MP in the way your 
constituency role is weighted against other parliamentary priorities (party political 
role, regional/national issues, sectional interests...)?  
14. What do you see as the key differences between the way an AM and an MP operates 
in the Assembly/in Parliament? 
15. On a collective level, are there any systematic differences (values, priorities) in your 
view between the parliamentary groups? 
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APPENDIX 4 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: PARTY OFFICIALS AND MPs 
(ARTICLE 3) 
LONDON/EDINBURGH/GLASGOW + TELEPHONE                       
(NOVEMBER 2008-MARCH 2009) 
Purpose: gain information about allocation of powers (and changes in these over time) with 
regard to (i) candidate selection, (ii) the formulation of electoral manifestos and (iii) funding 
and organisation of electoral campaigns for EP elections since the reforms to regional 
constituencies and the parallel creation of Scottish and Welsh legislatures in 1999. Examine 
the balance between subnational, national and European level of decision making, including 
process towards policy initiatives in the EP. [Note: what differences between Scotland/Wales 
and other electoral regions?] 
 
PARTY OFFICIALS: 
Candidate selection 
1. How are prospective MEPs for the party selected? 
 Creation of list 
 Rank-ordering of list 
2. What is the role of Scottish and Welsh party branches in this process? 
3. What is the role of the statewide party? 
 
EP electoral manifestos 
4. Who participates in the process of developing the manifesto? Who holds the ultimate 
authority? 
5. How is the cooperation with the European party affiliation managed? 
6. Is there any scope for Scottish/Welsh deviation form the UK-wide manifesto? 
 
EP campaigns 
7. How are campaigns financed? 
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8. How are dominant messages formulated? To what extent are they generated or 
sanctioned by London? 
 
European policy development 
9. What is the role of MEPs in the party in general? 
10. What arrangements are provided for communication between MEPs and statewide 
party or subnational party branches? 
11. What arrangements are provided for communication with MPs or MSPs/AMs? 
12. What procedures (formal and non-formal) exist in the party with regard to the 
running policy processes in the EP? To what extent is there a commitment in the 
party to liaise with statewide or subnational party in the course of these processes? 
13. Are there conflicting logics within the party with regard to Edinburgh/Cardiff vs. 
London as MEPs’ line of command? 
14. Are MEPs given voting instructions at any time from either statewide or subnational 
party? 
15. In Scotland/Wales: does the perception of a regional bench in the EP have any 
resonance at all (shared interest across parties)? 
16. To the position of Scottish and Welsh MEPs, how important are regional 
representations in Brussels and the occasional participation of Scottish/Welsh 
ministers in the Council? 
 
MPs: 
17. What arrangements are provided (and what significance attached) for 
communication with the party’s MEPs? 
18. Is there a perception of Welsh and Scottish party branches by-passing Westminster in 
parliamentary work? 
19. How do Westminster and EP representative roles differ? To what extent do they also 
entail different relationships to the party (statewide and subnational)? 
20. To what extent is the EP perceived as an alternative career track? How does it differ 
in this regard compared with the subnational legislatures? 
21. Do you perceive regional constituencies for the EP a good thing for representative 
democracy? 
